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Introduction:  The Lingering Legacy of Republicanism
Our present bourgeois looks downward, sees the crowd mount behind him, as he has 
mounted, and does not like their aspiration; so recoils and fixes himself by the side of 
“the powers that be.” Does he frankly confess his retrograde tendencies to himself? 
Rarely.  His past life makes him shrink from it.  He almost always remains in this 
contradictory position: liberal by principle, selfish by habit, wishing and not wishing.  If 
there remains any of the Frenchman within to chide him, he appeases it by the reading of 
some innocently grumbling paper, pacifically warlike.
Most administrations, it must be owned, have speculated on this sad progression of 
fear, which, in the long run, is no other than the hastening of moral death.  They have 
thought the dead easier to deal with than the living.  –Jules Michelet, The People
The disillusionment attendant upon matriculation into graduate school in the 
humanities has become a cliché:  an idealistic young person who feels out of place in 
American culture attempts to retreat to the bosom of art and discovers that academia is 
not a place of refuge from consumer culture but an exacerbation of it—the same harried 
rush after money and advancement; the effacement of the personal in favor of the 
professional; all the egos and insecurities, the hierarchies and politics and bureaucracies. 
She looks in vain for the radicals and iconoclasts, for the people whose humanistic 
commitments supersede their devotion to personal security and advancement, whose 
independent thinking translates into alternative living.  Instead, she finds that academics 
serve an inexplicable but fierce god called “professionalization” who demands 
compulsive allegiance to the construction of the curriculum vitae and anxious 
obsequiousness to the scarce rewards of academic labor.  Although she had hoped to find 
herself among the dissenters, among those who valued art, critical thinking, humanistic 
living, and social activism and believed in the interconnectedness of all these things, she 
instead finds that graduate students are expected to be devoted to their careers and
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personal advancement—careers that will probably be unavailable to them regardless of 
their efforts, given the “crisis” of the profession, and that will certainly involve very little 
social activism and humanistic living even if they do materialize.
At first glance my description of the situation might seem to reflect the frustration 
that has subsisted in various forms between generalists and professionals—humanists and 
scholars—since the inception of the modern university at the close of the nineteenth 
century, and in some sense it is, since that argument is itself one manifestation of the 
larger cultural debate about the value and limitations of professionalization, a debate that 
tends to take on additional fervor within professions whose products and services might 
legitimately be taken to possess larger cultural significance. But ultimately I am less 
concerned about the fate and functions of literature than I am about the fate of those of us 
whose ideals are being undermined by departments that chose to confine themselves to 
such a narrow construal of the sociopolitical functions of the workplace. Arguably, the 
belief that the purpose of literary studies is less broadly cultural than narrowly historical 
need not have prevented any given professor in my department from taking a personal 
interest in me or my fellow students.  A commitment to the advancement of scholarship 
rather than the transformation of culture need not have prevented professors from
creating a more communal environment within the department nor from forming political 
lobbies or organizations to protest the corporatization of the academy and the pressure 
being put on its employees to abandon such activities.  Theoretically, it need not have 
prevented graduate students from doing the same; but after bracketing my clearly 
erroneous assumption that, whether scholars or humanists, people who had dedicated
their lives to the practice of critical analysis might be expected to turn that analysis on
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themselves in ways that had recognizable repercussions beyond their fields of 
specialization, I have become more aware of the extent to which would-be and actual 
professors are, in fact, simply middle-class professionals, products not only of the 
bourgeois liberal culture and the virtues of conformity, passivity, and self-involvement 
that it inevitably perpetuates but also of a particular moment within that system, one 
which had seen the extension of civil rights to women and minorities, witnessed the fall 
of communism and generated in its heirs an extreme suspicion—one in some sense 
always at the heart of middle-class culture—of anything that threatened to upset these 
achievements or to foster a suspiciously elitist nostalgia for escape from the confines of a 
system that postmodern culture and literary theory had dedicated itself to proving 
ineluctable.  It was also a moment in which increasing pressure on the middle-class had 
apparently made academics so anxious about their personal survival that they had little 
time for personal investment in their students, much less for resistance to the culture that 
was pressing them in this way.
“Anxiety forever haunts the bourgeois,” Isaac Kramnick reminds us (13).  As 
William Deresiewicz writes in a recent article for The Nation, academia has become “a 
microcosm of the American economy as a whole: a self-enriching aristocracy, a swelling 
and increasingly immiserated proletariat, and a shrinking middle class.” Deresiewicz 
doesn’t hesitate to blame the shrinking middle class, the tenured professoriate, for 
striking a “devil’s bargain” with the system, which allows it “to retain its prerogatives— 
its comfortable compensation packages, its workplace autonomy and its job security—in 
return for acquiescing to the exploitation of the bottom by the top, and indirectly, the 
betrayal of the future of the entire enterprise.” He closes his article by exhorting
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professors to “get of their backsides and organize” in order to protect their own dignity 
and the future of academia.  But how realistic is it to expect aggressive action out of the 
American middle class in response to anything other than a direct threat to its own 
security and financial interests, especially when it increasingly argues that the individual 
freedom with which liberalism attempts to invest it is a chimera—that it is just as 
enslaved to the system as the rest of us?  As Deresiewicz points out, something seems 
inherently hypocritical about a group of people who enjoy the “strongest speech 
protections in society” arguing that they have no voice or that their hands are tied, but a 
recent Facebook exchange with a fellow graduate student reminded me of the 
pervasiveness of this conviction of powerlessness among the academic middle-class, a 
conviction that seems to be endemic to middle-class liberals as a whole.  The professors I 
work with are “heavily invested in their graduated students’ well-being and career 
development,” my friend insisted, but unfortunately they too are victims of “systemic 
issues which position tenured professors as both the mentors and exploiters of graduate 
students”—systemic issues which one professor, he added, was obliging enough to 
commiserate about with him and his classmates when they first entered the program.
Although obviously an overwrought comparison, my friend’s willingness to 
sympathize and identify with the self-proclaimed impotence of his professor reminded 
me of Marx’ description of the petit bourgeoisie and proletariat’s self-defeating 
alignment with the bourgeois republicans during the overthrow of France’s July
Monarchy in 1848, an alignment that ultimately—so Marx argued—spelled defeat for the
Second Republic when republicans revealed their liberal ideology to be sold to the
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service of their financial interests.1   But as Katherine Auspitz argues in The Radical 
Bourgeoisie, the failure of the French revolution of 1848, which put an end to French 
hopes of uniting workers and bourgeoisie under a common political cause, failed to quell 
the efforts of some of the better-intentioned of the latter towards furthering social and 
civic advancements that “laid the foundations of the Third Republic in the 1860s and
1870s” (3).  “What do progressive people do when revolutions fail (as they so often do)
or when they succeed [at] most incompletely?” is that question that Auspitz thus attempts 
to answer (2).  For those of us who live in America, a better question might be (unless we 
consider the counter-cultural movement of the sixties to be a failed or incomplete 
revolution of sorts):  what do progressive people do when they want to make a difference 
but can’t quite muster the enthusiasm for a revolution?  Or more specifically, what
actions are open to progressive Americans in a culture that discourages sociopolitical 
activism, that attempts to confine its citizens to the late-capitalist roles of professionals 
and consumers?  |How do would-be progressives conduct themselves within a 
sociopolitical system that has at best only partially realized the ideals of liberté, égalité, 
fraternité and at worse has actually betrayed them—and how do they conduct themselves 
when the ideals themselves are suspect, and when all these considerations seem to 
supervene over the clear necessity of action?  Auspitz suggests that progressives’ failure 
to take radical political action on behalf of those who lack access to certain privileges 
(like, say, basic health care or a decent education) does not necessarily belie the sincerity 
of their commitment to behind-the-scenes social reform, and to a certain extent this is 
true; but this project is about attempting to understand what social and political options
are available to citizens in a culture that works to disenfranchise them not by denying
1Marx The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.
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them the right to vote but by convincing them that their vote comprises the sum total of 
their duty to the rest of humanity.
Of course, the underlying assumption of this project is that the middle class and 
the classes above it do have an obligation to those people in the classes below them, an 
obligation that goes beyond voting “left” in elections.  Determining how much and what 
kind of an obligation has always been the difficult point and sometimes the excuse for not 
doing anything at all, so in this project I want to look at a handful of works by middle- 
class novelists of a historical milieu very similar to ours who were concerned with the 
same question and who considered the novel an appropriate forum in which to answer it. 
These novelists were writing during the Gilded Age, at a time when Americans were
being forced to acknowledge national class disparities in ways that they never had before, 
disparities that bewildered a generation that had been “nurtured in the faith of Bunker
Hill and Appomatox, as the beginning and end of all possible progress in human 
rights” (Hazard 323-4).  Instead, “with the depression of 1873, and spreading 
unemployment, poverty, unrest and strikes in the following years, social contrasts reach 
a pitch without precedent in American life outside the slave South” (Trachtenberg 72).  
For perceptive members of the middle-class as well as those members of the working 
class who had bought into the free labor rhetoric of the Republican party before the Civil 
War, it was becoming increasingly difficult to believe that honest labor held out “some 
hope for workers of social and economic, as well as legal, equality” (Trachtenberg 76). 
Immigrants, African-Americans and poor people from the country where flooding into 
the cities and overflowing out of urban ghettos in ways that dismayed the middle class 
who felt their values—quintessential American values—to be under attack from both the
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rapacious hordes below them and the plundering robber barons and engulfing 
corporations above them.  William Dean Howells perhaps captured their feelings most 
acutely in his 1890 novel A Hazard of New Fortunes, which depicts a middle-aged 
insurance salesman with buried literary aspirations attempting to start fresh in New York 
City by undertaking the editorship of a fledgling literary journal whose financial backer, 
unbeknownst to him, is an ignorant nouveau-riche speculator who will eventually force 
him to choose between his job and his loyalty to an impoverished German immigrant 
who once tutored him in Schiller and Goethe.  As Basil March and his wife ride around 
the streets of New York City looking for an apartment to call their new home, they 
accidently take side turns that plunge them into scenes of urban squalor that trigger 
middle-class guilt that they are naïve enough to feel ought to be taken seriously, despite 
their sense of insecurity about their own futures; at one point they encounter a “decent- 
looking man” searching for food in a gutter, a man who happens to be French—among 
other things, perhaps an ironic commentary on what Walt Whitman ten years earlier had 
recognized as the New World’s inability to improve on the mistakes of the Old (70).
If we take Howells to be the epicenter of the realist movement—the mediating 
figure between the provincial Twain, the elitist James and the working-class naturalists 
who were almost too much for everybody—we can understand that entire enterprise to be 
rooted in efforts to overcome the yawning divide between high and low and to overcome 
it in and with the help of art, a goal Howells makes clear in one of his better-known 
installments of the Editor’s Study columns he wrote for Harper’s Magazine from January
1886 through March 1892.  Lamenting the contemporary demand for “melodrama, 
impossible fiction, and the trapeze” he nevertheless insists on believing that neither the
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“unthinking multitudes” nor the “literary elect”—terms he borrows from the Western 
writer whose views he is rejecting—really prefer “the romances of no-man’s land” to the 
works of “Tolstoi, Tourguénief, George Eliot, Thackerey, Balzac, Manzoni, Hawthorne, 
Henry James, Thomas Hardy, Palacio Valdés, or even Walter Scott” except as an 
occasional guilty pleasure to which both groups are equally capable of succumbing (95). 
Howells does not to subscribe to the Western writer’s opinion about the “unthinking 
multitude,” whom he instead “respects” for “their good sense in most practical matters; 
for their laborious, honest lives; for their kindness, their good-will; for that aspiration 
toward something better than themselves which seems to stir, however dumbly, in every 
human breast not abandoned to literary pride or other forms of self-righteousness” (96). 
Praising popular novelist Mary Murfree for the degree to which she portrays the “poor, 
hard, dull, narrow lives” of the Tennessee mountaineers with “exquisite sympathy,” 
regretting the parts in which “she seems to have drawn upon romance and tradition rather 
than life,” Howells insists that literature that “consents to know [men] in some 
conventionalized and artificial guise” is “the last refuge of the aristocratic spirit which is 
disappearing from politics and society and is now seeking to shelter itself in 
aesthetics” (96).  “Democracy in literature is reverse of all this,” he claims:  “it does not 
care to paint the marvelous and impossible for the vulgar many, or to sentimentalize and 
falsify the actual from the vulgar few.  Men are more like than unlike one another: let us 
make them know one another better, that they may all be humbled and strengthened with 
a sense of their fraternity” (96).
The limitations of Howells’ rosy description of the working class and of the 
democratizing influences of American literature—and the exceptionalism of America
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itself—have been thoroughly dissected over the past century, especially by those 
generations of critics and writers who have felt the need to distance themselves from the 
normalizing impulses that Howells’ literature inevitably betrays, impulses typical of a 
intellectual community anxious to unify an increasingly chaotic society through a version 
of culture shaped by either science or the arts or—in  Howells’ case, with his
indebtedness to the social science of Comte and Taine—an amalgamation of the two. 
Unsurprisingly, Howells’ reputation was at a low during the first two decades of the 
twentieth century, when disassociating oneself from Victorian gentility was paramount
for “an entire generation of literary journalists” (Pizer 9).  However, his reputation rose in 
the 1930s through the 1960s, when American literary studies was consolidating its status 
within English departments in large part by claiming for American literature precisely
that “quest for cultural synthesis”—the unifying civic-mindedness—that was at the heart 
of the Howellsian artistic project and that was freshly relevant for a nation attempting to 
re-affirm democratic values and a sense of national destiny in the wake of World War II, 
not to mention for an academy attempting to secure its role in promoting those values 
(Graff 215; Pizer 10).  A reviving interest in naturalism outweighed attention to realism 
during the sixties and seventies as the dismissal of the New Critics and the advent of the 
theory boom ushered in a movement which seems to have been driven in all its phases by 
a deep suspicion of any discourse that exhibits insufficient awareness of the extent to
which its values are complicit in industrial capitalism and its mystifying ideologies.  Even 
Amy Kaplan’s pivotal effort to redirect attention from what appears to be Howells’ 
“essentializing” vocabulary of truth and common sense towards his more pragmatic 
understanding of the ways in which truth is and must be continually reconstructed within
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a self-critical society ends with a reassertion of Howells’ inability to integrate the urban 
poor into the middle-class community he constructs in A Hazard of New Fortune, the 
novel that Kaplan takes to “exhaust the project of realism to embrace social 
diversity” (63).  Ultimately, Kaplan suggests, the threat that the French and German 
immigrants pose to the financial and social stability of the Marshes has to be 
neutralized by the former’s death or demotion to the “unreal city” whose problems are 
allowed to recede into the novel’s background as the story closes (63).
In one of the more interesting recent readings of A Hazard of New Fortunes, 
Sophia Forster suggests that Howells did not intend for this novel to offer a pat solution 
to the problems of the urban poor and the middle-class’s responsibility for them; instead, 
by portraying Lindau the German tutor as effacing himself before Basil March has to 
experience the consequences of his avowed willingness to sacrifice his job for Lindau’s 
sake, Howells intended to force March—and his real-life counterparts—to come to terms 
with the inadequacy of their delusions of heroism, with the emptiness of their belief that 
their commitment to character somehow exempts both them and those below them from 
their enslavement to the wage labor system.  The reader is supposed to experience 
Lindau’s self-dismissal and eventual death as a deus ex machina that gets March out of a 
scrape that neither he nor Howells sees a clear way of resolving:  sacrificing his job 
would merely drag March and his family closer to the poverty line, whereas not 
sacrificing his job would jeopardize the illusion of “ethical independence” so essential to 
bourgeois self-esteem (Forster 231).  Thus, Howells doesn’t himself evade the question
of responsibility so much as present March as evading the question, or present March as 
recognizing that he has managed to evade the question and that these evasions are
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indicative of the inadequacy of the standard bourgeois answers.  Yet Forster also 
concludes her own argument by suggesting that Howells cannot avoid proposing a tidy 
solution as the novel closes:  in the end, March’s future is secured when Dryfoos, the 
literary journal’s nouveau riche financial backer, sells out to March and his partner 
Fulkerson in what both Mrs. March and Fulkerson suggest to be a fit of respect for 
March’s conduct in the Lindau affair.  “He seemed to take a kind of shine to you from the 
day you wouldn’t turn off old Lindau,” Fulkerson says (484).  As the novel’s ostensible
un-masker of the bourgeois romanticization of what are typically more sordid motives, 
March himself strenuously resists this “poetic” interpretation, insisting—to his wife’s 
disgust—that Dryfoos is more likely motivated by the same business concerns that got 
him involved in the journal to begin with (484).  But what March/Howells forgets or 
attempts to obscure, Forster suggests, is that Every Other Week was never a business 
concern for Dryfoos to begin with—that Dryfoos started the journal not to make money 
but to direct the energies of his hypersensitive son away from Christian socialism and 
towards more worldly pursuits.  By eliding the difference between Dryfoos’ business and 
personal motives, Howells implies the capitalism in America is “ultimately benevolent,” 
that it is still susceptible to the kinds of permeations that enable people who are 
committed to integrity and hard work to thrive almost in spite of themselves (Forster
233).
It is difficult to subject Howells (or any of the social realists) to an argumentative 
framework tinged by the residue of post-structuralism without emerging with another 
version of the tiresome conclusion that despite his best intentions Howells was ultimately  
complicit in bourgeois liberal ideology and its particular America variants; consequently,
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part of my goal for this project is to liberate Howells from the constraints of this approach 
simply by suggesting—as Forster begins by suggesting—that Howells was aware of this 
complicity (as one of his characters calls it in The Minister’s Charge) and that his goal in 
his most perceptive novels is to expose and explore it for the sake of resolving it—and for 
resolving it by keeping open to the possibility that capitalist culture is susceptible to 
permeations that allow personal freedom even as the culture places limits on that
freedom.  The consistency with which scholars still dismiss Howells as implicated in the 
structures he attempts to subvert demonstrates the pervasiveness of the American 
reluctance to recognize that such collusions are inevitable and not necessarily fatal given 
the decision to operate within the constraints of history.  In his early nineties review of 
the history of Howellsian scholarship, Donald Pease argues (though not in these exact 
terms) that Silas’ retreat from the business world at the end of The Rise of Silas Lapham 
ought to be read not as a retreat from the complexities of history into a nostalgic
reconstruction of an agrarian past or a Romantic reassertion of the autonomous self but as 
an attempt to reconfigure such moves as internal to an already socially and historically 
embedded struggle between corrupt and virtuous citizenry (16-18).   Although my
reading of Silas Lapham differs from Peace’s—I argue that this reconfiguration is better 
sustained in A Hazard of New Fortunes precisely because the latter refrains from the 
radical and reactionary gestures of Silas Lapham—I nevertheless agree with Peace that 
the consuming goal of Howells’ realist novels of the eighties and nineties is to stay 
engaged with American history for as long as he can possibly imagine and supply a real 
counterforce to the onslaught of capitalism, even if that decision entails a substantive 
check to his characters’ options as well as his own creative freedom.   J.G.A. Pocock has
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famously argued that the “paradox of American thought” has been its citizens’ reluctance 
to relinquish the “civic ideal of the virtuous personality, uncorrupted by specialization
and committed to the social whole in all its diversity”—an ideal, he adds, that has formed 
“an important ingredient of the Marxian ideal of the same personality as awaiting 
redemption from the alienating affects of specialization”—while also refusing to “involve 
them[selves] in history, or in political or historical action, to a degree beyond their 
capacity for consent” (551).   The freedom from compulsion so dear to the American
heart has been (and is) bought at the price of its perpetual evasion of a commitment to the 
“dialectic of historical conflict,” of its avoidance of the limitations on human freedom 
posed by the contingencies of the material and the historical (Pocock 551).  Instead of 
confronting these limitations or the consequences of its attempts to evade these 
limitations, Americans have continuously taken refuge from time in the expanse of space, 
lighting out for new territories whenever civilization threatens to impose its constraints
on liberty, expanding their empire and conquering new lands in the name of virtue— 
making a virtue out of extending virtue’s domain rather than coming to terms with to the 
importance of wresting a virtuous republic out of the here and now.
Pocock, Gordon S. Wood and other contextualist historians of the civic humanist 
camp have also suggested that the goal of the Founding Fathers was to create a republic 
that abjured the corruption and the flight from virtue inherent in British court society—its 
slough of aristocratic hierarchies and court patronage, as well as its susceptibility to the 
corruptions of urban commerce—and to replace it with a natural aristocracy based on 
merit and property (which was seen as a prerequisite for merit, since a man dependent on 
others could not be assumed to retain his independence of mind) and devoted to the civic
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duties incumbent upon a patriot.  “The ties holding men together would not be corrupting 
influence from above but willingly offered service from below, from patriotism, or, as the
18th century called it, “virtue,” Wood explains—“independence and virtue went together”
(11).  At the time, “men did not yet conceive of society apart from politics” (Wood 6). 
Unfortunately, however, the natural aristocracy that Jefferson envisioned failed to 
emerge, and the new nation and constitution facilitated not a redistribution of distinction 
based on merit but a redistribution based on wealth and commercial success—wealth 
which, as the nineteenth century progressed, became concentrated in the hands of large 
corporations and monopolies and opposed by property-less masses who “because they 
lacked control over property and therefore a basis of private autonomy, could have no 
interest in maintaining society as a private sphere”—no interest, in other words, in 
keeping government from assuming functions that had previously lain in the hands of 
private citizens, as well as few compunctions about using government to guarantee its 
rights against capitalist aggressors (Habermas 127).  The latter class, in turn, proved less 
interested in the “repressive demands” of “austerity and autonomy, participation and
virtue” that sustaining a republic required than in the “diversification of life by commerce 
and the arts” (although commerce was clearly more of the emphasis in America) (Pocock
551-2).  In consequence, the nineteenth-century witnessed the substitution of liberal for 
republican ideology and the gradual but steady disintegration of the notion of civic virtue 
and the maintenance of the public sphere.
Whether we read the civic humanist ideal as the fruit of an agrarian tradition 
opposed to the corrupting influence of court and commerce or as tied to the rise of the 
early bourgeoisie and its resistance to “imperial domination,” which is how Hans Baron
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interpreted it in the earliest articulation of the civic humanist thesis, the social-realist 
novel is a genre that emerges in response to the decline of this ideal or to various factors 
that can be associated with its decline.  (And whether or not the civic-humanist ideal was 
ever more than partially realized does not prevent our recognizing its potency for those 
who invoked it in the early years of the American republic; and we can generally 
designate the period from 1775 to 1875 as the period in which the rhetoric and spirit of 
republicanism effectively masked the creeping encroachments of liberalism and laissez-
faire capitalism2  —a masking whose effectiveness both Pocock and Wood attribute
primarily to the machinations of James Madison) (Moulakis).  These factors include the 
rise of unchecked and consolidated commerce; the waning of the agrarian emphasis on 
property, as well as the inaccessibility of property to increasing numbers of people; an 
increasing reliance on the rhetoric and ideology of rights rather than the more compulsive 
ideology of virtue; and the disintegration of the public sphere, whose neglected functions 
had yet to be assumed by the social-welfare state that emerged in the early twentieth 
century, and the organs of the public sphere into pure commodities rather than vehicles
for “rational-critical debate” or the expression and exercise of fuller notions of liberty, 
equality and fraternity (Habermas 164).   The social-realist novelists are not dedicated 
merely to re-instantiating these ideals, however, although they constantly—and 
desperately—flirt with this possibility in those elements of their fiction that are often 
labeled “nostalgic” or said to exhibit “elitist” overtones.  But these same passages often 
register a recognition that the republican ideal has proven itself, or is proving itself, 
insufficiently thorough, that its postulation of property ownership as a prerequisite to
merit and rational independence (whether we think of property in the agrarian way or in
2See Habermas 143-144.
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the more loosely bourgeois way of capital-ownership) confuses the ownership of property 
with something more basic, with the merit and freedom that ought to be attendant on the 
successful stewardship of the mind and body themselves.
In addition, social realists recognize that conceding each person’s right to self- 
ownership and self-development—regardless of whether or not he owns actual property-- 
does not insure that he will get what he needs to maximize this self-development.  “Equal 
political rights are only means to an end, and as an end have no value or reality,” asserts 
the traveller who arrives in America from the utopian commonwealth that Howells 
constructs in A Traveller from Altruria (37).  Human beings are owned positive liberty, 
not just freedom from domination; they are owed what property symbolizes and is 
sometimes thought to procure—the resources necessary to maximize civic virtue, that 
enable not only citizens’ personal flourishing but also their ability to maximize their 
contributions to the well-being of their community and nation.  However, what positive 
liberty looks like and how it is to be procured without jeopardizing the obligation to self- 
government incumbent upon virtuous citizens are difficult questions.  Few social realists 
attempt to suggest sophisticated political solutions to these questions in much detail in 
their novels, but they all attempt not only to imagine but also to invoke a nation in which 
the rhetoric of rights is undergirded by some kind of larger cultural—if not political— 
commitment to the propagation of positive liberty, to the collective commitment to the 
pursuit of personal virtue in the service of the nation-state.  Novelists who are members
of groups that have been denied basic civil rights often promote a kind of ethics of care in 
order to secure basic civil liberties for minorities as well as positive liberty, since the 
liberal appeal to enlightened self-interest does not seem to have led to a very
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sophisticated conception of what “enlightened” self-interest ought to entail and how it 
might be bound up in promoting the well-being of those around us and not just our own. 
This ethics of care is usually envisioned as an extension of the rhetoric and duties of 
fraternal or maternal relationships to the relationships between citizens or human beings 
in general.  But how government ought to be involved in promoting care is a question 
that puzzles Howells and many Gilded Age intellectuals who are already secure in their 
basic liberties, since it seems clear that government is too remote to provide the kind of 
attention necessary for the accurate management of care but also that its intervention in 
certain aspects of national life is becoming increasingly necessary to check the greed of 
those who threaten the possibilities for positive liberty that the ideals of care suggest.
The political resolution towards which Howells looked was Populism, which in the form 
in which it manifested itself in the 1880s and 90s demanded that government take control 
of “those sectors of the economy having to do with exchange, especially money and 
transportation,” but not “the means of production, of factories and raw materials,” thus 
allying government with the causes of small farmers and producers and endeavoring to 
enact some balance between socialist and republican ideals (Trachtenberg 176).
In this project I examine Howells in conjunction with three other social realists of 
the period, placing him in both diachronic and synchronic relation with those who helped 
generate this generic moment of which he was the center, a brief coalescence of the 
dialectical ferment into which the novel was thrown at the end of the nineteenth century 
by the particularly jarring conflict that occurred between industrial capitalism and 
democratic ideals; or, to put it in Pocock’s terms, by the war between corruption and 
virtue, the former of which was for some attributable to commerce itself and for others—
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notably those with more agrarian, republican roots—to government collusion with 
commerce.  This confrontation exhibited features that we can recognized as omnipresent 
in American culture but surfacing more violently at junctures when anger over the reach 
and sway of government (anger which in the 1800s manifested itself in Civil War and the 
particular wrangles and resolutions of Reconstruction) erupts alongside of a (sometimes) 
less conscious awareness that neither civil rights nor enfranchisement, which in the case 
of women and African-Americans failed to materialize at all in the nineteenth century,
has proven sufficient to check the excesses of capitalism or guarantee what human beings 
need or have expected it to guarantee.  For social realists, the only real hope that rights 
might prove able to perform any of these functions lay in understanding them to represent  
not the full flowering of sociopolitical selfhood (which Aristotle would have argued was 
human selfhood, an argument with which the social realist novelists would have been in 
complete agreement) but merely two of its many off-shoots, off-shoots that are not in 
themselves substantive enough even to provide for their own continuance.
What that full flowering entails and how exactly it is to be nurtured or shaped 
within the confines of a bourgeois liberal democracy that takes rights, enfranchisement 
and the possession of—or aspiration to—capital to be the summation of human 
fulfillment are questions answered differently by the four different social realists whom I 
examine in the chapters that follow; or rather, the answers are worked out in more detail 
by ideologues like Howells and Abraham Cahan than they are by polemicists like 
Rebecca Harding Davis or Charles W. Chesnutt, and with difference emphasizes.  “The 
vocabulary of citizenship, like the vocabulary of humanism, is complex and multiple,” 
Pocock observes; we should note again, however, that within the diversity of their
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attempts to reconstruct a notion of the public sphere in which citizens take an active role 
in determining their common destiny, none of the social realists whom I examine here 
conceptualize that sphere to be as thoroughly political as the Founding Fathers imagined 
it to be within their original idea of a government ruled directly by its most meritorious 
citizens (87).  Representative government was inherently problematic for the republican 
ideal of virtue; it freed citizens from their responsibility to self-government and liberated 
them to the unchecked pursuit of private interest, and one of the ongoing dilemmas that 
unites the writers whom I examine under the designation “social realist” lies with their
perception that liberal democracy is not always as empowering as it represents itself to be 
and that its divorce of the political from the social has weakened the ability of both to 
combat the encroachments of commerce.  Consequently, social realists spend a great deal 
of their time attempting to circumvent the difficulties involved in endeavoring to
resurrect and reunite various elements of the public sphere whose separation and 
commodification has been internalized by both culture and art, and in many cases their 
novels end up being the record of heroic failure rather than of qualified success.
“Life in the Iron Mills,” which I analyze in the opening sections of my chapter on 
Rebecca Harding Davis, comprises one of the first attempts to break with the American 
romance and sentimental traditions and to engage directly with the liberalism’s failure to 
create a space in which virtuous citizens might come together to provide a check on the 
corruptions of commerce and industry, which in Davis’ mind were often connected to 
urban aggression against the more agrarian and republican values of the South, values 
which she valued despite being an ardent abolitionist.  Davis began writing at the
moment in which the cultural power of domestic fiction (such as it was) was beginning to
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wane, cultural power that Elizabeth Barnes has claimed was linked to the genre’s 
endeavors to reconcile republican and liberal values and to envision the home and family  
as institutions that provided a model of and foundation for the nation as well as a space 
for working out the tensions between interest and disinterestedness, excess and
constraint, that was integral to cultivating the habit of virtue and the virtue of sympathy in 
particular (1-18).  But by the 1860s and the outbreak of Civil War, a conflict which Davis 
felt to have been enflamed by romantic ideals that were insufficiently attuned to the 
realities of human suffering, Davis was positioned to turn away from the model of 
domesticity and its fictive medium and to make an aggressive attempt to wrest sympathy 
away from its increasing marginalization within the home—to find an alternative way
and space in which sympathy might be made to mediate between the increasingly 
polarized domains of bourgeois liberal culture.  Davis’ notion of sympathy owes as much 
to Christian as to republican ideals, although she very deliberately mutes what Pocock 
might call the millennial aspects of Christianity in order to insist on the necessity of 
combating injustice in the realm of the here and now; unfortunately, however, “Iron 
Mills” becomes an exercise in the difficulty of finding a cultural space within which 
sympathy might do its work.  The middle-class male characters who represent the 
audience that Davis means to address are unable to interact with Hugh Wolfe, the mill 
worker whose story Davis’ narrator tries to tell, except within the jail where Wolfe
spends his last days and over the statue of the Korl woman that Wolfe constructs within 
the mill.  Art—a very specific kind of art, Davis suggests; certainly not the kind that 
anticipates and indulges consumerism—becomes the last remaining cultural sphere 
within which sympathy might be able articulate itself and to enable some real cross-class
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connection—“real” in the sense of engendering genuine and effective activism—although 
both Davis and her narrator understand the odds of that happening within a commodity 
culture, and whether or not the statue of the Korl Woman can or does speak through the 
veil behind which the narrator hides her as the story closes (a potent symbolic gesture) is 
left up for the audience to decide, as it was left up to Davis’ audience in real life.  When 
Davis next attempted to publish a novel in which the compensatory fetish that the home 
had become is depicted as torn asunder by the selfish individualism of an entrepreneurial 
protagonist, her publisher—Howells’ predecessor at The Atlantic—stepped in and forced 
her to conform her work to the conventions of domestic fiction.  With both art and home 
thus rendered ineffectual in the fight against greed and corruption, Davis subsided into
the realm of sentimental fiction for the rest of her writing career.
For Howells, who had more creative freedom than Davis, the fight waged over the 
course of several novels and decades and involved a pragmatic willingness to consider 
multiple possible resolutions.  For him art and the home also proved sites of resistance 
against the encroachments of commerce, sites whose collusion with bourgeois liberalism 
he struggled to understand and combat.  However, Howells was usually less inclined than 
Davis—although not completely averse—to using art as a forum for leveraging emotions 
by depicting scenes of suffering; instead, over the 1880s and 90s he turned the novel into
a site for a thoughtful examination of the multiples sides of the class issue and for 
imagining and constructing far-reaching sociopolitical solutions.  In The Rise of Silas 
Lapham, which is where I begin my discussion of Howells, he undertakes the task of 
synthesizing the values of the new money class with those of the East Coast 
establishment, a task he puts in motion first of all by making his noveau riche
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businessman, Silas Lapham, a former farmer who reveals his deep allegiance to 
republican values, particularly the sanctity of property, when he is tempted to succumb to 
a shady business deal.  Howells also attempts to secure this synthesis for future 
generations by uniting Silas’ daughter with the young son of one of the Boston Brahmins, 
a maneuver whose implications have been insufficiently explored in the history of 
criticism on Silas Lapham.  Presumably, this young pair will bear the standard for family- 
run businesses into the twentieth-century century, all the while (although this part drops 
out a bit at the end) maintaining concerned and paternalistic relationships with their 
employees; unfortunately, however, this arrangement seems to depend for its stability on 
the privileging (once again) of what Pocock calls virtù over virtue—the dedication to 
conquest in the name of preserving the domain of virtue rather than a dedication to 
establishing and maintaining local justice—since the young couple do not stay in
America to work and contribute to the nation culture but leave to expand its reach into
Mexico.
By the time he wrote A Hazard of New Fortunes, which most critics consider his 
best work and his “dominant” work of social realism, Howells had modified this earlier 
ambition of re-articulating a template for a social whole characterized by a union between 
town and country in the fight against industrialized commerce, recognizing that such an 
effort is unsustainable in a country already too diverse and too driven by private interest
to be united behind such a fight by the heroic tales of novelists.  Yet he refused to give up 
on the idea of resistance altogether, on the hope of planting virtue in the depleted soil of 
liberalism by way of the American novel; and in The Minister’s Charge and subsequent 
works he begins linking his belief in human interdependence—in humans’ inherent
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sociopolitical nature—to Darwinian biology, implying that the theory of evolution is not
a deterministic sinkhole that swallows up liberal pretensions to freedom but a web within 
which humans must recognize themselves to be situated (and this recognition is one of 
the key to their exercise of agency within it) in order to understand who they are and to 
recognize not only how their actions are effected by others but how their actions can 
affect others.  Thus, freedom becomes less a byproduct of property ownership than of 
human biology, with the guarantor of freedom being not the mutual commitment to 
stewardship of the earth but the mutual commitment to self-cultivation.  Of course, the 
extent of this freedom still lies in the extent to which everyone embraces their complicity 
instead of attempting to run from it, and herein lies the next stage of the problem for 
Howells, or the recurrence of the original problem: how do you get people to embrace 
their complicity when they are the products of a culture in which everyone does run from 
their biology and history—in which their growing awareness of their interdependence 
seems to be providing them with more of an excuse for their inertia rather than less?
For Basil March, the answer seems to consist, at most, in the exercise of a sort of 
private, defiant commitment to owning oneself even as one recognizes the extent to 
which that self is held hostage to the impoverished culture within which it is enmeshed. 
Small wonder, perhaps, that Howells reverted to utopian romances in the nineties, 
romances in which he eulogizes “the cultivation of the earth” as that which “brings man 
into the closest relations to the deity, through a grateful sense of a divine bounty” and 
which binds him to love of home and, through home, to love of country; and at this point 
in Howells’ development, or retrogression, I turn—still in chapter two—to Abrahan 
Cahan’s short story “The Imported Bridegroom,” and suggest that Cahan, with his roots
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in Russian realism and the European class structure—not to mention his membership in a 
ethno-religious group premised on the belief that God has manifest himself in history 
through the laws and experiences of the Jewish people—is able to pick up where Howells 
left off (being a long-term admirer of Howells, Cahan knew both his strengths and his 
weaknesses) and articulate a version of American national identity in which people who 
(literally) embody a variety of rich ethnic and cultural heritages come together in a shared 
public space that comes much closer to being a empowering sociopolitical space than 
anything else that we examine will be able to come.
In my last chapter I discuss Charles W. Chesnutt, who makes even less headway 
against white American culture than Howells but who helps demonstrate the extent to 
which republican rhetoric could of use to those who were excluded from its original 
formulation.  As a light-skinned black man from a middle-class background Chesnutt is 
caught between two races—and classes—whose identities are often aligned with one or 
another of those polarities that comprise the possible modes of being within bourgeois 
liberal culture, and his career-long struggle to negotiate between the realist novel and the 
romance becomes an ongoing illustration of the ways in which art itself is imprisoned 
within these dichotomies.  His novelistic ambitions were not always tied to concerns for 
his race, but they became more so as his career progressed and he became increasingly 
invested in carving out a space within American culture and history in which African- 
Africans could achieve the kind of self-fulfillment that the more progressive black 
thinkers of period—the ones that resisted the accommodationist viewpoint of Booker T. 
Washington—understood to be tied to self-enrichment through active citizenship and a 
liberal-arts education rather than through skills training and the acquisition of capital
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alone.  Chesnutt recognized the value of black entrepreneurship in furthering the case for 
civil rights—he also understood the dynamics of property and respected its ownership in 
a very agrarian way, even while arguing for the inherent respectability of the intellectual 
and artistic property that comprised most of his black characters’ only possessions—but 
he also understood the ways in which commerce could undermine civil rights if not
anchored in and moderated by larger concerns.  In addition, he recognized the fragility of 
guarantees to rights administered by people who had no concern for virtue; and while he 
was not prepared to deny rights to those who lacked virtue and lived on either side of the 
color line, he nevertheless spent most of his novels attempting to bring blacks and whites 
together in ways that demanded that each develop a larger vision of what civic obligation 
entailed.  His second-to-last novel, The Marrow of Tradition, is perhaps his most 
ambitious effort in this direction, since it concerns itself with large groups of people 
carrying out—or miscarrying—their public functions:  white men whose gross 
misconception of their civic duty destroys a Southern town’s tranquility and African- 
American professionals whose reluctance to demand or assume their civic duty results in 
the destruction of the social ground they have gained, thus demonstrating the absolute 
necessity of integrating the realms of the social, political and the professional in order to 
assure quality of life (not just equality) for all.
The virtues of balance and moderation are key to the integration of these realms in 
Chesnutt’s fictive worlds as well as in those of all the social-realist novelists:  bourgeois 
virtues turned against the excesses of bourgeois culture, which has forgotten that capital 
and property are supposed to form the basis for virtue, not the rationale for neglecting it. 
Re-asserting the necessity of personal property, re-interpreted (in the best cases) for the
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new millennium, while also insisting on both the obligations to ourselves and others that 
property imposes upon us and the true nature of freedom of choice—the freedom to run 
from or embrace these obligations—comprises the grounds for the social realists’ 
conservative radicalism.  Their agenda is also thoroughly radical in being flagrantly 
assertive, not just descriptive or diagnostic:  Henry James’ 1907 description of the Jewish 
ghetto in New York owes much (no doubt) to Abraham Cahan for the shrewdness of its 
observations about the “genius” with which the American Jewish community had 
“evolved” to embrace modernity by manifesting an ability to divide and proliferate while 
preserving its heritage and community intact, even etching that inheritance into the 
structure of the city itself; yet despite the omnipresent acuteness of James’ powers of 
perception he is not—here or in his novels—invested in intervening in such conditions in 
the same way that the social realists are.3   He is a traveler, observing, or attempting to 
integrate the chaotic manifestations of modernity into his characters’ psyches in ways that 
will enable them to survive, whereas the social realists are less concerned with their 
protagonists’ self-articulation and preservation than with their protagonists’ obligation to 
preserve society, outside of which their “selves” have very little interest or meaning.  If 
this effort sometimes seems to falter it is not because the novel is ill-equipped to handle 
such agendas but because the American experience proved—and still proves— resistant
to attempts to articulate its “metahistory” as a “dialect of historical conflict” rather than a 
story of “spatial escape and return” (Pocock 551-550).  Consequently, it is all the more to 
the credit of this particular group of novelists that they strove against these conditions to 
create spaces that are marked and constrained by history and by the necessity of aligning 
destiny with the ravages of time and inopportuneness as manifested in the lives of those
3In The American Scene 126-135.
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Chapter One:  Rebecca Harding Davis and the Rehabilitation of Sympathy
As I have already urged, the practice of what is ethically best—what we call goodness or 
virtue—involves a course of conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that which leads 
to success in the cosmic struggle for existence.  –Thomas Henry Huxley, Evolution and 
Ethics
“Life in the Iron Mills” was an instant hit when it appeared in The Atlantic 
Monthly in April 1861, propelling thirty-year-old Rebecca Harding out of the obscurity of 
her parents’ Virginia—soon to be West Virginia—home to literary fame and eventually 
marriage.  Although the outbreak of Civil War delayed her celebratory migration North 
until after the 1862 publication of Margret Howth, she eventually made her way up to 
Boston and Concord, where she developed an instant camaraderie with Hawthorne and
the editor of The Atlantic and his wife, James and Annie Fields.  She spoke more 
reservedly of Emerson and Bronson Alcott, the latter of whose oracular “paeans to the 
war” grated on her conscience and moral sensibilities (Writing 38).  “I had just come up 
from the border where I had seen the actual war; the filthy spewings of it;” she wrote 
years later in her autobiography Bits of Gossip:  “War may be an armed angel with a 
mission, but she has the personal habits of the slums.  This would-be seer who was 
talking of it, and the real seer who listened, knew no more of war as it was, than I had 
done in my cherry tree when I dreamed of bannered legions of crusaders debouching in 
the misty fields” (Writing 39).  Harding had just spent a significant number of pages 
attempting to turn her readers’ attention away from “paeans to the war” to a tale of 
“common, every-day drudgery” in a middle-America manufacturing town (Howth 6). 
The war, she wrote in the opening pages of Margret Howth, is driven by the “partial
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truths” of “patriotism and chivalry,” which obscure the “higher hierarchies” of “mercy 
and love” (4).  Later in Bits of Gossip, she pointedly contrasts Bronson Alcott’s 
“obstinate faith in himself”—a faith which leads him to fill “miles of paper” with his 
unpublishable ruminations while his wife and children struggle in poverty—with his 
daughter Louisa’s tireless commitment to the kind of writing that will contribute to the 
family upkeep (Howth 6).  “She would have ground her bones to make their bread,” 
Davis writes admirably of Louisa’s priorities (Writing 42).
In her frustration with American Romanticism—and her connection of its 
egocentricity not only with the glorification of war but also with the Gilded Age rush to 
what she would later denominate sordid “money-getting”—Davis exhibits the typical 
Victorian preference for moral sentiment over Romantic sensibility.4   As Nina Baym has 
reminded us, American nineteenth-century writers of domestic fiction—the tradition 
within and out of which Davis began to write as it entered its twilight years—were 
influenced by the atmosphere of Enlightenment moral philosophy and the edifying works 
of Maria Edgeworth rather than the self-centered idealism of the male-dominated 
Romantic tradition (29).  The sentimentalism that usually characterized domestic fiction
and that was later vilified as a form of decadent romanticism at the hands of Howells and 
James was considered by women writers themselves to be reflective of life as it ought to 
be experienced:  not life devoid of emotion but life devoid of self-directed emotion—self- 
love and self-indulgence—and characterized instead by emotions channeled into service
to and appreciation for others, emotions attuned to reality as it was rightly perceived
through the eyes of Christian sympathy, not through the eyes of egotism or scientific
4See Kaplan 9 for the distinction between Romantic sensibility and Victorian sentiment and the latter’s 
roots in Enlightenment thought.
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detachment.  As many critics have argued, sentimental fiction—whether the eighteenth- 
century novel of seduction or nineteenth-century domestic fiction—played an important 
role in negotiating the place of emotions and the body in the shaping of American 
national culture.5   For both male and female writers of the post-revolutionary and 
antebellum periods, sentimental novels provided a public space for exploring the 
possibility of “reconcil[ing] conservative republican values of duty to others with a 
liberal agenda of self-possession”—for negotiating between a model of the nation based
on republican ideals of civic duty and virtue, a model that included the proper exercise of 
emotions like sympathy, and one based on liberalism’s negative conception of liberty as 
mere freedom from coercion (Barnes 12).  As the nineteenth-century progressed, the
latter prevailed as the public sphere became increasingly perceived as vulnerable to the 
infiltration of an underclass whose “eccentric corporeality disqualifie[d] them from 
public life by rendering their bodies all too visible”—whose racially and ethnically 
marked bodies rendered suspect their capacity for the constrained and appropriate 
exercise of emotion necessary for the practice of citizenship (Burgett 14).   Republican 
ideals of participatory citizenship, built around a model of white male property owners 
and their families, proved impossible to sustain in an increasingly diverse nation, one in 
which participatory citizenship was also becoming less important than money-making. 
With its sociopolitical role consequently diminished, late nineteenth-century domestic
fiction devolved into a children’s genre while women’s fiction evolve into something
5See, among others, Nina Baym, Women’s Fiction: A Guide to Novels By and about Women in America,
1820-1870; Jane Tompkins, Sensational Designs: The Cultural Work of American Fiction 1790-1860; Julia
A. Sterns, The Plight of Feeling: Sympathy and Dissent in the Early American Novel; Shirley Samuels 
(ed.), The Culture of Sentiment: Race, Gender and Sentimentality in Nineteenth-Century America; Bruce 
Burgett, Sentimental Bodies: Sex, Gender and Citizenship in the Early Republic; Glenn Hendler, Public 
Sentiments: Structures of Feeling in Nineteenth-Century America; Elizabeth Maddock Dillon, The Gender 
of Freedom: Fictions of Liberalism and the Literary Public Sphere; and Elizabeth Barnes, States of 
Sympathy: Seduction and Democracy in the American Novel.
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akin to the “gothic romance,” as changes in the American landscape made the home seem
—as Nina Baym has suggested—“increasingly less tenable as a social unit, let alone a 
female power base,” and “rapid social changes…engendered tensions that called for 
escapist literature more than moral earnestness” (297).
Situating Davis within this trajectory is a fairly straightforward project, despite 
the fact that critics have had some difficulty doing it.  Critical consensus acknowledges 
that after—or midway—through the publication of Margret Howth Davis acquiesced to 
James Fields’ demands that she conform her novel to the conventions of women’s 
domestic fiction and never afterwards wrote a work on par with “Life in the Iron Mills,” 
spending the rest of her prolific publishing life churning out sentimental fiction at a time 
when such works had lost much of their sociopolitical relevance and were increasingly 
relegated to the “low” side of the growing divide between high and low art.  Young 
Henry James Jr. wrote withering reviews of Davis’s next two novels after Margret 
Howth, Waiting for the Verdict and Dallas Galbraith, scapegoating them as examples of 
sentimental novelists’ deplorable tendency to falsify human experience.  My own 
analysis of the “decadent” sentimental fiction that comprises the majority of Davis’
corpus—several examples of which I discuss at the end of this chapter—aligns itself with 
that of twentieth critics like Jane Tompkins who prove sympathetic to the cultural 
marginalization that underlay the late-nineteenth-century sentimentalist project and argue 
that sentimental novelists of that period were not falsifying human experience so much as 
responding to it from a position of powerlessness that necessitated a reactionary reading 
of experience, one that shares more similarities with the naturalist than the realist 
movement that proved its immediate successor.  But my main interest lies in Davis’ first
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two works, “Life in the Iron Mills” and Margret Howth—or, more accurately, the aborted 
original draft of Margret Howth—both of whose idiosyncratic agendas have often eluded 
critical explanation.  In the bulk of this chapter I argue that in those two initial works 
Davis is confronting, rather than submitting to, the waning cultural power of domestic 
fiction and attempting to rescue the discourse of sympathy from what she (on some level) 
recognizes to be its growing tendency to reify its own impotence as a defense
mechanism.  Instead, she wants to reassert its efficacy—via art—over the public sphere, a 
task that proves difficult because Davis has very little idea of how to invest the bodies of 
her marginalized characters—or the rhetoric of sentimentalism—or the idea of the public 
sphere—with any meaning outside of that available to her within the triumphant 
framework of bourgeois liberalism.  The most she can do is suggest that her failure to 
imagine the bodies of those she seeks to represent bespeaks their owners’ capacity to 
subject themselves—or be subjected—to the negation of the body required for assuming 
political rights in America, rights that are the closest thing to positive liberty that can be 
imagined under liberalism—and then to point out that Hugh Wolfe’s established right to 
civil rights, confirmed by the leaders of society who discover him in the mill, is not 
enough to insure that he is able to benefit from those rights:  something more is needed— 
namely, active compassion (Burgett 14).  “Make yourself what you will.  It is your right,” 
Dr. May says to Hugh Wolfe as they stand together in the inferno of the iron mill.   “I 
know,” Hugh says; “Will you help me?” (440).
“Life in the Iron Mills” has been read at different times as a pioneering work of 
literary realism and a pioneering work of literary naturalism.   In her 1972 “Biographical
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Introduction” to the Feminist Press reissue of “Life in the Iron Mills” Tillie Olsen claims 
that “there is an untraced indebtedness to [Davis] in the rise of realism” (155).  More 
recently, Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar have claimed that “some six years before
the French novelist Émile Zola began publishing what were called “naturalistic” novels, a 
thirty-year-old Virginian had brilliantly dramatized the socioeconomic implications of 
environmental determinism” (1104).  While neither of these descriptors necessarily 
excludes the other, it is important to recognize that Davis did not intend for her 
dramatization of the “socioeconomic implications of environmental determinism” to 
obscure the fact that she held her middle-class audience responsible for creating the 
environmental conditions that determined Hugh Wolfe’s destiny.  In fact, “Life in the
Iron Mills” comprises Davis’ attempt to use the deterministic rhetoric of sentimentalism 
to gain sympathy for her beleaguered protagonist while simultaneously attempting to 
prevent her audience from taking refuge in its emotional and aesthetic consolations.  Like 
conventional sentimental reform literature of the period—Uncle Tom’s Cabin being the 
most obvious example—“Iron Mills” wants to engage its middle-class audience’s 
sympathy on behalf of its downtrodden characters by a dual strategy of portraying them
as powerless and as possessors of personal qualities of recognizably bourgeois hue, 
qualities that entitled them to the freedom and opportunities that they have been denied. 
Arguably, the first part of this equation becomes a more difficult task when the 
downtrodden character is already white, despite being begrimed by a heavy coating of 
filth and ashes.  As incontestably “other,” black bodies provided nineteenth-century 
writers and readers with a simple explanation for African-Americans’ exclusion from 
civil society as well as a ground for arguing that their blackness belied—or signaled—an
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otherworldly nature that transcended whatever they might hope to achieve on this earth; 
in contrast, Hugh Wolfe is dully and inescapably white—and male—and lacks any 
particularly saintly qualities.  Without impugning Hugh himself, explaining why his 
whiteness has not guaranteed his upward mobility involves relying very heavily on 
depictions of the overwhelming horrors of his oppressive conditions.
In addition, Davis refuses her audience the common sentimental consolation of 
believing that Hugh will someday be known and redeemed in a Christian afterlife. 
Instead, Davis places the possibility of heavenly justice under suspicion, forcing her 
readers to confront characters whose freedom has been overwritten by the iron pen of 
industrial capitalism and whose hope of heaven is tenuous at best, not because these 
characters are worse than any others but because the earthly manifestations of love and
hope that are the primary evidence of the existence of God are conspicuously absent from 
the urban landscape.  Davis’ “naturalism” is—as naturalism itself arguably is— 
sentimentalism without the escape clause, without the compensatory conviction of a 
transcendent reality that invests surroundings and experiences otherwise unbearable with 
an illusion of hope and comfort.  Davis’ defrocked sentimentalism shares with naturalism 
the belief that those without access to the means of production are at the mercy (in this 
life) of socioeconomic conditions that deny them access to and understanding even of 
their own bodies, except as objects of consumption;  rather than fetishize or aestheticize 
this powerlessness, however, as sentimental and some naturalistic narratives have a 
tendency to do, Davis insists on the freedom of her (male) middle-class characters and 
audience to change things, transporting the weakness typical of sentimental heroines onto
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a feminized working-class character while simultaneously struggling to keep her 
audience from complacent complicity in that imposition.
“There never was a slough in which there were not stepping-stones, if we looked 
for them with common sense and a little faith in God,” Davis says piously in an 1869 
essay entitled “Men’s Rights,” written to discourage suffragettes from agitating for the 
vote.  Yet Hugh Wolfe—who is obviously not a suffragette—lives in a slough out of 
which there appear to be no stepping stones besides those which might have been 
provided by the various middle and upper class characters who “came too late” or never 
come at all (450).  Wolfe is a day labor in an iron mill and possesses a thwarted and 
incipient artistic genius.   When the deformed cotton-mill worker who loves him steals a 
check from the pocket of a gentleman touring the mills in order to give it to Hugh, Wolfe
succumbs to the temptation to keep it after a prolonged internal struggle. He is caught and 
sentenced before he escapes town, however, and commits suicide in his jail cell. Yet 
Wolfe is never judged by the narrator: his acceptance of the fruits of Deborah’s theft, a 
theft which is itself excused by a romanticization of Deb’s passion for Hugh—“she’s a 
woman, you know,” the jailor says in accounting for the difference between her and 
Hugh’s punishments for their crimes—is acknowledged as an “error” which might 
prejudice readers against him, but the point of “Life in the Iron Mills” is to prevent
readers from taking refuge in conventional judgments. “You see the error underlying its 
argument so clearly,—that to him a true life was one of full development rather than self- 
restraint? that he was deaf to the higher tone in a cry of voluntary suffering for truth’s 
sake than in the fullest flow of spontaneous harmony?” the narrator asks bitterly at the 
height of Hugh’s internal struggle:  “I do not plead his case.  I only want to show you the
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mote in my brother’s eye: then you can see clearly to take it out” (443).  This ironic pre- 
emption of outside judgments, which the narrator articulates as questions that he refuses 
to answer except by simultaneously conceding their legitimacy and their hypocrisy—yes, 
there is a “mote” in Hugh’s eye that her audience has neither seen nor taken out—is 
immediately followed by a return to recording Hugh’s consciousness, to portraying the 
struggle going on in his mind.  Hugh understands what’s at stake, the narrator insists; he 
knows what he is doing when he takes the money and he has an answer to those who 
might judge him.  He confronts the question of his culpability in Deborah’s theft “face to 
face, wiping the clammy drops of sweat from his forehead” like Christ in the garden of 
Gethsemane (443).  “A thief! Well, what was it to be a thief?” he thinks and then he 
responds: “God made this money—the fresh air, too—for his children’s use.  He never 
made the difference between poor and rich.  The Something who looked down on him
…loved all his children alike” (443-4).
The narrator frequently transitions between melodramatic sentimental/naturalist 
rhetoric and such self-conscious appeals to the reader which are often presented in the 
form of questions.   The narrative descends down several levels from the street-window 
where the narrator begins the story to the jail cell in which Hugh ends his life and these 
appeals interrupt it at every level of the descent, and they interrupt again at every level as 
the story climbs more weakly back to its frame narrative and conclusion.  The story has 
three levels, structured on “three concentric rings, each inhabited by one of the three focal 
characters”—the narrator, Deborah, and Hugh Wolfe (Rose 16).  The narrator’s gender is 
never revealed; it is usually assumed to be female but is more probably male, since this 
would more accurately explain why the narrator seems to be loitering in the industrial
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district as the story opens and has penetrated deeply enough into the life of the iron mills
—though always remaining a spectator—to know something of Hugh’s story.  It would 
also jibe with what seems to be Davis’ intention in this narrative:  to lift the discourse of 
sympathy out of the sentimental context of the home and impose it on the workplace.  
The narrator opens with a “stifling” description of the atmosphere of a “town of iron 
works,” one in which the “negro-like river” is more free than “the slow stream of human 
life creeping past, night and morning, to the great mills”—images of mass, 
undifferentiated corporality at the mercy of the sluggish but inexorable devolution of life. 
Even the river (and the negroes themselves, the descriptor implies) will eventually flow 
out to a place of “odorous sunlight,” but “the future of the Welsh puddler passing just
now is not so pleasant”—he will be “stowed away, after his grimy work is done, in a hole 
in the muddy graveyard” (430).
“Massed, vile, slimy lives, like those of the torpid lizard in yonder stagnant water- 
butt,” the narrator continues, piling on the imagery in grim, melodramatic fashion; yet he 
stops here—for the first time in the story—and turns to the reader, his “friend,” whom he 
derisively characterizes as an armchair psychologist, and asks—“Lost?” Answering the 
question only provisionally, he insists that his reader, who is also characterized as male
(at one point the reader is asked to think about his wife), keep it in mind as he tells him 
Hugh’s story.  The narrator then repeats this technique when he introduces Deborah and 
again when he describes Hugh in the midst of his moral crisis: the story transitions from 
an overwrought naturalistic description that plays on the reader’s emotions to an 
interruption in which the narrator anticipates his readers’ imagined criticism, burdening 
them with the responsibility of providing an answer, and then back to a response in which
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he plunges them into a deeper level of the narrative, one which seems meant to reaffirm 
the humanity and dignity of the characters along with the intensity of their suffering. 
Readers who, like Doctor May and his wife reading the newspapers over breakfast, 
attempt to dismiss the trials of “that kind of people,” have their faces rubbed in them 
instead.  They are led out from behind the window at which the narrator stands at the 
story’s opening and thrust into “the thickest of the fog and mud and foul effluvia”; the 
excuses through which they attempt to distance themselves from the situation are 
forestalled and they are provoked into responding and then plunged deeper into the abyss 
(445, 431).
The description of the abyss is more naturalistic than realistic, as many critics 
have observed; it is infused with the sentiment and melodrama—the decadent 
romanticism—that will characterize the works of Crane and Norris two generations later, 
although Davis’ determinism is inherited as much from Calvinistic doctrine as from the 
social Darwinism that would influence her successors.  William Dow calls this 
sentimental naturalism “performative naturalism”—naturalism in which the characters’ 
inability to articulate a self that exists in opposition to the consumer culture is overwritten 
by narrators who seem bent on performing or enforcing their characters’ artificiality—
and their own—rather than merely portraying it.  This strategy rarely registers as 
deliberate: it is usually dismissed as sign of inferior artistry.  What is interesting about 
Davis, however, is that she seems to have perceived the inadequacies of the 
“performative naturalism” that she inherits by way of the sentimental tradition: losing 
oneself in the sentiment is tantamount to legitimatizing the alienation that it both 
describes and inscribes.  The strategically placed interruptions are designed to forestall
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this possibility even as the narrative sets it in motion.  Davis is clearly straining against 
the limitations of the rhetorical tradition she has inherited, counterpoising an almost 
burlesqued depiction of her characters’ ills with hostile reminders that the apparent 
hopelessness of their lives does not negate her readers’ culpability, even if these readers 
manage to detach themselves from the emotional weight of the narrative in which they
are meant to be inundated—or even if (more likely) they lose themselves in the exploitive 
and self-indulgent experience of the narrative itself.
Some critics have argued that the narrator’s invocation of Christian hope in the 
frame narrative at the beginning and end of the story—the stock remedy of 
sentimentalism—provides readers with the inevitable escape clause, a way to deflect 
responsibility onto “the promise of the Dawn” and the “Hope to come”; but Sandra M. 
Harris has rightfully observed that the inner rings of the story call the narrator’s official 
stance into question through characters whose reliance on Christianity as the writer of 
wrongs is shown to be specious and hypercritical (431,451; ).  The narrator is himself 
portrayed—or portrays himself—as implicated in the impassivity that he condemns in his 
characters and hopes to cure in his readers; his recourse to Christianity at the end of the 
narrative has already been critiqued, by the time we get there, through the hypocritical 
characters Mitchell and May.  Equally telling is the comparative weakness of the 
narrator’s appeals to the reader on the way back out of the abyss, towards the comforting 
conclusion; he is much less keen on leading his readers out of the iron mills as he is on 
leading them into it.  As Hugh lies dying in his jail cell, the “black nauseous stream of 
blood dripping slowly from the pallet to the floor”—no redemptive brightness in it—the 
narrator speculates that “A Voice may have spoken for it from far-off Calvary, ‘Father
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forgive them, for they know not what they do!’ Who dare say?” (450).  The referent of 
“them” is left unclear—is it Hugh, who has robbed others and taken his own life, or it is 
those who have sinned against him?  Either way, the narrator seems unconvinced that the 
life to come holds any hope that can repair the wrongs of this one, as he asks her tepid 
question of the reader; in fact, no one can say.  Similarly, he seems bent on pointing out 
that Deb’s hope of heaven is driven more by her desire to meet Hugh there than by any 
real investment in the life to come:  “something is lost in the passage of every soul from 
one eternity to another,—something pure and beautiful, which might have been and was 
not: a hope, a talent, a love, over which the soul mourns, like Esau deprived of his 
birthright.  What blame to the meek Quaker, if she took her lost hope to make the hills of 
heaven more fair?” (450)  Heaven can’t make up for the losses here on earth—it cannot 
recoup everything—and the narrator’s closing appeal to the “flickering, nebulous 
crimson” of the coming Dawn resounds much more weakly—with much less pious 
complacency—than the endings of Howells’ novels will sound several decades later: the 
hope here still lies squarely with the earthly Jerusalem and the potential for social 
activism and cultural redemption latent in sympathetic readers, a potential that “Iron 
Mills” intends less to model—except in the figure of the Quaker whose arrival is 
deliberately delayed—than to induce.  The novel refuses the sentimental solution of the 
happy ending (Deb’s reclamation being the minor exception, an exception we will
discuss in more detail later), attempting instead to coerce readers into performing that 
consolation in their daily lives. The answer to the question of human suffering posed at 
the beginning of the story may ultimately lie with God, but Davis’ readers are still 
responsible to do what they can to combat its particular manifestations; the text is, in fact,
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anticipating and countering the deterministic legacy of Calvinism as it will merge with 
social Darwinism and the self-indulgent fatalism of laissez-faire capitalism in the later
half of the nineteenth century with bourgeois liberalism’s insistence on the possibility and 
power of individual intervention in creating change, in inaugurating a more democratic 
social order.  In “Life in the Iron Mills” the disease of money-getting is still curable and 
the cure lies in the hands of the individual agents whom Davis is attempting to inspire.
But what exactly is the cure?  It seems important to point out that although the 
story relies on black and white imagery to enforce the difference between slavery and 
freedom its does not resolve those issues simply by incorporating Hugh into a redemptive 
rhetoric of whiteness, as Erik Schocket has suggested.  As the story closes the narrator’s 
library is “yet steeped in heavy shadow” and the dawn merely casts a “cool, gray light” of 
blessing on the head of the korl statue, a light that is meant to prefigure the hopeful 
dawning of other things (451).  It is impossible to deny that questions of labor functioned 
in ante and post-bellum literature to deflect attention away from the issue of slavery and, 
in the North, to abrogate class differences.  Indeed, Davis’ own ambivalent feelings about 
emancipation and the politics of the war, as illuminated in her Civil War stories, suggest 
that there must have been some relief in writing a story in which the character’s 
underlying whiteness, when not “muddy with grease and ashes,” could underwrite her 
argument for his liberation and enrich the irony of his imprisonment while the mulatto
girl outside swings by with a “free, firm step”; yet as Schocket himself admits, “the 
symbolic freedom of whiteness” is affirmed only in Hugh’s death, and death—as we have 
just seen—is not portrayed as the great and ultimate liberator in this story (441,8; 55).  If 
the story celebrates anything as potentially transcendent and transformative it is neither
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religion nor whiteness but art and love, as these lie latent in the respective figures of 
Hugh and Deb or present in the objects in the narrator’s library—the “half-moulded 
child’s head; Aphrodite; a bunch of forest-leaves; music; work; homely fragments, in 
which lie the secrets of all eternal truth and beauty (451).  The story’s tragedy is the 
broken figure of the angel in the opening paragraphs, the statue of the Korl Woman that 
bespeaks a capacity that is never realized, a hunger for artistic expression that is never 
satisfied.  The story is not the tragedy of Hugh Wolfe as Hugh Wolfe, individual, but the 
tragedy of Hugh Wolfe, representative of the human capacity for creativity, a capacity 
that is meant to speak for itself; similarly, the pathos with which Deb is imbued comes 
from her embodiment of the virtue of love, a virtue that Davis valorizes and 
sentimentalizes again in Margret Howth through the deformed mulatto Lois.
“Life in the Iron Mills” juxtaposes the values of art and love with those of money 
on the one hand and religion on the other, with Hugh trapped between the latter two 
alternatives, wandering into church with the stolen check in his pocket, neither of which 
has the capacity to save him.  Yet the potential problem with the story’s valorization of 
art and love—especially its valorization of art—is that it comes at the expense of the 
story’s valorization of human life—or any life.  As Amy Schrager Lang argues in one of 
the most trenchant reading of “Life in the Iron Mills” to date:
Prophecy, both social and religious, fails in Life in the Iron Mills because 
in the end art has been made to substitute for life after all.  That is to say, 
prophecy fails because the narrator has made us acutely aware not only of 
the difference between the artifice, the story or the sculpture, and the 
Truth, the “reality” of Hugh Wolf’s “soul-starvation,” but also of the
45
inevitable tendency of art to appropriate the life of its subject, the mill 
hand, just as the mill owner appropriates his labor (140).
“Prophecy”—the answer to the story’s opening question “What is the end?”—fails 
because art—the Korl woman who both speaks and doesn’t speak for the silent and 
finally silenced artist, the story that attempts to bridge that silence—demonstrates the 
necessity for asking the question but fails to provide an answer.  The difference between 
artifice and truth that Davis attempts to open up by complicating and questioning the 
assurance of the sentimental storyline (i.e. the artifice) ultimately exposes that difference 
but provides no resolution for it.  We are left, as Lang suggests, “with only a morally 
equivocal art to mediate between the sunlit world of [the] middle-class reader and the 
gloom of the mills” (142).  The Korl Woman—who “hides” some “terrible problem” in 
her face—gives testament to Hugh Wolfe’s uniqueness and to his claim to human 
consideration, but she also enables the men who come to the mill to distance themselves 
from Hugh’s grimy reality as they concentrate their attention on figuring out the statue’s 
significance (439).  Mitchell, the aesthete who understands the statue’s message best, is 
the one who turns away the most decisively, despite having the money to save Hugh in 
his pocket.  Perhaps he is the narrator, hiding the statue behind a curtain at the story’s 
conclusion, ending his narrative on the same note of uncertainty as he began.  When the 
story opens, the wrong that the narrator feels the need to address is the suffering of the 
masses, the general symptoms of “pain and cunning” that mar the bodies and faces of the 
“slow stream of human life creeping past, night and morning, to the great mills,” whose 
suffering seems to be a wrong in and of itself (430).  The lives and deaths of these men 
demand that we ask the great questions of life, the narrator proclaims; yet as he attempts
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to get past his ponderous presentation of the problem, to put a genuine face on the 
tragedy, his argument twists into something else—it is no longer that the poor quality of 
such a life is unconscionable for any living being, but that the quality of such a life is 
especially unconscionable for people who demonstrate the kinds of gifts and capacities 
that ought to earn them a spot in the privileged class.  Hugh Wolfe is not the average 
mill-worker—he is someone exceptional, an “infant genius”—someone with “stronger 
powers than many men,” an outsider even among the mill hands, who feel that with his 
“foreign thoughts and longings he is not “one of themselves” (435,438-40).  “‘You have
it in you to be a great sculptor, a great man’” the Doctor tells Hugh (440).  Thus the effort 
to represent an individual working-class experience is displaced by a representation of the 
travails of an aspiring middle-class artist whose “morally ambiguous art”—like that of
the narrator who tells his story—sidesteps the problem even as it attempts to answer it.
As Lang points out, this erasure of class issues under the auspices of art is a 
gendered process:  art is typified here as the domain of men—albeit curiously feminized 
men—who bring to life female creations.  While Hugh epitomizes artistic and creative 
talent—mind and soul—Deborah epitomizes the nurturing love of the ideal housewife; 
the salvation of each depends on the extent to which he or she is able to embody the 
gender ideals of the middle-class—gender ideals that (as Lang suggests) also help mask 
the story’s elision of the issue of class.  The “stray gleams of mind and soul’” that even 
young Kirby, the son of the mill owner, admits to seeing in Hugh are not the gleams of 
mind and soul that result in labor uprisings or typical class agitation (438, 440). Hugh’s 
quite plea to Doctor May is as one gentleman to another:  “Will you help me?” Yet 
Wolfe’s gentlemanly plea is not enough to save him, despite the artistic credentials he
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brings with him, whereas Deborah’s capacity for love—although it does not save Hugh— 
at least enables her to save herself.  We could argue that on some level “Life in the Iron 
Mills” is a record of a female artist’s attempt to negotiate between the competing claims 
of the masculine prerogative to produce and the woman’s injunction to nurture and that 
the decision in Deb’s favor is meant to resolve Davis’ own ambivalence about the value
of following these competing paths, an ambivalence that will resurface in future stories. 
We should note, however, that love’s efficacy is once again limited to the home and to 
the afterlife; the Quaker who comes too late to save Hugh only saves Deb by removing 
her from the city life and into the hills that evoke the celestial city.  Like the “negro-like
river” Deb eventually  finds her way to the “air, and fields, and mountains—to the “broad, 
wooded slopes and clover-crimsoned meadows” that surround the Quaker meeting house6 
(430, 450).   But this redemption is predicated on her removal from the city and the
people who are presumably abandoned to their ruin, except when a stray Quaker wanders 
in to save them, usually too late.
We could continue to illustrate the story’s systematic effacement of working class 
embodiment and agency:  it is noticeable, for example, that the group of men who visit 
the iron mill are differentiated by their personalities and occupations—and capacities for 
free thought and agency—in ways that Hugh is not, although to him the men, especially 
young Mitchell, are themselves symbolic of “Man all-knowing, all-seeing, crowned by 
Nature, reigning,” representative of something he longs for rather than distinct 
individuals—themselves types of of the bourgeois liberal male who is valorized
throughout the story (441).   Yet Hugh’s voice is not the one that prevails in the story; his
6The thoughts in these last two paragraphs owe a significant debt to Lang’s reading of “Life in the Iron
Mills.” For this particular point see page 140 of her essay.
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presence is almost completely effaced at the mill except as it functions as an illustration 
of the exception to the norm, an exception that threatens to stabilize the visitors’ view of 
the fitness of the things.  Kirby’s visitors, out on a leisurely tour of the works, talk about 
and above Hugh, critical of each other while the narrator criticizes them, even as the story  
is directed towards their real-life counterparts.  The narrator is the story’s controlling 
voice, and for him Hugh and Deb are mostly tokens—types—just as Mitchell and his ilk 
are to them, while Mitchell, May and the readers they stand for are individuated enough
to bear primary responsibility for the conditions the texts unveils.  Hugh is both idealized 
and feminized throughout the story even as his capacity to transcend the limitations of his 
soot-covered body is denied him.  He cannot inhabit “Mitchell’s privileged, free, 
disembodied position, one unhampered by negative denotations of class and race”
without the help of Mitchell and others who do inhabit it (Miles 94).  Instead, he is 
constrained to function as untapped potential, an artist trapped in a working man’s body. 
When he accepts the stolen check from Deb—an action excused, as we have seen, on the 
grounds that it is motivated by a woman’s love—he  doesn’t immediately attempt to cash 
it or flee the scene but wanders around town drinking in the color and beauty of the 
setting sun that represents the life he has been denied.  He is less frustrated by his
physical ills than by his mental and spiritual ones; what he ultimately wants is not 
money—which the author knows would makes him a less sympathetic character—but 
“Beauty, Content, and Right” (444).  “A consciousness of power stirred within him,” the 
narrator tells us; “a man,—he thought, stretching out his hands,—free to work, to live, to 
love! Free!  His right!” (444).
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Hugh’s plea for rights and freedom rather than for anything more grossly 
materialistic is meant to signal his middle-class birthright, his fitness for induction into 
the bourgeois liberal dream; the ironic juxtaposition of these civilized desires with his 
working-class dependency forms the substance of the narrator’s appeal to her audience. 
Simultaneously insisting on both his capacity for enlightenment and his absolute 
impotence, the narrator intersperses her grim tale with aggressive interrogations of her 
readers that are supposed to remind them that, unlike Hugh, they do have agency; in fact, 
they have absolute power over whether or not he lives or dies.  Only her readers can
reach out to clasp the hands stretched out in hunger, hunger that cannot be dismissed as 
hunger for “meat” or whiskey” but as hunger for the right to live—and only individual 
actions by such readers can save men and women like Hugh and Deb (338).  But what 
kind of actions might these be?  The narrator clearly disapproves of Mitchell’s insistence 
that “no vital movement of the people’s has worked down, for good or evil” and that only  
one of the people can save the people (440).  Doctor May is pointedly criticized for
tacitly agreeing with Mitchell that praying that “power be might given these degraded 
souls to rise” fulfills his duty to those souls (440).  Yet as we have seen, the narrator’s 
own artistic intervention on Hugh’s behalf has equivocal results; the only action that the 
text seems able to endorse is the one modeled by the Quaker woman at the end of the
story: one person—a friend—reaching out to another with “slow, patient Christ-like 
love” (450).  Mitchell and May are both condemned for assuming that the impossibility of 
saving all the men excuses them for saving one; neither May’s lack of funds nor
Mitchell’s scruples about interfering in cross-class situations—about assuming that his
“pity” for Wolfe justifies his interference in Wolfe’s affairs—are treated as legitimate
50
excuses for inaction.  The Quaker whose Christ-like and far-reaching sense of 
compassion will be modeled by other female figures in future Davis novels is the kind of 
private philanthropist the text seems designed to produce.  As we have seen, this kind of 
philanthropy is not figured as particularly effective, but—as we have also seen—the text 
is designed to preclude the possibility that readers might take refuge in imaginary acts of 
compassion rather than actually attempt their own; there is supposed to be some measure 
of shame involved in depicting the story’s moneyed elite as pre-empted by a lowly 
Quaker—some burden born by the audience in recognizing that they (or their fictive 
counterparts) were actually present in the town that the Quaker had to travel to get to.
In short, the story’s goals are not to represent or even to imagine working class 
individuals who might be different or unknowable in ways that ought to be both explored 
and respected or to argue that laborers’ need better working conditions and better pay 
regardless of their apparent ability to appreciate it or to motivate the working class to rise 
up in its own behalf, to understand its own strength and capacity to inaugurate change; 
rather, its goals are to present middle-class readers with characters who under all their
dirt and grim look very similar to them—who exhibit not only incipient traits of 
bourgeois respectability but even exceptional capacities, appropriately gendered, for 
societal contributions that can be recognized as such by the established class—so that 
those readers will be inspired to undertake the private acts of philanthropy that lift those 
of their inferiors who prove to be extractable out of the cycle of poverty and exploitation. 
This is not to deny that compassion often involves making a connection between one’s 
own needs and capacities and the needs and capacities of others; as Glenn Hendler has 
pointed out, sentimental literature of the period has the tendency to conflate feeling like a
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character with feeling with a character, to confuse an “analogy it posits between 
[subjects] with an illusory and risky coincidence between them,” but Hendler rightly 
remarks that this confusion can have the seemingly paradoxical effect of allowing the 
sympathizer to expand the boundaries of class and family by insisting that marginalized 
Americans are in fact indistinguishable from middle-class family members (121). 
Whether or not Davis has actually achieved—or even attempted—an accurate 
representation of the lives of individual members of the working class, she nevertheless 
insisted upon seeing them in the same light in which she views family and friends, 
deliberately juxtaposing her position with Mitchell’s, who insists that recognizing the 
irreducible otherness of the working class precludes intervention in their affairs.  Davis 
also makes the valid point that many people confined to the working class have the 
talents and abilities to contribute to society in more complex ways than they are often 
allowed to do, that the working class is not a homogenous mass of ignorance and feral 
desires, a prejudice clearly more widely prevalent—or at least more openly voiced—in 
the nineteenth century than in the twenty-first.  Yet perhaps for that reason, Davis seems 
unable to conceive of a middle ground in which otherness and intervention are not 
represented as mutually exclusive.  Her strategy for evoking sympathy involves imbuing 
her working class protagonists with recognizably bourgeois tendencies to sublimate and 
aestheticize their physical desires and material needs; it also reinforces a top-down social 
hierarchy in which middle-class hegemony is extended without counter-pressure being 
exerted from below.
In States of Sympathy: Seduction and Democracy in the American Novel,
Elizabeth Barnes argues that many post-revolutionary and antebellum novelists, male and
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female, “employ sympathetic identification to reinforce a familial model of politics that 
subordinates difference to sameness and that teaches readers to care for others as if they  
were reflections of themselves” (17).  Such novelists sought to reconcile liberalism’s 
emphasis on independence and self-regulation with a republican investment in the good 
of the body politic through the practice of sympathy as modeled in or elicited through 
fictional narratives. Sympathy becomes a way of regulating one’s own emotions by
making them responsive and responsible to others while at the same time imagining those 
others as similar to or even coextensive with oneself; the practice of sympathy was also 
understood to perform a public function by creating and maintaining a version of cultural 
and political cohesion modeled on family structure, one in which the public is articulated 
by way of the private and the collective by way of the individual, but an individual whose 
private desires are already constrained by an imaginative appreciation of the needs of 
others, construed as versions of himself.  Barnes also points out that the cultivation of 
sympathy was not considered a gendered enterprise in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries to the extent that it would become later in the nineteenth century. 
Citing the influence of Adam Smith as well as the general tendency of Enlightenment 
thinkers to understand sensibility or right feeling not as antithetical to reason but as 
necessary for its proper exercise, especially in the realm of moral judgment, Barnes notes 
that sentimental novels were the provenance of both men and women and—in America— 
performed the important task of articulating and regulating the proper but essential 
exercise of emotion within the national body.  Both post-revolutionary novels of
seduction and the domestic fiction that eventually replaced them shared an understanding 
of the political importance of rightly negotiating the claims of feeling or sentiment within
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the domestic sphere, of understanding the well-ordered family to be the model for the 
well-ordered nation; it was not until later in the nineteenth century that women’s 
domestic fiction became increasingly exempt from public discourse, as “liberal women” 
writing in the wake of the Civil War found (as Nina Baym observes) “the redemptive 
possibilities of enlightened domesticity no longer credible.”
We can watch this shift from sympathy to sentimentalism taking place not just 
within the Davisean corpus but in the middle of Davis’s first novel, Margret Howth, 
which was published a year after “Life in the Iron Mills.” But the important thing to 
recognize about “Iron Mills” is that despite being neither a novel of seduction nor a work 
of domestic fiction it sets itself to the task of modeling and eliciting the kind of sympathy 
that Barnes describes and that Davis intends and understands to be “a value scheme for 
ordering all of life, in competition with the money and exploitation that is perceived to 
prevail in American society” (Baym 27).   By putting a dysfunctional but recognizably 
middle-class version of a working-class family at its center, Davis literally takes the 
domestic and the sentimental out of the home and places it in the marketplace, forcing 
readers to recognize the mirror image of their own lives within the working class 
environment.  Emotional responses are then extorted from readers who are seduced 
through descriptions that (as we have seen) are tied less to the travails of any specific 
individual than to existential conditions wrought in sensational detail, conditions clearly 
unconscionable for characters who contain the germs of respectability.  Yet the seduction 
is immediately—sometimes even simultaneously—harnessed to sympathetic recognition 
that prevents the self-indulgent enjoyment of emotion as an end in itself and entails 
rational social action, sympathy as public duty, as the foundation for civil society and the
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patriotic basis for resisting the corrosive effects of industrialization. Family ought to be 
treated like family; people who “act like us” ought to be treated like us—a principle 
whose Kantian echoes Davis invokes alongside a deliberate re-limning of the boundaries 
of the family circle.
It is understandable that Davis would make a last desperate appeal to family 
resemblance and human commonality at the onset of a war that pitted brother against 
brother and played out in her back yard, a war that suggested both in its cause and 
consequences that sectional and racial differences were unbridgeable and more 
fundamental to human self-recognition than sympathetic relations—a war whose 
motivations were indistinguishable, in her mind, from those that generated the inferno of 
the iron mills; nevertheless, it is also important to recognize that the notion of sympathy 
Davis promotes even here is essentially a conservative one, implicated in the erasure of 
difference typical of Enlightenment ideology and committed to a conception of public 
duty that depends solely on private intervention rather than collective action.  The 
aggressive but masturbatory quality of Davis’s polemic foreshadows the dilemma at the 
heart of this notion of sympathy and, by extension, at the heart of the American 
democratic project, a dilemma intensified in her later sentimental fiction and endemic to 
sentimental fiction in general:  the difficulty involved in generating compassion for the 
problems of others whose otherness has to be “erased” in order for sympathy for them to 
be imagined or legitimized at all.  If readers are meant to save and weep over Hugh 
Wolfe whose identity has been evacuated of any substance beyond an idealized creative 
potential that mirrors their own bloodless values, the rhetoric has to overcompensate to
manufacture grief both for the pseudo-character and the pseudo-loss.  Moreover, if one of
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the differences persistently (or increasingly) denied in literary and political discourses of 
the nineteenth century—discourses attempting to manufacture solidarity out of a nation 
conceived out of autonomy, individualism and capitalist (self) interest—is the difference 
of gender itself, then female writers have the choice either of masquerading as men to 
continue to insist on the public value of their already etiolated concept of sympathy or of 
surrendering any claim to intervention in a public sphere dominated increasingly by 
materialistic and “rationalist” values, instead retreating into the home to reify emotions 
already thoroughly inflected with patriarchy.  In “Life in the Iron Mills” Davis makes the 
former choice, but after 1862 she will increasingly make the latter.
In the afterword to the 1990 feminist press edition of Margret Howth Jean Fagan 
Yellin recounts the “feminization” process by which Davis’ polemical manuscript “The 
Deaf and the Dumb” was transmogrified—at the behest of her publisher James T. Fields, 
then editor of The Atlantic Monthly, who objected to the book’s “gloomy” tone—into the 
sentimental “Story of Today” and eventually published in book form as Margret Howth, 
enacting—literally mid-text—Davis’ devolution from pioneering realist to popular 
women’s writer (Yellin 271).  Clearly, Fields wanted Davis to mold Margret Howth 
along the lines of the domestic fiction of the period, putting Margret at the center of the 
story as a young woman who experiences personal hardships—in this case, as in most 
domestic fiction, family impoverishment—and consequently develops the independence,
strength, and various inner resources necessary to guarantee her survival, the unique twist 
in this case being that instead of going to work as a teacher or seamstress Margret takes a
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job as an accountant in a woolen mill.7     In addition to the imposition of gainful 
employment, Margret is exposed to another hardship, that of being recruited by the 
fanatical socialist Dr. Knowles in his scheme to start a charitable phalanstery.  In the nick 
of time, however, she is rescued by her repentant lover Stephen Holmes, who abandons 
his cold-blooded “Fichtean” independence partly under her influence and partly because 
the mill on whose ownership he had staked his hope of independence—the same mill in 
which Margret is forced to work—burns down and leaves him chastened and injured 
although fortunately not permanently maimed, despite the instructive example of his 
literary forerunner, Mr. Rochester.  Yet Yellin conjectures that in the original story that
Davis wanted to publish she allowed Holmes to be killed in the fire that destroys the mill 
and doomed Margret to “live out her days supporting her parents by working among the 
slum-dwellers with Dr. Knowles,” a hypothesis that accounts not only for the jarring 
disjunction between the book’s declared intention to avoid easy romanticism and its 
cloying conclusion but also for the difference in chronological structure between the 
chapters leading up to the fire—which take place over the span of forty-eight hours—and 
those coming after it, which unfold over the course of a year (Yellin 295).
The question becomes, then, to what degree the published version differs in its 
aims and achievements from its hypothetical original version—how much the transition 
from sympathy to sentiment really alters the novel’s agenda.  Does its capitulation to the 
trajectory of the decaying genre of domestic fiction compromise its basic value 
commitments or—as in “Iron Mills”—is its notion of sympathy “always already”
compromised by its inability to imagine an outside to the social and political paradigms
7Here I’m referencing Nina Baym’s analysis of the stock plotline of American eighteenth-century domestic 
fiction.
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in which it is enmeshed?  In the sentimental version that we have inherited the two 
competing male protagonists are brought to a recognition of the error of their ways and 
recouped under the aegis of the domestic, which is figured as the only possible salvation 
for a town and—by implication—a society and nation that teeters on the brink of selling 
out not simply to vulgar material interests but to the rationalist and socialist ideals that 
both enable and occlude those interests.  Holmes is a “Fichtean,” as Davis labeled him in 
her letters to Fields, someone who models “the development in common vulgar life of the 
Fichtean philosophy and its effect upon a self-made man,” and Dr. Knowles is a socialist, 
a follower of Fourier, Saint Simon and Comte (qtd. in Yellin 288).  Fichte, Fourier and 
Comte are unfamiliar names to many twenty-first century readers, but Davis identified 
them all with forms of idealism that unhealthily subordinated the personal and the 
emotional to the rational and the scientific; she had little interest in doing justice to their 
actual theoretical complexities rather than pointing out that such complexities were often 
lost—as they seemed to be to her—in their translation into everyday conduct guides.
As Mr. Howth and Dr. Knowles debate the relative merits of feudalism and 
socialism in the opening pages of the novel, Margret is a silent auditor whose thoughts 
and emotions are portrayed as highly susceptible to her father’s romantic portraits of 
suffering and heroism in the days of chivalry; only those ideals that are rooted in the 
emotions have any intelligibility to her.  For her and for Davis, Holmes’ living 
Fichteanism consists in a version of liberalism that makes no gestures, however specious, 
to incorporating sympathy into its agenda, despite the fact that Fichte himself made a 
distinction between the practical freedom of the ethical self and the necessary inter- 
subjectivity of the theoretical self.  Comte too—the father of modern sociology—was
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critical of what he called the metaphysical stage of human existence, which he associated 
with the liberalism of post-revolutionary France; his own solution was to replace a
society based on freedom and rights with one bent on collective pursuit of the communal 
good.  Yet both men arrived at their respective concepts of inter-subjectivity and social 
cooperation through a process of scientific investigation into what they believed to be the 
organizing principles of the human self and human society; they both used the word 
“science” to describe their lifelong ambitions to systematize human identity and history, 
whereas Davis was consistently suspicious of any social schemes that originated from a 
posture of detachment—of supposed “objectivity”—and that privileged reason, will, duty 
and universal benevolence over love and natural attachments, primarily those between 
husband and wife and parents and children.  In Margret Howth Davis seems presciently 
aware that detachment can breed a kind of proto-fascism, a willingness to treat other 
people as if they are specimens in a jar, as means to achieving one’s personal or political 
ends—an attitude that is all the more dangerous when those ends are conceived as 
promoting the elevation of the self or the human race as a whole.  The narrator describes 
Holmes as “practic[ing] self-denial constantly to strengthen his benevolent instincts,” and 
relates a story of Holmes “chuck[ing]” a dollar at a cripple who resented being treated
like a dog being tossed a bone (120-1).  “You will find no fairer exponent than this 
Stephen Holmes of the great idea of American sociology,—that the object of life is to 
grow,” she adds; “self-salvation, self-elevation,—the ideas that give birth to, and destroy 
half of our Christianity, half of our philanthropy!” (121).
The rational cultivation of self or social improvement is clearly linked in Margret
Howth to issues of control that Davis sees as inimical to Christian principles of
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contentment and surrender.  To attempt to be more than one is—to deny the more humble 
capacities and place in life God gives us—is to commit the sin of pride.  “God help you, 
Stephen!” Dr. Knowles warns Holmes early in the text:  “For there is a God higher than 
we.  The ills of life you mean to conquer will teach it to you” (118).  The place for 
Holmes’ pride lies not in the cultivation of a self-determined and determining identity
that can worship itself as its own creator but in its reconfiguration in a more limited role, 
under God, as the master of a wife and home.  By surrendering his ambition to master 
himself and by extension the world (since the world only exists as a manifestation of the 
will of the determining self, in Davis’ “vulgar” articulation of Fichteanism) to instead 
take his rightful place in the home, once “life’s ills”—namely, an apocalyptic mill fire
that almost destroys along with his financial backing—have in fact taught him that “there 
is a God higher than we,” Holmes reclaims his rightful role as a creature not a creator, 
abandoning his attempt to replace or efface God.  The work Holmes has left to do in the 
public sphere remains vague and unspecified as the story closes—the home subsumes the 
novel’s world in much the way Holmes originally meant his self to subsume the world— 
but nevertheless, in his repentance Holmes is portrayed as closer to the right path than his 
continually frustrated friend Knowles, who at the end of the novel is still groping for 
answers to the perennial problem of suffering.  When robbed of his hubris, Holmes’ 
sturdy self-reliance, his yen for doing his immediate duty without worrying unduly about 
the workings and sufferings of those around him, is reconfigured as an asset—as long as 
that duty is understood to incorporate his obligations to his wife and family—whereas 
Knowles’ constant worry over the wrongs of the world, over “the cry of the slave and of 
nations going down in darkness” is condemned as the story closes.  In fact, Knowles
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becomes one of Holmes “unwilling” followers, “knowing him closer to the truth than 
he” (265).   The minister Vandyke, with whom Holmes deliberately allies himself after 
his own come-uppance, has the final say, a perspective that the narrator aligns with her 
own: “the instant peril of the hour”—the seeming urgency of the pervasive problem of 
human suffering—enables us not to intervene but to “lift clearer into view the eternal 
prophesy
of coming content,” making it possible for us to “hold no past and no future, to accept the 
work of each moment, and think it no wrong to drink every drop of its beauty and 
joy” (266).
Thus, the novel’s rejection of notions of individual freedom and autonomy for a 
commitment to familial inter-subjectivity ultimately facilitates a conservative agenda, one 
in which everyone and everything that cannot be incorporated into the family structure 
gets consigned to God and to the more perfect justice that will only be made manifest in 
and after death.  In fact, suffering and death become the means by and through which we 
legitimize our nonintervention in larger matters of human justice, since it teaches us to 
surrender hope for—and aid in—the amelioration of suffering in this life and to accept
the limitations attendant upon our finite lives and wills.  Love is the answer, not justice, 
and love by nature has its limits, at least according to Margret Howth:  it is an intensely 
personal emotion closely tied to biology and to natural instincts, especially those of 
women, who are always portrayed as having a desperate and almost ungovernable 
passion for a husband and children which somehow becomes distorted and unnatural if it 
is redirected into works of universal benevolence.  Men, on the other hand, have to be 
trained to recognize and prioritize their passion for any specific woman or for their 
“longing for rest, on something, in something,” rather than continue to feed their egos
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and prize their autonomy and ambition, and a great deal of Davis’s corpus is directed 
towards this task, towards domesticating male energy (122).  In fact, one of the more 
consistent features of her writing—and its crucial difference from the tradition of 
domestic fiction described by Nina Baym, which was often directed (albeit 
conservatively) towards promoting female independence and self-assertion as a 
prerequisite for entering into matrimonial bonds—is its emphasis on women’s intense 
investment in domestic love and happiness, which exert pressure on men to conform to 
family values.   Men are the real source of Davis’s concern because their values are the 
ones that will—or that primarily do—shape the nation.  In novels like Dallas Galbraith 
(1868) and John Andross (1874), for example, the protagonists are men who open 
themselves up to social scorn that sometimes seems disproportionate—to modern 
readers—to the nature of their infractions.  However, Davis clearly wants that scorn to 
warn men against capitulating to standard masculine vices, vices which are tied to the 
temptation to power and sordid money-getting and that are only forsaken and forgiven 
through the influence exerted by the love of a good woman.
Stephen Holmes is a forerunner to such characters, although the pressure Margret 
exerts is a feeble thing compared to the more purely feminine power with which Davis 
will endow some of her later female characters (a power which she will limn with greater 
intensity as her female characters become more feminized and as her own writing is 
channeled away from the high-brow market represented by the Atlantic and towards a 
more popular female audience).  The desperate need to establish the power of women’s 
capacity for love as a controlling force in men’s lives so that women will not feel the
need to identify with marginalized characters in the humiliating way that Margret is
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forced to see herself in the tragic mulatto Lois or fall prey to Dr. Knowles’ charitable 
endeavors—much like Jane Eyre falling prey to St. John when she is forced to work in 
his charity School—seems to be the driving force behind Margret Howth, and religion 
becomes away of avoiding that potentially demoralizing identification.  After Holmes 
parts from Margret for what she believes to be the last time and Knowles finds her in a 
state of collapse by the roadside and drags her to a tavern that he’s converted into a poor 
house in order to prey on her emotions at her most vulnerable moment, Margret rallies 
and resists him by insisting that Christ “was a man, and loved as we do” rather than 
someone who expects her to give up her love for Holmes to serve the poor (157). 
Christianity thus works in the book primarily to provide the limit or counterforce to the
seductive pressure of sympathy, to prevent it from being extended outside of the bonds of 
family and to promote family itself—very narrowly defined—as central to social order: 
Holmes’ proposes to Margret on Christmas Eve and the entire book resolves in a 
triumphant celebration of the fact that coming of Christ has appropriately contained the 
problem of suffering.  “Even the lowest slave half-smiled, on waking, to think it was 
Christmas-day,” the chastened and reclaimed Holmes imagines as he leaves the scene of 
his betrothal (245).
We could argue, then, coming back to our original question, that in killing off 
Holmes in what Yellin speculates might have been the original ending for “The Deaf and 
the Dumb,” Davis could have been enacting a moment of artistic revenge on a male 
character who refuses to be seduced into domesticity, the moral being that men who hurt 
women by refusing to love and marry them are better off—for themselves and for society
—dead.  It seems clear even in the opening chapters of Margret Howth that Davis
63
did not intend for self-renunciation in the service of others to be read as the best outcome 
in life for women or for anyone, despite the original title’s apparent prioritization of the 
concerns of the unheard and the voiceless and its possible assignment of the task of
taking care of them to Margret, once Holmes is out of the picture.  As we have seen, 
Davis’ preferred solution to such concerns—evident not just in Margret Howth but 
throughout her entire corpus, beginning with “Life in the Iron Mills”—is to incorporate 
the less fortunate into the structures of already-constituted middle-class families just like 
Deb in “Iron Mills” is adopted by the Quakers or the mulatto Lois is adopted by middle- 
class families of the town community in Margret Howth or several other embattled 
African-Americans are adopted by the saintly young matron Ross Garrick in Waiting for 
the Verdict, whose “hearth and home would take in all the orphans of the world,” her 
husband recounts fondly (340).  Dr. Knowles is characterized as something of a brutal
and oppressive force throughout Margret Howth; his frantic “groping” after the answer to 
the problem of human suffering is continually contrasted to the light of Christ that 
prevents even the “fetid dens” and “deepest mires of body” from seeming completely 
impenetrable (91).
The difference, then, between the original and final versions of the text probably 
lay less in their underlying values than in their different methods of promoting and 
reproducing those values.  In constructing an initial story that consigned Margret to 
Knowles rather than to Holmes, Davis might have been endorsing a narrative agenda 
similar to that of “Life in the Iron Mills”: denying readers the satisfaction of a happy 
ending in order to impress them with a sense of their real-life responsibility to fix things 
themselves, using fiction to provoke emotions that are not resolved or resolvable within
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the text or within the experience of reading the text—and provoking emotions that are not 
only tragic rather than comedic but that deny readers the potential catharsis involved in 
invoking emotions through literary and rhetorical strategies that might prevent them from 
losing sight of their own powers of judgment in the midst of their pity.  Yet ultimately,
the goal of such an agenda is still the valorization of private philanthropy, of bourgeois 
liberal morality—morality conceived in the first half of the story as a potent antidote to 
contemporary political and social ills and in the rewritten second half reified, within the 
closing chapters of a woman’s novel, as a consolation prize for its failure to achieve the 
kind of cultural authority to which it originally aspired, but still middle-class morality 
from first to last, with all its insistence on moderation, caution, uniformity, conformity, 
and the careful cultivation and maintenance of boundaries between uplifting and 
corrosive inclusions of others.
One of the curious facts about the novel, but about the first seven chapters 
especially, is that they contain very little action:  they revolve around descriptions of the 
protagonists’ personalities and states of mind or around conversations about ideas that do 
little to propel the action, except to the extent that measuring ideas and different ways of 
being in the world are in fact what the novel is about.  The novel is pervaded by 
ruminations, by a spirit of rumination, in which it is often unclear whether the characters 
themselves are thinking or the narrator is thinking about and for them, a version of third- 
person omniscient in which the narrator is such a frequent and close commentator on the 
characters’ thoughts that she comes across as a mother attempting to interpret the speech 
of an inarticulate child.  She positions herself, in fact, as an interpreter, a sympathetic 
liaison between her conflicted characters and her resistant readers.  Much like “Life of
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the Iron Mills,” the story opens with an extended address by the narrator, who is 
determined to take readers away from the scenes and subjects they usually expect and 
plunge them into an experience she expects them to resist, a strategy reinforced by 
frequent appeals to the reader and counter assertions to these imagined appeals by the 
narrator:  “you think” often followed by “I say.”  This time, however, the narrator is not 
taking readers from the sanitized interior of a store or office or library to the “foul 
effluvia” of the iron mills but in the opposite direction—from the “bloody glare” of war 
to the “crude and homely” commonplace, a move also prompted by a relic, not an statue 
of korl but an old iron-bound ledger; yet Davis clearly believes her impetus to be the 
same, the desire to deny her readers—who are again conceived as male, while the 
narrator here seems more recognizably female—anything that smacks of escapism or 
idealism—aestheticism or heroism—in order to remind them of their everyday 
obligations to virtue (“Mills” 431, Margret 6).  In fact, she specifically directs herself to 
the bourgeois need to escape the “common” as manifested in the current cant on the war:
Your ears are openest to the war-trumpet now.  Ha! that is spirit- 
stirring!—that wakes up the old Revolutionary blood! Your manlier 
nature has been smothered under drudgery, the poor daily necessity
for bread and butter.  I want you to go down into this common, every-day 
drudgery, and consider if there might not be in it also a great warfare (6).
These romantic expectations are anticipated and then denied throughout the story, 
each time the narrator introduces a new character; and although we might think that even 
in these early chapters Davis exhibits the inferior realist’s schizophrenic tendency to 
sentimentalize the commonplace in ways that make it even more cloying than the
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romance, avoiding sentimentalism is not Davis’ goal; harnessing it to right action is, and 
what she relinquished in moving from the more dialectical mode of the first half of the 
novel to the more purely saccharine (and probably revised) mode of the second half of 
the novel is the aggressive appeal to individual agency and personal responsibility.  The
goal of the novel’s self-celebratory final chapters is not to provoke people into action but 
to indulge their sense of self-complacency, to allow them to feel that in reading about the 
reconciliation between Margret and Holmes or about Lois’ triumph death—all wrapped 
up in a glowing Christmas package—they have witnessed the world being set to rights in 
ways that exempt them from further action; and indeed—as we have repeatedly seen— 
the novel closes with a belabored insistence that the larger wrongs of the world are not 
ours to correct but to surrender to the contentment of today and the acceptance of our
own finitude.
Although this message might at first seem to directly contradict the message of 
“Life in the Iron Mills,” my simple point here is that despite Davis’ much-rued transition 
from serious to sentimental novelist after the publication of Margret Howth (or right in 
the middle of it, as we have discussed), a transition that is rightly attributed—since she
apparently protested, albeit weakly, the mutilation of her original story—to contemporary 
prejudices and preconceptions about women’s participation in the literary marketplace,
the conservative values that underlie even the seemingly progressive text “Life in the Iron 
Mills” probably made that transition much more logical and inevitable than it might 
otherwise seem.   If the plan for achieving social transformation entails eliciting 
sympathetic recognition from middle-class citizens on behalf of characters whose latent 
capacity for bourgeois respectability might not be immediately clear outside of the pages
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of a novel—and if, in addition, “bourgeois respectability” involves prioritizing 
appropriately gendered domestic virtues over a corrupt money culture—then the 
corrective to a male-driven business culture is still a male-dominated family circle.  None 
of Davis’s writing is the traditional eighteenth-century domestic fiction that critics like 
Baym and Jane Tompkins praise for being subversively invested in establishing women
at the centers of homes and homes at the heart of the nation, fiction in which male 
validation and concerns are often and surprisingly peripheral.  Davis’s homes are male- 
centered too; reflecting back over her major texts reveals how few of her female 
characters are provided with strong maternal or sororal support or the opportunity to 
develop self-sufficiency or even to figure prominently or positively in the plots at all. 
Davis wrote many novels and short stories over the course of her career that featured men 
as protagonists and title characters, but she protested turning “A Story of Today” into one 
of her few woman-entitled works, rightly claiming that Margret was “the completest 
failure in the story, besides not being the nucleus of it” before acquiescing to Fields’ 
demands (qtd. in Yellin 290).
This is not to suggest that Davis should not be praised for protesting the 
repercussions of industrial capitalism run amuck, including the valorization of sentiment. 
She should also be commended for suggesting that family or community values, not 
business ones, ought to be at the center of national life and for insisting that political 
activism can and will be at its most effective when grounded in the cultivation of private 
virtue—virtue which places emotion at the service of individual commitments to 
extending the family circle to include the underprivileged.   However, we would be 
remiss to deny that Davis’ notion of family is a conservative one and that she seems
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determined to see its survival as contingent upon men’s continuing commitment to lead
it.  Her writing betrays an anxiety endemic to much of the decadent sentimental fiction of 
the late nineteenth century, anxiety that domestic life and virtue—and consequently, 
women’s power and sphere of influence—are being pushed to the margins of national life 
and that the only way to exert any counter-pressure or to provide women with any
comfort in this scenario is to continuously construct fictive worlds in which men are held 
hostage to hyper-refined standards of conduct.  Davis was clearly writing in the lull that 
superseded women’s domestic fiction and that preceded the political resurgence of 
women’s voices at the end of the nineteenth century.
One of the unsurprising and unfortunate consequences of Davis’ position in this 
struggle over national identity and culture—which I will mention briefly in closing our 
discussion of Margret Howth—is that she becomes increasingly willing to sacrifice 
characters who prove incapable of assimilation into the nuclear family model. Besides 
Lois and her father the convict—and the Howths’ marginally literate but self-important 
servant, who exemplifies the potential dangers of a democracy that makes its freedoms 
too readily available to a marginally educated underclass—there are no significant lower- 
class characters in Margret Howth, and the few who are present are depicted as outside 
the pale of redemption.  Lois is black as well as deformed, and like Deb from “Iron
Mills” her only hope of salvation lies in the thoroughness with which she manifests a 
saintly interior that purifies the taint of her repellant exterior and the serenity with which 
she waits for eternal salvation.  Yet Deb is allowed to be weak—and allowed to be 
reclaimed and reformed on earth—in ways that Lois is not; apparently there is a 
difference between physical deformity that is either directly or indirectly attributable to
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human error and that which “sets Lois apart from the poorest of the poor—the taint in her 
veins of black blood” (MH 56).  The consolations of religion are underplayed in “Life in 
the Iron Mills” in order to emphasize the value of earthly intervention in the fight against 
social injustice, whereas Lois’ happiness is quite clearly dependent on a hope of heaven 
that involves—and enables—letting go of any expectation of equity here on earth.  When 
Hugh Wolfe dies society is to blame; when Lois dies God is to blame, and heaven alone 
can rectify her wrongs.  Lois is denied even the advantage of physical beauty typical of 
tragic mulatto figures of the period, nor is her lack of physical appeal portrayed as 
potentially liberating in any secular sense, à la Jane Eyre.  The only compensation for 
physical disfigurement in Davis’ oeuvre is religion, and the loss or absence of beauty is 
consistently depicted as a tragedy for all women, since it often deprives them of the 
opportunity to fulfill their true destiny, marriage.  Even on her deathbed Lois experiences 
a pang of regret at the sight of a pretty young girl in her wedding dress, and Margret 
herself is forced to face the pain that Davis insists on attributing to all her female 
characters who despair of finding a man: the self-loathing that comes from being denied 
“every woman’s right,—to love and be loved” (MH 60). There are two kinds of wrongs
in Davis’ novels, those inflicted by God and those inflicted by man, and ugliness in 
women and black blood in anyone belong to the former category and can only find 
alleviation in an appeal to their source.  The suffering of (the best of) the working class 
can be ameliorated if their superiors will set their priorities right and help them rise to 
their natural place; but martyrdom is the only outcome for those who identify with the 
deaf and the dumb, either by choice or necessity.
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Davis does, however, makes a distinction between the martyrdom of necessity 
and the martyrdom of choice:  Lois has no alternative but to trust in something outside
the boundaries of the material and the immediate if she wants any happiness in this life at 
all, whereas Margret at least has the consolation of her whiteness and class status, 
something she clings to very closely in chapter two when she rides into town—to her job 
at the wool factory—on Lois’ peddler’s wagon, simultaneously recognizing and denying 
the similarities between their lots in life.  All three of the story’s major middle-class 
characters are given the choice between lives lived in the service of high ideals and lives 
lived for ordinary human satisfactions; their internal conflicts over these competing
goods (if they are both goods) drive the story’s action, as the narrator wanders in and out 
of their individual consciousnesses, using Lois as a foil against which to measure all 
three.  Margret has to decide between marrying Holmes and assisting Knowles and her 
choice is constrained by Holmes’ choice between a “self-actualization” that abjures 
affection and an embrace of domestication that comes at the expense of his life dreams. 
Yet despite the paucity of these choices, Margret’s destiny still entertains the possibility 
of agency in a way that Lois’s does not.
As Shirley Samuels has pointed out, critical assessments of the political value of 
nineteenth-century sentimental literature always involves negotiating between “a 
dismissal of the sentimental move outside or beyond the boundaries of a gendered and 
racialized body—a move seen as a betrayal of the specific embodiment figured—and, 
alternately, a celebration of the emancipatory strategies of a sentimentality that rescues 
subjects from the unfortunate essentializing that the fact of having a body entails” (5).
71
Because of its susceptibility to the influence of rationalism and materialism or the 
unacknowledged need to impose a certain vision of the world onto others, 
sentimentalism, even in its least sentimental versions, often proves inadequate to 
imagining the bodies of others—or anyone’s bodies, anyone’s embodied essence—in 
ways that would seem most likely to foster the connections that it seems bent on making, 
since the ability to imagine different and alien experiences—even if they are only 
imagined as different—seems to be as fundamental to genuine sympathy as the ability to 
imagine that others are having experiences exactly like our own.  When cultural
powerless is added to this basic blindness sympathy can degenerate into a fetishization of 
sameness that has potentially disastrous consequences.  However, none of this detracts 
from the recognition that sentimental fiction had an overt social mission and message that  
was potentially empowering to its nineteenth-century female audience, a message which 
claimed that surrendering control over one’s self, over one’s body and environment,
could allow a person to reclaim them all on a higher plane, even a plane ruled by a male 
Christian God—and that this spiritual realm is not only the true source of personal power 
but also the wellspring of social and political change.  Nevertheless, there are obvious 
limitations to this configuration of power even when healthily worked out, and when 
promoted from a position of ignorance about exactly what is possessed that needs to be 
surrendered it can become a nasty business of making pieties out of renouncing things
that have not been properly understood or desired to begin with.8
A young Henry James Jr. wrote devastating reviews for The Nation of both
Waiting for the Verdict and Dallas Galbraith, Davis’s next two novels after Margret
8  See Jane Tompkins Sentimental Designs for one of the earliest and best discussions of the Christian 
ideology that undergirds the sentimental novel.
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Howth.  In his review of Waiting for the Verdict—a novel that he deemed “monstrous”— 
James used the occasion to vent his spleen towards sentimental writing in general:
Nothing is more respectable on the part of a writer—a novelist—than the 
intelligent sadness that forces itself upon him on the completion of a 
dramatic scheme which is in strict accordance with human life and its 
manifold miseries.  But nothing is more trivial than the intellectual temper 
which, for ever dissolved in the melting mood, goes dripping and trickling 
over the face of humanity, and washing its honest lineaments out of all 
recognition…Spontaneous pity is an excellent emotion, but there
is nothing so hardening as to have your pity forever tickled and stimulated, 
and nothing so debasing as to become an agent between the supply and 
demand of the commodity (411).
In her spirited 1985 defense of the worldview of the sentimental novelist, Jane Tompkins 
argues that for sentimental writer, “a dramatic scheme which is in strict accordance with 
human life” is one that understands that life’s “manifold miseries” can be transcended 
through a recognition that “it is the spirit alone that is finally real” (Tompkins 133).  For 
such writers, to attempt to see the face of humanity “objectively” as James demands in
his review of Dallas Galbraith is to wash its lineaments out of recognition, to deprive its 
face of the spiritual aura and immanence that comprises its real essence (331).  Viewing 
Lois the deformed mulatto or the poor and outcast characters in Waiting for the Verdict as 
children of God rather than sub-par human beings is to perform both a revolutionary
social act and the most authentic kind of recognition; the point is not to see such 
characters as the world sees them or—more significantly—even as they see themselves,
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but to see them as they are capable of being seen by those who have been given the mind, 
eyes and love of God.  James seems incapable of critiquing these novels from their 
essentially religious viewpoint, but we can perhaps reformulate his critique along terms 
that his sentimentalist contemporaries might have understood by suggesting that the 
constant tickling and stimulating of pity he contrasts with genuine sympathy aroused by 
novelists who are not straining after moral affect could be symptomatic of sentimental 
writers’ limited conception of the way God’s eyes might work.  Why can’t God see Lois 
or Dr. Broderip from Waiting for the Verdict as something more replete than either 
deformed mulattos or dead saints?  Davis and sentimental novelists in general seem 
unable to entertain the idea that seeing people as God sees them rather than as the world 
often dismisses them may not be incompatible with portraying them as complex, 
embodied human beings.
Tompkins would doubtless argue that Protestant dualism and anti-materialism and 
the bodily disempowerment to which American culture often consigned women
prevented them from imagining a God who might have a redemptive purpose for people’s 
bodies as well as their souls.  Women’s only source of cultural power and resistance lay 
not just in a Christian ethic of renunciation but in a Christian ethic that demanded that 
renunciation be complete: a renunciation not just of the possibility of reclaiming the body  
in any sort of earthly incarnation but also of the possibility of even knowing or 
understanding one’s body to begin with.  The path to women’s freedom lay not through 
attempting to claim their own bodies but through persuading or forcing men to relinquish 
theirs, an act that is figured throughout Davis’ novels by the motif of disclosure, by the
act of making one’s life and body both transparent—through self-negation—and
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transparent to the gaze of others, an act symbolized in “Life in the Iron Mills” not only by 
Hugh literally offering up his body to the “white splendor of the moon” as he allows his 
blood to spill out on the floor—a martyr to Davis’ social message—but by his offering up 
the pale statue of the Korl woman in his place, as something his middle-class auditors and 
their real-life prototypes can embrace instead of his grime-covered body.  Something 
similar happens in Margret Howth and Davis’ other sentimental novels, except that these 
male characters are not asked to surrender their bodies altogether but to make them 
transparent to the controlling gaze of women who are recognizable as good because they 
themselves are not at the mercy of their bodies or of unhealthy emotions.  Revealing
one’s secrets—sometimes literally the secret of one’s body, as when the mixed-race 
doctor in Waiting for the Verdict exposes the secret of his blood to the white woman he 
hopes to marry—is the first step towards entering into sympathetic relationships with 
others.  “I want you to come right down with me,—here into the thickest of the fog and 
mud and foul effluvia,” the narrator of “Iron Mills” begins:  “There is a secret down 
there…I want to make it a real thing to you” (431).
In what follows I want to trace out this emphasis on disclosure in three of 
Davis’ sentimental novels and then compare it briefly to James and Howells handling of 
the same issue.  I have been arguing thus far in this chapter that despite Davis’ laudable 
attempt to wrest the discourse of sympathy out of its conventional and commodified 
packaging and clarify its intentions as well as extend its domain, this attempt has mixed 
results precisely because, for Davis, disclosure ultimately involves not the exposure of 
the “real” body (as opposed to its sentimentalized version) but its erasure altogether. 
What I want to do in closing, however, is recoup a bit of that ground by comparing
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Davis’ attitude towards disclosure to that of the realists who succeeded her—to James 
since he criticized her so harshly for her “unnatural” commitment to exposing Dr. 
Broderip’s secret but also to Howells who wrote a novel of passing in which he makes 
the Aunt who unhelpfully exposes her niece’s negro blood an avid reader of sentimental 
novels.  What reading Davis against Howells and James helps us do is recognize the 
degree to which the latter’s realism is predicated on the repression of certain kinds of 
experience—on the denial of sympathy to those who lack the possibility of assimilating 
into the sociopolitical world of the white bourgeois male.  Although Davis may not
completely recoup such characters either—choosing instead to consign them to God or to 
the uncertain aid of the art whose limitations she has already exposed—what she at least 
does is force their suffering to remain out in the open.  What I would also like to argue is 
that sentimental reform fiction’s failure to reclaim the lives and bodies of those it exposes 
to our (ideally) sympathetic gaze may ultimately be not because of its complicity in a 
problematic economic and political system but because of its complicity in human 
experience.  There are obvious dangers in suggesting that the problems to which 
sentimental fiction responds are in some sense unsolvable, but it is important to recognize 
that such fiction is at least registering the anguish involved in facing life and cultural 
issues so grave and so apparently irresolvable that some kind of mystification is required 
to face them at all–especially if the other alternative is to accept suffering as a “fact of 
life,” à la James in The Golden Bowl.  James puts Charlotte Verver, née Stant, in a “long 
silken halter” and leads her off to slaughter as complacently as if he held the ends of her 
rope himself, which he does—an aestheticization of the suffering of the “other” much 
more cold-blooded than anything Davis can devise (523).  Female sentimental writers are
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obviously displacing their own feelings of impotence onto the world around them in 
arguably unhealthy ways, but there is a sense in which their inability even to understand 
that they are doing this—except as dimly as Davis seems to feel it—is a manifestation of 
how appallingly deep their feelings of helplessness lie.
The three novels Davis published after Margret Howth all feature male 
protagonists.  Although two women share the spotlight in Waiting for the Verdict, neither 
of them is allowed the kind of life-altering experience that Davis bequeaths to her two 
male protagonists, one of whom reveals his negro blood near the novel’s end, loses his 
work and social standing but then leads a negro regiment in the Civil War until he dies a 
heroic death—the male counterpart of the tragic mulatta.  The other makes the ugly 
mistake of selling off a loyal family retainer because “Old Hugh” knows a secret that 
could disinherit his master, who is afterwards forced to go on a journey of penance to 
reclaim his servant and his own integrity.  Dallas Galbraith and John Andross also
feature title characters who, like Dr. Broderip in Waiting for the Verdict, keep secrets that 
according to sentimental convention they would be best advised to disclose, despite the 
potentially devastating consequences:  Dr. Broderip hides the secret of his negro blood, 
Dallas Galbraith the secret of his incarceration and John Andross the secret of his shady 
collaboration with a whisky ring modeled after the real-life Tweed Ring.   All three of the 
men possess temperamental, childlike, charismatic personalities—Romantic personalities
—that captivate everyone around them but that also make them subject to frequent moral 
vacillations, which Davis describes with a great deal of uneven melodrama.  
Consequently, the three men’s journeys toward maturation involve purging themselves of 
this susceptibility to error and, along with it, the tendency to hide and
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coddle their weaknesses and to avoid the kind of transparency necessary for integration 
into polite society.  Clearly, James says wryly in his review of Waiting for the Verdict, 
Davis has “read Dickens with great assiduity, to say nothing of “Jane Eyre” and 
“Wuthering Heights” (410).
What is potentially absurd about these three men’s secrets is that they rarely 
involve real sins:  presumably, a real sinner—a murderer, perhaps—would be beyond the 
pale of redemption and certainly of matrimonial consideration, despite the fact that John 
Andross’ criminally silly love interest—on whom Davis heaps a great deal of scorn— 
insists that if John had been a murderer she still would have loved him.  John is not a 
murderer, but he is certainly the worst of the three characters, since after being weak 
enough to do the dirty work for the corporation of a friend who pays for his “support and 
education” after his father’s death—and who keeps John chained to the corporation by 
blackmailing him with a tale that his father was a forger whose crime will be revealed to 
the world if John ever leaves—he steals money from another friend who has given him 
the chance to start afresh, unaware of his past; in fact, he steals the money in order to buy 
off the first friend who has come looking for him, afraid he will spill the corporation’s 
secrets.  All Dallas has to hide is a five-year incarceration for a forgery he didn’t commit 
but that he chooses to take the blame for—destroying the letter that could have
exonerated him—so that he can spare the fiancée of the man who has framed him.  Dr. 
Broderip has even less to hide, although his life itself could be called a forgery—an 
attempt to pass himself off as someone he is not.  To lie about one’s past—to forge one’s 
identity is the great Romantic sin; and disclosure—confession—offers the only chance 
for redemption, the necessary condition for integration into respectable society and for
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purging oneself of the subversive turmoil of the id.  “It is either a fool or a knave who 
must have secrets,” says the upright characters who has given John Andross his fresh 
start but who is not himself spared from confronting and expunging a capacity for falsity 
that manifests itself as lust for the same silly—and evil—female creature who leads John
astray and who is the one female character in all these novels who hordes her own secret, 
one that she refuses to reveal until she has wrought havoc on the lives of everyone around 
her.  In contrast, the “good” women in these novels are transparent as day:  the only one 
who possesses a secret reveals it unhesitatingly to the fastidious but wavering man who 
asks for her hand in marriage.
For Davis, encumbering her male characters with secrets from which only pure 
and honest women can liberate them comprises a large part of the her novels’ cultural 
work of bolstering and sustaining women’s precarious social power.  Each of these men 
is saddled with a host of faults characterized as especially pernicious to the maintenance 
of a well-ordered state, chief of which is an incapacity for self-regulation—specifically
an inability to negotiate between legitimate and illegitimate claims on sympathy.   Unlike 
Hugh Wolfe—who lacks personality altogether—or the stern and self-contained 
protagonist of Margret Howth, the heroes of Davis’ sentimental romances are 
(unsurprisingly) Byronic figures who lack fathers, maintain intense attachments to their 
mothers and possess an unfortunate tendency to form seductive friendships with 
degenerate older men.  Although an emotionally repressed and egocentric male like 
Holmes is usually placed somewhere in the novel as a foil to the childlike Byronic hero, 
the weakness that Davis is now intent on exposing is less the tendency to abjure emotion 
and personal attachments altogether but the susceptibility to the wrong kind of emotional
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attachments, although the end result still seems to be a greater susceptibility to the 
corrosive influence of money and power and the other depravities of modernity.  Both 
egotism and excessive emotionalism are inimical to tendencies need to be mitigating by 
the counter-pressure of relationships with the opposite sex.  In this new scenario, 
women’s cultural work consists less in coaxing men into appreciating the role that
sympathy and domesticity play in creating a democratic nation-state than in training them 
to direct and contain their emotions within forms of domesticity that won’t imperil the 
ordered workings of the republic, and the women best suited to this task are the ones who 
possess an incongruous mixture—which Davis unsuccessfully attempts to pass off as a 
delicate balance—of hearty commonsense and female submissiveness.  In these novels 
women themselves run the risk of becoming either frivolously self-indulgent, caricatures 
of real femininity like the perniciously flighty Anna Maddox in John Andross or 
dangerously masculine like Old Madame Galbraith, who invests all the money and 
attention she might have invested in her dead son and missing grandson into a utopian 
scheme for creating a self-supporting community of immigrants on the family land,
which she decides to drill for oil.
The oil that erupts and coats the entire landscape before Dallas returns to put out 
the fires and, in the process, to reveal his true identity and to assume his role as the family 
heir forms an obvious symbol for the simultaneous process of disclosure and containment 
that Davis understands to be necessary for the successful deployment of emotion in the 
service of communal enterprise.  Women who repress their emotions and men who 
overindulge them are both disadvantageous to progress, order and decency, although the 
opposite is not necessarily true—men who repress their emotions and women who
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indulge them usually only need to recognize their need to open themselves up to the 
stabilizing influence of the opposite sex.  In the new order of things, however, an order in 
which everyone seems liable to the self-delusion and overweening appetites fomented by 
consumer culture, the first order of business is to distinguish between wholesome and 
unwholesome emotions, between authentic and false or artificially inflated passions.
This is the primary business of John Andross, for example, which is a novel set in the 
corruption of the Grant administration and featuring a man who has difficulty saying no 
to people who tempt him into doing dishonorable deeds in the name of love and family 
honor, a man whose first business in life seems to be to make things easy for himself, 
who steals and evades instead of facing the consequences of his actions—who lets 
himself be influenced by second-rate women whose sole motivation is greed.  The goal 
the text sets for him is to recognize that feelings indulged at the expense of integrity 
inevitably lead to destruction; true love and friendship engender mutual progress towards 
self-control and the exercise of domestic and civic virtue, which are always mutually 
reinforcing.
What clearly frustrated James was the irony of an author attempting to make this 
kind of argument while suffering from obvious delusions about her own relationship with 
consumer culture and the realities of American life—an irony that can also strike a
twenty-first century reader confused about the seeming contradiction between Davis’ 
continuous condemnations of Romanticism and the overwrought artificiality of her own 
prose.  Obviously, Davis is not able to embrace the level of openness that James will later 
valorize in his texts; the position of (relative) empowerment from which Jamesian 
characters feel free to confront the limitations of their worldviews and open themselves
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up to new impressions is not an option for Davis’ women—although we could probably 
argue that it is never a completely realized option for James’ female characters either, 
who inevitably suffer for their attempts to push past the boundaries of the conventional. 
In fact, a case could be made that the entirety of James’ fictive corpus is dedicated to 
probing the limits that women’s vulnerability to exploitation places on their—or 
anyone’s—commitment to shedding received wisdom and immersing themselves in the 
flux of experience; no surprise then that for Davis, who recognizes more thoroughly than 
James the extent to which women’s potential for pain is exacerbated in a culture that 
promotes pliancy but rarely encourages its moderation, much less the delicate capacity 
for discrimination with which James invests his characters, disclosure is about
maintaining rather than undermining traditional values and social mores, about promoting 
the kinds of divulgence dedicated to self-discipline rather the self-exploration.
One of the secrets that Davis insists ought to be subject to exposure is the secret
of miscegenation and its tragic consequences, and I want to look now a little more closely 
at Davis’ contribution to tragic mulatto literature and the difference between her
treatment of Dr. Broderip in Waiting for the Verdict and that of Howells writing on the 
same issue a generation later.  One of the criticisms James makes of Waiting for the 
Verdict is the “unnaturalness” of Dr. Broderip’s decision to reveal his black blood to his 
fiancée and identify with his “negro brethren” rather than attempt to pass for white; and 
when Howells publishes his own novel of passing in 1891-2 he foregrounds a guardian 
aunt whose miserable compulsion to “out” her mixed-race niece is traceable to her 
“morbid sympathy with the duty-ridden creatures of the novelist’s brain” (55).  Howells’ 
narrator—a Dr.Olney who specializes in treating women who suffer from nervous
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disorders and who eventually marries the unfortunate niece, despite the taint of her 
blood—expands on his impressions of Rhoda’s Aunt Caroline in a criticism that has 
obvious implications for Davis’ fiction:
He remembered from that first talk of the winter before…that she had 
shown herself incapable of sinking the sense of obligation in the sense of 
responsibility, and that she apparently conceived of what she called living 
up to the truth as something that might be done singly; that right affected 
her as a body of positive color, sharply distinguished from wrong, and not 
shading into and out of it by gradations of tint, as we find it doing in 
reality.  Such a woman, he had vaguely reflected, when he came to
sum up his impressions, would be capable of an atrocious cruelty in 
speaking or acting the truth, and would consider herself an exemplary 
person for having done her duty at any cost of suffering to herself or 
others (55).
The title of Howells’ novel, An Imperative Duty, is meant to question how imperative this 
duty is.  As Paul R. Petrie points out in his introduction to a recent reissue of the novel— 
and as this quotation demonstrates—Howells’ attitude towards truth was colored by the 
pragmatic and utilitarian influences of his day; in general, in Howells’ fiction, truth is 
ultimately answerable to social utility, to a larger view of the ends that telling the truth 
will serve: the “sense of obligation” to the truth must be “sunk” in the “sense of 
responsibility” to others.  For Davis, however, there is no contradiction between these
two things; the obligation to truth is always the obligation to others—if one does not tell 
the truth, society will suffer; more specifically, women will suffer in very practical ways
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like lacking knowledge of the antecedents of the men who try to marry them, an 
ignorance which could have devastating consequences for their futures.  It isn’t an 
accident that the tragic mulatto in Waiting for the Verdict is a man—an effeminate man 
but still a man whose decision to hide his descent might have impressed even twenty-first 
readers as a caddish thing to do to Margaret Conrad, whose marriage will not only affect 
her already fragile future but the future of her blind and impoverished father.
The confrontation that occurs between Dr. Broderip and Miss Conrad is ultimately  
a measure of who has the most freedom in American culture—a very direct attempt, as 
sometimes occurs in Davis’ novels, to weigh white women’s power against that of other 
marginalized groups.  In the stand-off between Conrad and Broderip the winner is in 
many ways the latter, who even after his revelation and Margaret’s rejection has the 
support of his colleagues at the hospital, who respect his skill and character, as well as the 
option of leading a colored regiment into the war and dying in a blaze of glory and 
heroism while Margaret—much like Deb in “Iron Mills”—is left to languish in the here 
and now.  Although she too undertakes a heroic task after Dr. Broderip dies— teaching in 
a negro school—she is not able to find fulfillment and redemption in heroic work alone, 
and very few of those around her read her actions as heroic; her father (the text tells us) 
would rather have seen her a foreign missionary than a teacher at a negro school.  By the 
end of the novel it seems clear that Margaret will probably marry Broderip’s (white) rival 
who has been sanctified by his attendance on Dr. Broderlip’s deathbed and who wants to 
join Margaret in her sacrificial work.  As Amy Lang rightly observes, African-Americans 
were in some sense blank slates to white observers of the time period:  they were free to 
be inscribed with whatever potential artists saw fit to mark
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them, whereas white women or working class men were to a certain extent already bound 
and burdened by specific cultural markers (138-139).  Davis inscribes Dr. Broderip with 
all the markers of her stock romantic hero, a figure whom James disgustedly calls “a 
woman’s boy”—“unnatural, irrational, and factitious” and (the real reason for James’ 
irritation) completely dependent on women to shape and direct his social personality.  But 
by refusing Broderip her hand, Conrad frees him to direct his aspirations towards a higher 
standard than she can set for him, one that allows him to transcend his need for her
control and direction and achieve the otherworldly influence of a saint.
The “tragic mulatto” in An Imperative Duty is actually a “tragic mulatta,” as such 
figures typically were in literature of the period; and Rhoda’s double powerlessness as 
both a woman and a member of a despised class is emphasized by the careless freedom 
with which Dr. Olney rescues her from it, laughing at fears that continue to plague Rhoda 
herself as the novel ends.  What is interesting about the contrast between Davis’ and 
Howells’ stance on the issue of passing, however, is that the latter’s pragmatic and 
progressive ethics enable him to circumvent the racial issue while Davis’ commitment to 
truth at all costs forces readers to confront it, despite the fact that she allows them to 
displace some of the responsibility onto God.  Davis approach is very similar to that of 
Charles Chesnutt in The House Behind the Cedars: they both prevent their mixed-race 
characters from passing even though they are unable to imagine alternatives that do not 
force these characters to become martyrs.  Nevertheless, their willingness to pander to 
their audience’s religious and romantic sensibilities seems no less avoidant than Howells’ 
determination to dismiss the plight of mixed-race characters and the problem of race 
altogether; at least Waiting for the Verdict insists on making the sympathetic connection
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between Dr. Broderip’s tragedy and that of his browner brother Nathan, whereas An 
Imperative Duty stages a dramatic chapter in which Rhoda, after learning of her black 
ancestry, rushes out of her Aunt’s house and takes refuge in a negro church, where she is 
driven half-mad with repulsion at the “hideousness” of the church members before she 
runs back to her Aunt (85).  One of the points Chesnutt will later make in The House 
Behind the Cedars is that passing usually involves insupportable decisions to cut off 
family members and accept subterfuge as a way of life, and the ease and impatience with 
which both James and Howells insist that such subterfuge is necessary and appropriate in 
situations like Rena’s or Rhoda’s or Dr. Broderip’s can come across as a bit glib.  While 
clearly right to resist the popular assumption that a few drops of black blood imply some 
kind of insurmountable taint, Howells nevertheless backs away from the race problem 
and specifically the African-American body more thoroughly than Davis does.  By the 
end of Waiting for the Verdict, its heroine, Ross Burley—now married and mother of a 
son—has installed a freed slave and his wife and child in a cottage she has prepared for 
them right next to her own, and she has also adopted an orphaned mixed-race child.  Her
part in the novel closes with an intimate conversation with this mulatto wife, whose name 
is Anny, over the necessity of solving the race problem so that the latter’s child can have 
the advantages and future that every mother wants for her children; and the novel itself 
closes without resolving the question of Margaret Conrad’s future or attempting to 
assuage the pain of thwarted love and a lost life; in fact, the novel closes on a series of 
questions—Davis’ signature move resurfacing again—designed to provoke the reader
into seeking the answer to the pain that the novel insists on portraying.  Howells, on the 
other hand, allows Rhoda to avoid the import of the deep and desperate questions about
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suffering and justice that she puts to the “old colored woman” she meets on the street as 
she rushes out after her aunt’s revelation: “What does [God] leave you black for, if he 
could make your white?” (88).
My point here is not just to reiterate the standard observation that the sentimental 
(race) novel, despite its attempts to solve (or dissolve) issues of class and race through 
appeals to the common bonds of gender and/or equal status as children of God— 
containing and displacing those issues even as it confronts them—nevertheless insists on 
keeping these fault lines visible in ways that a realist like Howells has to force himself to 
do, and keeps them visible in the first instance merely by enacting the difference between 
certain situations and the available means (artistic and otherwise) to figure their 
resolution.  What I also want to suggest is that the sentimental novel figures certain 
situations as irresolvable not just within the constraints of the bourgeois liberal system
but within human experience as a whole; for Davis, the problem is not just that art is 
inadequate to repairing the gap between self and others symptomatic of modern life but 
that art—and the sympathy it attempts to generate—is inadequate to resolving human 
evils that are ultimately depicted as generating and transcending the corruptions of a 
capitalist culture.  Men are always going to resist women’s attempts to domesticate them; 
they will always want money and power more than they want love and family, unless
forced to think otherwise; women are always going to want a man and children more than 
they want anything else, even though there will never be enough good men to go around; 
people who are not male, white, privileged and beautiful are going to suffer more than 
those who are male, white, privileged and beautiful; and the only real escape from such 
inequities is death, which has to be portrayed as an escape in order to make earthly
87
injustice bearable at all.  Whether or not these things are true, the trajectory of Davis’ 
literary career from novelist of sympathy to sentimental novelist suggests that ultimately 
she found it difficult to sustain the belief that they weren’t, even as she found it 
impossible to let them be true.
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Chapter Two: Howells, Cahan, and the Nature of Property
The supreme dread of every one who cares for the good of nation or race is that men 
should be adrift for want of anchorage for their convictions.  –Harriet Martineau, Preface 
to The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte
It is unsurprising that William James was a bigger fan of William Dean Howells’ 
fiction than he was of his brother Henry’s.  Henry’s fiction was obscure and indirect and 
Howells’ was not; Howells’ perceptive eye was usually directed towards ideas and 
politics rather than the subtle nuances of social relationships. Howells was anxious to 
engage with the dilemmas of modernity in their sociopolitical rather than their 
psychosocial forms; he was also unable to take the aesthete’s comfort in clarity of vision 
when he was confronted with experiences of suffering and injustice or the breakdown of 
political or religious beliefs on which he had tried to rely.  His novels not only imagine 
resolutions to the fracturing of nineteenth-century social mores and established 
discourses; they attempt to enact them by creating cultural spaces that resurrect and 
perform the functions of the public sphere, that draw people together in an empowering 
and unifying experience.  The literary realism that Howells promoted from his positions 
of editorial influence was Populism in action—the people lifting their diverse voices as a 
collective nation—and if its vision sometimes outran its stamina, as was the case with the 
People’s Party itself, it was because, like the Party, it underestimated the strength of its 
opponent—the power of the marketplace to co-opt these experiences as well as the form 
and experience of novel-reading itself.  For Howells, situating himself in opposition to
the marketplace proved especially difficult because he was in some sense a true heir to 
the bourgeois liberal dream:  his intellectual and artistic property was his personal 
experience of the middle-class success story, and his two most enduring novels are both
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dedicated to determining if there is something left in the myth of American success that 
might be leveraged to save America from its abuses of that myth.
While both The Rise of Silas Lapham and A Hazard of New Fortunes possess this 
same agenda, they deploy different tactics to achieve it, in true pragmatic fashion.  The 
Rise of Silas Lapham tries two defenses:  one to fall back on businessman Silas Lapham’s 
dormant but ultimately indomitable respect for the sanctity of honor and property; the 
other to endow an heir of the Boston Brahmins with Silas’ daughter and paint business, to 
merge that marriage with a family of West-Virginian brothers who have discovered a 
cheaper way to process paint, and then to send the entire operation on an expedition to 
Mexico to expand its markets and expose the Mexicans to the wonders of corporate 
brotherhood:  family business on the grand scale.   Recognizing the nostalgia of the first 
tactic if not the nascent imperialism of the latter, Howells abandons such radical gestures 
in A Hazard of New Fortunes.  He does not, however, abandon his desire to impress his 
audience with the reality of their interdependence and the necessity of their 
acknowledging that interdependence if they are to resist the grimmest encroachments of 
industrial capitalism in any way at all.  But he no longer attempts to tie this 
interdependence to the old republican bonds of family and property and, through them, 
nation; or if he does, he re-figures them for an industrial age: everyone in A Hazard of 
New Fortunes is “complicit” in the capitalist system, a complicity colored by 
Darwinianism and comprising Howells’ new basis for arguing for the necessity for
greater concern for others.  Even the nouveau-riche Dryfoos, Lapham’s counterpart in 
Hazard, has been forced to sell his farm and turn to business under the combined pressure 
of the Standard Oil Company and his acquisitive daughters.  Yet the story’s only real
93
“out” lies with Dryfoos; he is the one with the most money and power and, consequently, 
the one whose choices will affect the most people, and the choice he eventually makes 
affirms Howells’ enduring hope that capitalists can act from motives other than greed: 
Dryfoos’ remorse over his son’s death and grudging respect for his principled employee 
Basil March causes him to sell his magazine to March and liberate that enterprise to 
become the organ of free speech that March has wanted it to be.
Predictably, given Howells’ lingering horror over the Haymarket affair, freedom 
of speech is the right at the heart of A Hazard of New Fortunes.  Ultimately March’s 
contribution to Dryfoos’ change of heart lies in his refusal to fire the German socialist 
Lindau, who is doing translation work for the magazine, for incendiary comments that 
Lindau makes at Dryfoos’ dinner party.  Thus, March’s contribution to the morality of 
society consists in his refusal—weak and ineffectual as it may be, since it neither saves 
Lindau from death nor solves the labor problem—to allow his concern for his own 
livelihood to compromise his commitment to basic American liberties.   The point of A 
Hazard of New Fortunes (if it has a point besides letting the story evolve in all its 
complex ramifications without attempting anything more than a series of partial and
pragmatic solutions) is that such a stand as March’s, however half-hearted and ineffectual 
it may be, is still capable of generating the kind of micro-level effects that Howells has 
come to believe to be most realistic to expect from a class growing increasingly incapable 
of dramatic and heroic gestures.  Howells has moved away from his belief in the efficacy 
of grand gestures like Silas Lapham’s, but not from his hope that people like March—or 
Dryfoos—will keep making such choices in quieter ways.  Nevertheless, it is undeniable 
that the power of such choices has been diminished not merely by a more diffuse and
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decadent culture but also by an increasing suspicion among thoughtful people like 
Howells that such actions need to be linked to something more than older bourgeois 
notions about the sanctity of property.  What these newer notions might look like is a 
question whose answer evades Howells, who after A Hazard of New Fortune turns 
increasingly to utopian romances.  Consequently, in the last third of this chapter I turn 
briefly to the short story “The Imported Bridegroom” by Abraham Cahan in order to 
discuss his template for a nation in which the corrective to capitalist excess is not a return 
to the earth but the cultivation of property in a less a literal sense—the cultivation of the 
self as property, a concept that is liable to its own corruptions but that nevertheless has
the benefit of not necessitating a wholesale restructuring of American society.
In American Literary Realism and the Failed Promise of Contract, Brook Thomas 
suggests that ongoing efforts to find unifying themes or principles behind the two major 
plotlines of The Rise of Silas Lapham are misguided; Howells’ point, Thomas thinks, is 
that moral judgments are specific to discrete spheres and not universally applicable (124). 
Thomas’ appreciation for Howells’ sensitivity to the historical and cultural contingency
of moral judgment is one of many current contributions to the ongoing rehabilitation of 
Howells’ literary reputation, which was clouded for almost a century by his immediate 
successors’ belief that his realism was stodgy and blinkered and by mid-century 
reformulations of the same criticism, in which Howells’ texts were characterized as 
enfeebled compromises between James’ romances and Dreiser’s fierce social
commentaries.9   Only recently have critics begun to recognize that James and Dreiser
9See Donald Pease for an excellent overview of the reception history of Howells’ fiction in general and The
Rise of Silas Lapham in particular.
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were perhaps more similar than otherwise in their sense of the futility of resisting the 
onslaught of industrial capitalism and that the motivation underlying Howells’ anxious 
rhetoric of truth, reality and commonsense was his determination to continuously re- 
apply art as a counter-pressure to this onslaught, even if that meant accepting the 
malleability (although not the relativity) of what counted as “true to life” in late 19th- 
century American culture.  This recognition has perhaps been delayed by the fact that,
Thomas’ assertions notwithstanding, Howells did not conflate historical contingency with 
spherical contingency:  while he was very much invested in the former, he was not at all 
committed to the latter—his appreciation for the historicity of both the true and the good 
was often a motivation for, not a deterrent to, the construction and maintenance of an 
overarching mode of being in the world.  Howells was not afraid of system-building, 
despite his awareness of its liabilities, particularly its encouragement of the human 
tendency to overlook the exceptional case and to ignore marginalized groups.  In his 
neurotic, middle-class way, he was extremely anxious about the problems of race and 
class in America, but like many of his white, middle-class peers, he was ever on the look- 
out for a national narrative into which all groups could eventually assimilate, a narrative 
that would repair the kinds of divisive dichotomies that capitalism and idealism had 
conspired to produce.
As Amy Kaplan observes in The Social Construction of American Realism, “the 
major work of the realist narrative is to construct a homogeneous and coherent social 
reality by conquering the fictional qualities of middle-class life and by controlling the 
specter of class conflict which threatens to puncture this vision of a unified social 
totality” (21).   But building on Kaplan’s pivotal work means providing a comprehensive
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framework through which to anatomize the narrative of the “unified social totality” that 
Howells was attempting to construct in and through The Rise of Silas Lapham.  Kaplan 
spends very little time dissecting Howells’ “homogeneous and coherent social reality” 
besides identifying it with a “search to posit character,” rooted in productive work, as a 
“moral anchor” in an increasingly frenetic and superficial world—a search that opposes 
the popular press’ obsession with plot and personality in sensationalist novels and 
journalism (42).  And while Howells is clearly invested in character in contradistinction 
to personality—in the exercise of virtue rather than the deployment of charm—his 
commitment to character is embedded within an investment in narrative that Kaplan 
glosses over by making the mistake of conflating “narrative” with “storyline” at the 
expense of a more thorough investigation of the overarching cultural narratives that drive 
Howells’ novelistic production throughout the 1880s.  What Howells is actually 
attempting to do in Silas Lapham is establish or reconstruct a moral tradition akin to the 
kinds of tradition described by virtue ethicist Alasdair MacIntyre, a tradition in which 
morality is tied to a shared teleological conception of human flourishing that provides 
individual moral agents with roles and practices—and virtues attendant upon those roles 
and practices—through which they can advance a common cause, and in what follows I 
want to use MacIntyre as a way in which to understand what Howells was doing in Silas 
Lapham and how relevant it is to discussions of virtue that are still underway a century 
later.
According to MacIntyre, pre-Enlightenment moral deliberation was characterized 
by “a threefold scheme in which human-nature-as-it- happens-to-be (human nature in its 
untutored state) is initially discrepant and discordant with the precepts of ethics and needs
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to be transformed by the instruction of practical reason and experience into human- 
nature-as-it-could-be-if-it-realized-its-telos (53). Post-Enlightenment (or rather, post- 
Protestant) moral discourse is consequently rendered unintelligible when it abandons the 
idea that reason can generate any conception of “human-nature-as-it-could-be-if-it- 
realized-its-telos” and instead attempts to root the “precepts of rational ethics” in various 
conceptions of “untutored human nature” that it retains from earlier moral and religious 
traditions, static ideas of human reason or human sense whose only fundamental 
justification outside of the teleological context in which they originally evolved is how 
vociferously their proponents can advocate for them. For MacIntyre, the stand-off that 
results between appeals to human goods and appeals to human obligations in the absence 
of an appeal to a communal telos opens a moral vacuum in Western culture, one in which 
someone like Howells can see industrial capitalism running amuck.  In The Rise of Silas 
Lapham reviving a “narrative concept of selfhood” entails reviving a cultural narrative in 
and through which—and only in and through which—individual human stories, 
behaviors, and practices are rendered intelligible (Virtue 217). Superficially akin to the 
standard progressivist narrative of upward mobility with a conscience, though more 
urbane than earnest, Howells’ narrative nevertheless possesses some deep features that 
make it very much a narrative tradition in this MacIntyrean sense, committed to 
reintegrating the spheres of the public and private, fact and value, self and world, science 
and art.  Narrative understood in this sense means something much more replete than plot
—it is simultaneously a formal artistic device and a cultural organization strategy. 
Consequently, when Howells’ plot lines waver or fail to come together it is not because 
his novelistic interests lie outside plot or because he is endorsing disparities between the
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moral structures that govern the domestic and the business worlds but because he is 
struggling to articulate a tradition that will in fact harmonize a culture—and a genre— 
that is predicated on the fragmentation of society and the individual, a struggle that 
cannot be dismissed as nostalgic if only because Howells is so dogged in his 
determination that it not be so and so persistent in insisting—at least in Silas Lapham— 
that the ideology of the middle class is adequate to the task.
This chapter dissects the particular narrative tradition which Howells attempts
to construct in the cultural moment of The Rise of Silas Lapham and, in the process, pays 
attention to the many dilemmas that Howells attempts to circumnavigate in advancing a 
holistic justification for the virtues in which he is invested.  Along with Donald Pease and 
against Kaplan, I argue that Howells does not abandon his sociopolitical agenda at the
end of the novel by “stripping [Lapham] of his story and returning him to his mythical 
origins” on the family farm where he began, reducing him to a spectacle of decayed 
heroism on par with the tired aestheticism of the novel’s old Boston elite (Kaplan 42). 
As Pease insists, Lapham’s financial catastrophe “become[s] an exchangeable social 
property able to generate profound social effects,” but more importantly, the novel’s 
forward motion ultimately depends not on Lapham’s success in defending his agrarian 
values against the onslaughts of laissez-faire capitalism but on his daughter and son-in-
law’s success in articulating a new tradition that models what we might call—for lack of 
a better word—a cosmopolitan notion of family business, albeit a distinctly bourgeois 
version of cosmopolitan virtue that attempts to combines the virtues of stability and 
proprietorship with those of tolerance and class permeability (Pease 18). This latter 
tradition has its own problems—namely, that it depends for its exercise on expanding its
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reach into foreign territories in a kind of budding imperialism—but it nevertheless shows 
that Howells was consistently working against the temptation to flee his responsibility  to 
society altogether.
Altruism, brotherhood, partnership—whatever Howells called it, he believed that 
this virtue, like all virtues, could best be defended to his middle-class readers through 
constructing a narrative that might garner communal consensus on the nature of human 
flourishing, as well as on how that human flourishing could best be achieved.  Howells 
was painfully aware that virtue could no longer be backed by an appeal to shared
religious principles like it had been in the past, and that secular versions of such
principles lacked popular force without the power of God behind them. In the early pages 
of The Minister’s Charge, a novel published a year after Silas Lapham and featuring 
several of the same characters, Reverend Sewell (the minister of the title) notes that he is
rather faithfuller and busier in [his parish duties] than he might have been
if he had not laid so much stress upon duties of all sorts, and so little upon 
beliefs.  He declared that he envied the ministers of the good old times
who had only to teach their people that they would be lost if they did not
do right; it was much simpler than to make them understand that they were 
often to be good for reasons not immediately connected with their present 
or future comfort, and that they could not confidently expect to be lost for 
any given transgression, or even to be lost at all. He found it necessary to 
do his work largely in a personal way, by meeting and talking with people, 
and this took up a great deal of his time, especially after the summer 
vacation, when he had to get into relations with them anew, and to help
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them recover themselves from the moral lassitude into which people fall 
during that season of physical recuperation (6).
We might think of “duties” here as equivalent to Alasdair MacIntyre’s idea of practices, 
defined as “any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human 
activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of 
trying to achieve those standards of excellence appropriate to, and partially definitive of, 
that form of activity” (187).  Virtues are specific to duties and practices; for Sewell’s 
parishioners, these duties clearly include acts of philanthropy that demand the exercise of 
virtues like compassion, sensitivity and generosity.   But both MacIntyre and Sewell 
believe that duties and practices often need to be justified not only in terms of the goods 
“internal to” these practices but also in terms of their place within some larger conception 
of the nature and direction of human activity that “transcends the limited goods of 
practices by constituting the good of a whole human life”—a human life which is itself 
articulated in reference to the communal telos (MacIntyre Virtue 203).  Sewell tries to 
influence his parishioners in a “personal way,” but by the end of the Minister’s Charge he 
feels the need to preach a sermon that describes a “complete philosophy of life”—that
ties these duties to a larger way of being in the world.  The way of being in the world that 
the Reverend Sewell describes in The Minister’s Charge is different from the one 
articulated a year earlier in Silas Lapham—the former grounded more in an appeal to 
shared experiences than shared values—but nevertheless both texts share this need to find 
some way of providing Americans with a shared conception of the good that enables its 
adherents to identify the roles, practices and virtues through which each member of the 
community can best promote this good.
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The tradition that is sketched out in the most complete detail in The Rise of Silas 
Lapham is the agragian tradition that Silas sketches out to Bartley Hubbard in the 
opening pages of the novel, and we can look at it in some detail here in order to uncover 
the structure of a tradition before suggesting that this structure is apparent in the 
cosmopolitan mindset that Howells is in the process of articulating throughout the latter 
half of the novel.  Silas offers up his agrarian narrative to Bartley (albeit uneasily) as an 
object of consumption for the popular press, an exchange which signals the extent to 
which—and the moment in which—this particular tradition is passing from a living to a 
commodified entity, one that no longer defines Silas’ life but that instead functions as a 
diversion for a mass reading public.  Howells always becomes uneasy when human 
relationships degenerate into those of spectacle and spectator—and indeed a tradition 
must still be in play if it is to have any moral payoff—which is one of the reasons for his 
discomfort with an ossified character like Lapham’s old-money counterpart Bromfield 
Corey, who refuses to adapt to the times even as he recognizes, from the safety of his 
library, how much they are evolving.  No one sits around inactive in the narrative Silas 
tells Bartley, however.  Everyone works in the service of a common good, the narrative 
telos, which in this case is advancing the family unit, the family farm and fortunes 
(“fortunes,” not “fortune”), and the well-being of the individual family members along 
with it—well-being which comes from healthily fulfilling one’s proscribed familial role. 
Each family member has a distinct role to play in promoting the common telos:  Silas’ 
father “work[s] like a horse in doors and out—up at daylight, feeding the stock, and 
groaning all day with his rheumatism, but not stopping” (6).  Silas’ mother is the 
homemaker, and she does “the whole work of a family of boys, and board[s] the hired
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man besides” (5).  As the last of five brothers, the rest of whom move West to continue 
the pioneer tradition in far-flung locations (and we might note here the way in which 
Howells conflates the pioneer tradition, which prioritizes freedom and self-determination, 
with an agrarian tradition rooted in home and family), Silas’ role involves continuing his 
parents’ work by “keep[ing] up the old house” and developing the paint that his father 
finds on the land—finds literally at the root of a family tree—but is unable to “make go” 
before he dies and passes the dream to his son.  Clearly, work is one of the virtues 
attached to this way of life, but other virtues are tied to the specific kinds of work that 
each person’s role in the family dream entails.  It is important, for example, that Silas’ 
mother be good at “cooking, sweeping, washing, making and mending,” which no doubt 
demand a commitment to cleanliness, order, and good health, alongside a variety of 
practical skills that are important to keeping up house—“cooking well” is a virtue just
like “working well” is.   It is also important that Silas’ father be good at working the
stock and the house and farm.  Perseverance, self-discipline and family loyalty seem to be 
virtues demanded of everyone—or at least of everyone whose role involves maintaining 
the core family unit—and morality is tied to judgments about how well each member is 
exemplifying the virtues tied to his or her specific role within the common good.
Thus, a commitment to roles, practices and virtues that forward the collective 
telos is one feature of a tradition.  Another is an appreciation not only for the 
indispensible contributions one’s partners make in forwarding the collective dream but 
also for the natural resources and physical structures—the paint, the house—that play a 
role in forwarding family prosperity.  Initially, Silas develops his paint as a tribute to his 
family and his father’s dream; the paint would never have come into being, he tells
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Bartley Hubbard, without his family, without the relationship they cultivate not only with 
each other but with the land on which they live.  Silas’ father discovers the paint literally 
at the roots of a family tree, and Silas inherits and develops its potential through the 
collective efforts of his father, mother, and eventually his wife.  Every cask, barrel or keg 
is inscribed with Silas and his father’s initials as well as the date his father discovered the 
paint and the date Silas “tried” it, inscriptions which read like “mystic devices” branded
on the containers’ sides (10).  The refined Persis-brand paint appears on the market on the 
anniversary of Persis Lapham’s birthday and exemplifies (rather than merely symbolizes) 
the continuity between their marriage and his business, the union of the private and the 
spiritual with the public and material.  Lapham is emphatic about the extent to which the 
development of his paint depends on both his wife and his mother:  “‘If it hadn’t been for 
her,” Lapham says of his wife, “the paint wouldn’t have come to anything” (13). 
Remembering his mother and her tireless contributions to making the family work gives 
Silas “‘a lump in the throat’” (5).  “‘When I hear women complaining nowadays that their 
lives are stunted and empty, I want to tell ‘em about my mother’s life,’” he tells Bartley. 
“‘I could paint it out for ‘em.’”
That Silas identifies both his mother and his wife not only with the success of the 
paint but with the paint itself—that their stories are told in the paint and that the paint 
“tells” through their stories—demonstrates the thoroughness of Howells’ belief not only 
that the business and private realms ought to be integrated but that they were “always 
already” intertwined.  Both paint and people have a potentiality that can only be
developed through appreciation for their mutual interdependence.  ‘The paint was like my 
own blood to me,” Silas says to Bartley, who himself becomes a conduit, albeit a corrupt
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one, for the perpetuation of the story of the paint.  It may be a truism that people don’t 
develop in isolation, but it is a truism that needed reiteration in the America of the Gilded 
Age, where the stratification of classes and cultures was becoming increasingly 
transparent even to the more obtuse members of the middle-class.  What makes Howells’ 
version of the agrarian tradition unique is less the virtues and practices to which he is 
committed—work, property, marriage, family, progress—than his recognition that the 
propagation of these institutions depends on individual people’s willingness to recognize 
human “complicity” or continuity with the world around them and to develop collective 
narratives that support these goals, which is a role that art can take on.  Of course, 
Americans’ reluctance to acknowledge their interdependence is the real root of the 
problem, one which Howells will address in later novels using different strategies, but in 
The Rise of Silas Lapham he is still attempting to achieve this acknowledgment by 
emphasizing the community values at the heart of the agrarian tradition as well as the 
community values at the heart of the cosmopolitan tradition that he will try to construct 
out of its remnants.
The root of Silas’ ruin in the novel’s main plot lies in his forgetfulness of this truth 
of acknowledged dependence.  Silas’ mistake lies not in listening to his wife’s insistence 
that he take a partner but in believing (along with her, apparently) that anybody with 
capital will do.  On the contrary, partnerships only work in the world of Howells’ novel 
when both members share a commitment to treating people and things as valuable
in complex and individual ways that have very  little to do with their market value.  It is 
not enough that Silas have a partner with capital; he must have a partner who shares his 
appreciation for the paint and who is also an honest and capable businessman.  His
105
partnership with Tom Corey, which eventually proves to be incredibly lucrative for all 
involved, is sealed when Tom insists on his belief in the paint, not when Tom offers to 
invest “a little capital in the business,” an offer that Silas refuses (66). Mrs. Lapham’s 
reluctance to blame Silas for crowding Rogers out of their partnership is based on her 
vague but accurate perception that “his paint was something more than business to him; it 
was a sentiment, almost a passion…it was the poetry of his nature, otherwise so intensely 
prosaic” (44).   The partnership between Tom and Silas works because each man is 
appreciative of the other as a human being who exhibit traits that are answerable to and 
with something more than their cash value—traits that are answerable to a more holistic 
conception of human flourishing that is itself rooted in observable (and even biological) 
descriptions of human capabilities.  Both paint and human beings—and individual human 
beings—have observable capabilities that are in a large incipient sense tied to their 
particular material or biological composition:  clearly, there are things that paint has the 
capacity to do that are different from the things that a house or a horse or a human being 
can do, some of which every house or horse or human being will have in common with 
the rest of their species and others which will be specific to a particular house or horse or 
human being.  For Tom and Silas, an effective partnership supports their shared desire to 
develop the capacities of the paint while maximizing the development of their own 
capacities in relation to each other, the paint, and their individual human potential.
In 1954 Everett Carter wrote that “the ability to rise above self-interest to the 
interests of another, the ability to rise above the interest of another, no matter how close, 
to the interest of the group, the strength to rise above even the interests of a group to 
which you have ties of proximity and affection to the interests of the larger society of
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which you are impersonally a part—these were the successive stages of the salvation of 
modern man, Howells told us in The Rise of Silas Lapham.”  We may disagree with 
Carter’s use of the term “rise above” and prefer something like “build upon,” especially if 
we understand that Howells tied genuine self-interest to the interest of the group(s) in 
which any given individual is (always already) involved; but we can also recognize that 
the Howellsian self is inter-determined with and by the Howellsian marriage or the 
Howellsian state; the smaller partnerships like those between man and land or man and 
wife are the building blocks for business or national communities.  At each step there
must be an appreciation for and re-evaluation of the capacities of the individual things 
and people involved as well as an appreciation for the capacities of the group entities 
built by and through these individuals.  The self defines itself in relation to its own 
capacities and the environment in which it finds itself, and that self makes connections 
with other things or selves through organizing entities like marriage or businesses or
property contracts, and marriages are connected under the organizing umbrella of society 
or the state and states are connected through the nation and so on, and each of these
things also builds upon the structures below it and is ultimately answerable to the 
smallest unit.
If we turn now to look at the characters whose marriage forms the basis for the 
new tradition that emerges at the end of the novel we can see that they too possess 
characteristics that become the building blocks for the narrative which they begin to 
construct for themselves.  This narrative is not as clearly delineated as the narrative that 
precedes it—Howells is not yet able to discern its roles and values as clearly as he can
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anatomize the agrarian traditions of the past—but we can begin to decipher its parts if we 
look more closely at the individuals at its heart.  Tom Corey is described as
an energetic fellow, a little indefinite in aim, with the smallest amount of 
inspiration that can save a man from being commonplace.  If he was not 
commonplace, it was through nothing remarkable in his mind, which was 
simply clear and practical, but through some combination of qualities of 
the heart that   made men trust him, and women call him sweet” (110).
Howells clearly values the common and the commonplace, which all the guests at the 
Coreys dinner party—old and new money alike—are capable of valuing, with a typical 
American appreciation for the virtues of rationality and commonsense.  Yet Tom Corey 
exudes both reason and spirit:  his “clear and practical” mind is contrasted with his 
father’s vague and dilettantish one, but it is also contrasted with his grandfather’s mind, 
which was the mind of an “old India merchant.”  The old India merchant commands 
Silas’ respect, but Bromfield Corey likes Tom “for the gentleness that tempers his 
energy” (61).  In short, Tom is neither a pure businessman nor a pure aesthete; he 
possesses the best characteristics of both, and he also has an honest and forthright 
character.  He has money to invest in his partnership with Silas, but more importantly he 
brings his “belief” in the paint (67).
Penelope has a similarly complex character.  The narrator tells us that she has “an 
odd taste of her own for reading,” and her family flatters this fancy even as they stand 
outside of it (23).  Penelope lacks Tom’s social manners but she has a better developed 
capacity for irony and reflection.  She is emphatically not pretty; she is small and dark 
and eccentric.  At one point in the novel her looks are called Japanese; later Tom’s sister
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will suggest that Penelope form herself on the “Spanish manner…strange and foreign” in 
order to gain the polish she lacks (316).  Penelope is something of an anomaly in the text; 
she never develops polish—or if she does, we never know it—and she escapes 
categorization as a type.  She has “mind” but she is not an intellectual; and she is 
supposed to be “sensible” even though she behaves nonsensically in her interactions with 
Tom (141, 213).  She may be a symptom of Howells’ recognition of the need to allow for 
the possibility of chance, of aberration, in his system—the ironic and inexplicable factor, 
the random mutation, that makes change and the evolution of new traditions possible—or 
she may be a token of his confusion over how women do, in fact, fit into his partnership 
model when they are not allowed to be full equals with men in every realm of life.  As an 
aside, we can note here that one of the fault-lines in The Rise of Silas Lapham is its 
inability to take up one of the most obvious implications of its own commitments; Silas’ 
real partner should be—and initially is—his wife, and her inability to legally inhabit that
role and Howells’ inability to fully imagine her into that role (he allows her to fail Silas at 
several crucial business junctures) is the real cause of the novel’s crisis.  But despite the 
inexplicable elements of Penelope’s personality and Howells’ reluctance to pursue them, 
what is discernible is that she is not Irene, that she possesses qualities that make her
Tom’s equal in ways that Irene is not.   Irene “isn’t really equal to [Tom],” Mrs. Lapham 
says to Penelope in an early burst of perspicuity: “She hasn’t mind enough” (109). 
Howells is much more confused about the role of women in his new cosmopolitan 
tradition than he is about the role of men—he does better with Silas’ wife and mother, 
who are both elemental pioneer-women types—but this very confusion, we could argue, 
opens up one of the places in the book where Howells’ formula for success shows the
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most promise for adaptability and its most ingenious integration of the romantic and 
realist modes—of the unexpected and the commonsensical.  It is a surprising twist that  
Tom cares for the “little, black, odd creature, with her joking and —— ” (253).  Mrs. 
Corey leaves it to the reader to finish the sentence.
An allowance for the unexpected or the incommensurable is a hallmark of most 
theories of narrative ethics, and we might also argue (and will take this up later) that the 
presence and disappearance of the lower classes in the novel is another clear example of 
the recalcitrant societal issues that constantly send Howells back to the drawing board. 
At any rate, Irene’s value is very clearly superficial.  Along with Rogers, she is the
character who embodies most closely the easily bought qualities that Howells believes to 
be least useful to a civilization that takes its moral development seriously.  Of all the 
Laphams, she is the one whose identity is most closely identified with the money and 
status Lapham acquires through his business ventures.  She spends her “abundant leisure” 
in shopping and spends “hours on her toilet every day” (23).  Her beauty is itself made to 
order, modeled on the popular type of the period as it appeared in countless novels and 
portraits; the narrator tells us that she is a “very pretty figure of a girl, after our fashion of 
girls,” with red hair and “delicious” coloring (46).   When Tom proves indifferent to her, 
she withdraws onto the family farm in an act of self-exile worthy of any sentimental 
heroine, refusing to be consoled with her Cousin Will.  Howells is careful to show that 
such self-sacrifice is not nearly as romantic in real life as it is in the novels, but in pairing 
Tom with the peculiar Penelope when even his snobbish family expects him to choose the 
“beauty” as the only possible excuse for marrying outside his caste, Howells seems to be 
drawing on the ever-popular Jane-Eyre myth and the legions of small, dark, and plain
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heroines it inspired to undermine class distinctions and make the democratic (but also 
romantic) point that true worth and inner beauty ought to conquer superficial value.  The 
only difference is that in this case “Jane’s” virtues are not the tempestuous willfulness of 
the indomitable original but a “pert” sense of humor, an untutored wit and something that 
passes for “character”—and that the rejected sister is neither evil, greedy nor
manipulative but no less undesirable for her “innocent” vacuity.
But whatever qualities that Penelope and especially Tom embody that Irene does 
not, both Penelope and Tom are the kind of “thick” characters who belong in a narrative 
in which success depends on neither money nor character but on some useful 
combination of both, on some particularly modern combination of industry and ambition
that does not come at the expense of either irony or “authenticity.”  In short, it seems that 
one of the characteristics of the cosmopolitan family tradition is that its characters’ roles 
are more porous—more complexly and ambiguously defined—than the roles in either the 
pioneer or the aristocratic traditions of the past.  Although Tom and Penelope will 
reappear (at least via hearsay) in The Minister’s Charge in less ambiguous roles—Tom 
will be the head of the very successful paint company and Penelope is referred to as the 
“dam” of some “very pretty chickens”—they are nevertheless portrayed in Silas Lapham 
as characters loyal to a concept of family whose enlarged borders demand that they 
develop virtues of awareness and malleability that their progenitors do not possess, at
least to the same extent.  Tom acquires this virtue earlier than Penelope, partly because he 
is thrown—or throws himself—into contact with her family much sooner than she is 
willing to embrace his family (a fact that, once again, seems to reflect Howells awareness 
and/or reinforcement of the more limited opportunities for growth available to middle-
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class women of his time, and the more defensive positions in which they consequently 
found themselves) but their exit from the Corey family home strikes all involved as a 
migration to new frontiers that, to the extent these frontiers are defined, are defined as 
opening into an exotic unknown and demanding a reciprocal openness in the newly 
married young couple—a civic humanist might argue that this openness comprises the 
safety valve often included in American cultural traditions to guard against the potential 
for corruption inherent in any enterprise that attempts to establish a coherent order within 
the constraints of history and mortality.  The only clearly defined structure on the
horizon, besides Tom and Penelope’s inter-cultural marriage, is the merger of the Tom- 
Silas remnant of the Lapham family business with the business of the West Virginia 
brothers, a merger that requires not only that Tom and Penelope adapt to the differences 
in their own family backgrounds but that they bring people into the family business who 
are not technically family at all.  Yet the fact that these new partners are themselves 
brothers seems to reinforce Howells’ insistence that, in his new tradition, family and 
business should remain indistinguishable from each other even though the borders of the 
family have been enlarged.
Despite their more malleable characters, neither Tom nor Penelope is expected to 
embody all the qualities of their progenitors or to be an amalgamation of everything that 
has preceded them.  Instead, they both come to the partnership as members of families 
whose other members possess the values that they lack.  Penelope might not have the 
same connection to pioneer values that her parents and grandparents had, but her parents 
and grandparents embody that connection for her, so that while Penelope herself might fit 
more solidly in the progressivist tradition than in the older pioneer tradition of her parents
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and grandparents she nevertheless bears both the legacy of that tradition in some of the 
traits she brings to her new life (like her indifference to Boston “society”) as well as in 
the more undiluted pioneer traits that survive in her parents and that Tom recognizes in 
Silas, despite Silas’ own corruption during his brief period of immersion in the 
“tradition” of new man of business or the noveau riche.  When Tom marries Penelope he
is marrying not just an individual but the family and tradition(s) in which she is involved. 
In fact, the novel sets up the situation so that neither the readers nor the Lapham family 
are clear if Tom is even coming to see Penelope—or her sister—rather than to going into 
business with her father, although Tom is already aware that going into business with 
Silas involves embracing a specific set of outlooks and values from which his family has 
heretofore disassociated themselves.  Tom’s father thinks those values reduce to a love of 
making money, but Tom is able to recognize that Silas is “simple-hearted and rather 
wholesome” in addition to being a business “force”—that Silas is not in fact a vulgar 
capitalist, but instead possesses some virtues independent of avariciousness, his 
dedication to his paint being among the foremost (59).  The Lapham family is more
aware of the tradition and values that the Coreys represent: a social and artistic milieu 
from which they have been excluded, at least until their money has been in the family for 
several generations and they have acquired all the culture that their library in their new 
house on Beacon Street seems to promise.  The families find common ground in their 
appreciation for the virtue of courage and honesty and integrity, particularly the integrity 
of not pursuing financial gain at the expense of others, but even this ground seems shaky 
until Silas’ big stand, and even after Silas’ stand they do not come completely together or 
attempt to deny their differences.  The Coreys “find a delicate, aesthetic pleasure in the
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heroism with which Lapham had withstood Rogers and his temptations,” but Bromfield 
conveys his pleasure in a letter that he mails from the safety of Boston to the Lapham 
farm.  The last we see of Tom and Penelope, she is crying on Tom’s shoulder, relieved to 
be escaping the inmates of the Corey manse, and the narrator concludes that “our
manners and customs go for more in life than our qualities.  The price that we pay for 
civilization is the fine yet impassable differentiation of these” (317).
This “impassable differentiation” is obviously not completely impassable if Tom 
and Penelope have bridged it, thanks to her odd taste for reading and his unusual practical 
bent.  They are the mutations that make the evolution of new traditions happen.
Traditions, MacIntyre insists, are living entities, built upon and answerable to the past 
even as they evolve to meet the demands of the present: “it is central to the concept of a 
tradition that the past is never something merely to be discarded, but rather that the 
present is intelligible only as a commentary upon and response to the past in which the 
past, if necessary and if possible, is corrected and transcended, yet corrected and 
transcended in a way that leaves the present open to being in turn corrected and 
transcended by some yet more adequate future point of view” (Virtue 146).  Yet for 
Howells this is not simply an assimilationist position; in Silas Lapham he seems to 
believe that the formation of new traditions out of elements of the old, with the necessary 
aberrations, can happen within a culture that also makes room for older traditions to 
survive intact.  Indeed, Bromfield Corey reappears in A Minister’s Charge more 
comfortably ensconced in his aesthetic indolence than ever, thanks to his shares in his 
son’s company and despite the fact that he is going blind and must hire a young country 
bumpkin to read him his books.  Tom’s acquisition of wealth guarantees the survival of
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his father’s way of life in much the same way that it allows Silas to continue his legacy 
by upgrading the family farm and producing the fine grades of Persis-brand paint that 
were at the heart of his original business.  The only “tradition” whose existence Howells 
seems to find unequivocally threatening is a tradition defined by and committed to 
nothing but the accumulation of wealth and to structures that support the accumulation of 
wealth, a tradition that—if it is one—is certainly as thin as its devotees appear to be, 
characters like Rogers and Irene or Jim Mellon’s wife and daughter who collapse without 
money to indulge their compulsive behavior, whether that behavior is drinking or 
shopping or merely making more money.  What unites the traditions of Bromfield Corey, 
Silas Lapham and Tom Corey (the Boston Brahmin, the pioneer, and the progressivist 
traditions, respectively) is that they are all characterized by complex value systems 
designed to support a plethora of human virtues and ends, traditions that understand 
human flourishing to entail more than indulging individual or collective greed, especially 
at the expense of others.  Howells valued work, and Bromfield Corey is a slight and 
slightly contemptible character in a way that Lapham is not, without much “force” or 
presence outside his library or dining room, aware that his tradition is dying out but not 
particularly perturbed by that or by much else—the Reverend Sewell is probably a more 
accurate embodiment of the virtues Howells appreciated in the tradition of East-Coast 
establishment—but Bromfield nevertheless represents a tradition that possesses virtues 
lacking in the Laphams’ world:  culture and manners, refined tastes and pleasures, 
delicacy in human interactions, and appreciation for other cultures and traditions.  The 
cosmopolitan family tradition, in turn, embodies virtues of complexity, reflexivity and 
inclusiveness that neither of these older traditions exemplify; yet all three are infinitely
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preferable to the culture of commodification and exchange against which they are set, 
because they place a higher value on goods internal rather than external to practices (the 
latter would include things like wealth, power, social status) and because they feature 
practices that cultivate more than the virtues attendant upon money making, virtues that 
answer to a notion of human flourishing established through a socio-biological 
assessment of, and appreciation for, a plethora of wholesome human capacities and 
goods.
The effete Bromfield Corey is the one who expresses the most approval of Silas
Lapham’s isolated and isolating stand against Rogers and the representatives of the
British investors, when Silas is forced—at the novel’s climax—to make a choice between 
losing his business or selling a piece of property that he knows to be worthless without 
enlightening the potential buyers.  Although Bromfield avoids seeing Silas in person, he 
writes Silas a letter praising him for the “heroism with which [he] had withstood Rogers 
and his temptations” (315).  Yet this “heroic” stand has consigned Silas to a life similar to 
Bromfield’s—a life at the margins of the social world, exiled to a place that time is 
passing by.  Even though Silas’ exile is still “an exchangeable social property able to 
generate profound social effects,” perhaps the most useful of which is exposure of the 
upper class delusion about the superiority of their principles to those of the nouveau
riche, we have seen that for Howells the ideal solution is not, ultimately, that 
businessmen be forced to make agonizing moral choices within a existential wasteland 
but that they be active participants in building and supporting a tradition in which respect 
for the rights of others and a nuanced understanding of what those rights look like is the
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norm.  As we have already pointed out, however, business ethics was in its infancy in the 
later half of the nineteenth century: of the three standard tomes of moral philosophy in 
circulation, only one outlined a code of business ethics that extended moral obligations 
beyond the latitude of the legal (Dooley 75-9).  This “divorce of the private from the 
public and the separation of personal from social duties were not accidental or 
unconscious,” Patrick Dooley reminds us (76).  Slavery and, later, the exploitation of 
immigrants and the underclass demanded the demarcation of a distinct line between what 
a business owner owed himself and his family and what he owed anyone else.  In 
addition, the rise and expansion of corporate power in the late 19th-century created a shift 
of the burden of fiscal responsibility and integrity from individuals onto corporate
entities; the Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Supreme Court case, which 
provided corporations with fourteenth-amendment protection, was only a year distant 
when The Rise of Silas Lapham was being serialized in The Century Illustrated Monthly 
Magazine.  More generally, the belief that mechanization, industrialization and 
incorporation were ineluctable stages in the march of human progress was increasingly 
the mindset of the population at large.  Inventing a tradition in which business and family 
ethics were inter-determined and good choices were undergirded by that tradition was
part of Howells’ long-range solution, at least in The Rise of Silas Lapham; but in the 
meantime, what recourse did American citizens have in the moral vacuum of the 
immediate present, in a situation such as the one in which Lapham finds himself?
First of all, Howells was keen on insisting that individual human beings possessed 
an ability of some kind, whether learned or innate, to apply counter-pressure to the 
seemingly irresistible force of the marketplace.  Silas’ mistake is not that he leaves his
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farm to market his paint or that he bows to his wife’s pressure to take a partner or even 
that he treats that partner unfairly, but that he doesn’t understand himself well enough to 
make the right choice of partner—that (as we have seen) he makes a choice that confirms 
the primacy of avarice untempered by other values.  This original choice, not the pressure 
of outside circumstances (since this is slight—listening to the voice of one’s wife does
not absolve anyone of culpability), leads to Silas’ isolation when he is faced with the 
situation with the English investors.  “It seems to me I done wrong about Rogers in the 
first place,” Silas tells Reverend Sewell at the novel’s end;  “the whole trouble came from 
that” (320).  Even though the business world in which Silas finds himself is clearly not 
answerable to a notion of human flourishing that would support transparency in business 
dealings or a respect for private property—not to mention one in which Mrs. Lapham 
might be informed enough about business dealings to have helped Silas in his extremity
—in Howells’ view Silas himself is answerable to such a notion regardless, and his failure 
to make choices that could help create and maintain such a world, choices that Tom does 
make, is why he is consigned to his family farm in the end, visibly chastened and worse 
for the wear.  “Preservation of a belief in a ‘moral universe’ in which rewards and 
punishments flowed from character and moral choice assumed an urgency in these years 
of massive mechanization,” Alan Trachtenberg reminds us (45).
Yet this still leaves open the question of how Howells justifies the specific choice, 
not just the act of resistance, which Silas does eventually make within the moral vacuum 
of the late 19th-century business world.  That choice is to protect the British investors at 
the expense of his own family and business (not to mention his workers and other 
dependents)—to refuse to sell the property back to Rogers when he knows Rogers will
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sell it to the investors without telling them that the land is worthless, worthless because it  
is only accessible by a road that has just been bought by a large railroad company. 
Clearly, Silas’ unease with duping the British investors lies in his belief in the sanctity of 
private property, in his adherence to the importance of “not robbing people” who trust 
him (288).  The evil to be avoided in this situation is the “easy-going, not evilly 
intentioned, potential immorality which regards common property as common prey, and 
gives us the most corrupt municipal governments under the sun,” and the good to be
respected is the well-being of the government and institutions that keep society going and 
ensure the  protection of “common property”  (286).  The “common property” referenced 
here is the money of the absent English investors, whose representatives turn out to be in 
cahoots with Rogers in his attempt to cheat them; thus the basis for moral action, in this 
particular situation (which is unfolding, let us not forget, in the age of incorporation) is 
respect for private ownership, for individual and cooperate financial property, even when 
the trail back to that owners of that property has been obscured.
However, Howells does not attempt to defend his respect for private property 
except by pointing out that not respecting it leads to chaos, a point he returns to in a novel 
like A Hazard of New Fortunes, where labor agitation does little but engender death and 
resentment and keep everyone from going about his work; nevertheless, Silas’ decision 
and Howells’ valorization of it seems to suggest a top-down rather than a bottom-up 
justification for morality, one in which the answer to the question “Why is this particular 
decision right?” is “because it upholds order and civilization,” not “because it guarantees 
human flourishing for every human being.”  Howells’ most respectable characters 
frequently voice a commitment to the good of society as a whole, in the long run, rather
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to what seems expedient to individuals in immediate danger—a commitment that they 
equate with a utilitarian ethic, self-evident to those who are ruled by common sense.  The 
traveler in Howells’ 1894 utopian romance The Traveler from Altruria claims that the 
ideal great man in his country is one who “has been able, for the time being, to give the 
greatest happiness to the greatest number” (119).  That “one suffer instead of three, if 
none is to blame” is “the economy of pain that naturally suggests itself, and which would 
insist upon itself, if we were not all perverted by traditions which are the figment of the 
shallowest sentimentality,” Sewell tells the Laphams when they come to him for advice 
about the love triangle between Tom, Penelope, and Irene (212).  How do we square this 
(seeming) top-down element in Howells’ fiction with what we have been arguing about 
his appreciation for a family-oriented tradition in which a shared commitment to a 
particular concept of human flourishing seems to ensure that each and every member of 
the community achieves those goals?
Perhaps the most honest answer is that cosmopolitan family tradition only 
appears to include everyone, but that, on the contrary, it actually excludes those whose 
well-being is not clearly indispensible to the success of the larger social endeavor.  The 
agrarian narrative with which The Rise of Silas Lapham opens mentions several groups of 
people whose connection to the Lapham family farm does not seem to guarantee them the 
consideration given to those connected by birth or marriage to the property owner
himself.  The “hired men” who work for Silas’ father for wages are mentioned in passing 
and not given any of the credit for the success of the farm that Silas heaps on his father, 
mother, wife or even the paint itself.  The “shif’less Kanuck” to whom Lapham rents the 
farm before the latter begins to develop his paint is eventually turned into a prototype of a
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factory worker and put to work, along with his entire family, firing up the kiln that 
processes the raw paint—apparently, the Kanuck’s “shif’lessness” is more closely 
connected to his foreign status and lack of connection to the land than to a fundamental 
inability to work.  This connection to the land, or to the land-owner, seems to be what 
guarantees individuals a place and a common goal within the agrarian tradition; an 
emphasis on the sanctity of a particular kind of relationship to property is one of its 
underlying factors.  It is not just that human beings can and ought to have a relationship 
with the land and its resources that mirrors and furthers their relationship with each other; 
it is that they can’t have that relationship with each other unless each of them also has the 
same relationship with the land.  It is as if a specific relationship with the land—and 
“land” can be construed as some kind of property that possesses intrinsic and not just 
financial value; paint, pictures, books, horses and houses are some of the things that 
possess intrinsic value in Silas Lapham, besides land—is a mark of the kind of things one 
values and, consequently, a mark of one’s right to be valued as someone who is worth 
more than mere money, whether that money takes the form of wages or capital.  If a 
person is no more than the sum of his wages, then how can he expect to be treated as 
more?
In the account Silas gives of his family, the way in which they have acquired 
their land is shrouded in the mists of the past:  the farm is simply there, and when Silas’ 
brothers escape the pressure of their father’s obsession with the paint to head West and 
“take up” their own land, the metaphor of “taking up” is the only explanation Silas gives 
for that process, as if the land is lying there waiting to be found by wandering men whose 
right to it lies with their ability to recognize its potential and wed themselves to its
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development.  This particular kind of “stewardship” of the earth is more closely allied to 
the Protestant new-world mythology of the original New England settlers than to the 
ruthless acquisitiveness of the Gilded age, but it is still tied to the idea of ownership, to 
the desire to make a personal and exclusive claim on the ownership and development of 
some corner of the earth.  But the acquisitive and exclusionary overtones of this 
connection to the land cannot blind us to its differences from the exploitative ideology 
that characterizes Rogers and the big railroad companies that are about to swallow him 
up:  in the long run, Howells identities the desire to steward the land not (just) with a lust 
to exploit the land solely for the sake of its financial value but with a more complex and 
mystical desire to possess and develop it for reasons that include its connection to our 
past and to those we care about, as well as its hold over our own hearts and souls as we 
work with it to enable it to reveal itself both to and for itself and for us.  In Howells’ 
utopian romance The Traveller from Altruria, published nine years after Silas Lapham
and over the course of a period in which Howells was working out his social and political 
ideals through interactions with many of the progressive and socialist leaders of his day, 
the “one occupation [that] is honored above another” with the peaceful Altrurians is “the 
cultivation of the earth” (161-2).  “We believe that this,” says Mr. Homos, the Altrurian 
ambassador who has landed on American shores, “when not followed slavishly, or for 
gain, brings man into the closest relations with the deity, through a grateful sense of the 
divine bounty, and it not only awakens a natural piety in him, but that it endears to the 
worker that piece of soil which he tills, and so strengthens his love of him” (162).  In The 
Travellor from Altruria, Howells makes a very transparent attempt to connect this love of 
land to the abrogation of class divisions and to contrast the honest and hard-working local
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people to the clueless and self-satisfied representatives of the middle-class who are 
summering at the hotel.  The hapless and conventional novelist who is Mr. Homos’ 
patron registers frequent consternation upon finding Mr. Homos working in the fields or 
fraternizing with the hotel staff.  But in Silas Lapham a relationship with the land is not 
necessarily tied to either a love for God or for a romanticized peasantry but rather with a
more general capacity to respect things for what they are, not for what they can purchase, 
and to demonstrate that respect by showing oneself to be a caretaker of the earth.
Clearly, Howell felt that mutual investment, rightly conceived, in property— 
which is ultimately an investment in the earth, the material, and by extension the body 
itself—was a necessary condition for sustaining human community. For Howells—or at 
least the Howells of Silas Lapham—community could not be sustained outside of a 
mutual commitment to stewardship of the material world, and having some stake in that 
world seemed to be a prerequisite for valuing it properly in the cosmopolitan tradition 
discussed at the end of the novel as well as in the agrarian tradition that begins it, 
although having a stake in the world might be interpreted slightly differently in the 
former than in the latter: an argument could be made that for Tom “the earth” is broadly 
construed and means material goods—like the paint—in general rather than land in a
stricter sense.  The larger point, however, is that Silas’ commitment to property rights at a 
juncture when larger issues seem to be at stake, like the life and health of Rogers’ wife or 
Jim Millon’s family  or the “hands” at Silas’ “Works,” can be shown to be consistent with 
the role that property plays in the narrative traditions that are worked out in other places
in the novel, although acknowledging this also means recognizing that both traditions 
value a particular kind of relationship between man and beast and earth as a prerequisite
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for valuing these things in any way at all.  “I don’t care what becomes of the hands,” 
Lapham cries when his wife expresses pity for them: “They’ve shared my luck; now let 
them share the other thing.  And if you’re so sorry for the hands, I wish you’d keep a 
little of your pity for me.  Don’t you know what shutting down the Works means?” (253) 
To say then that Howells would like to wed rights and principles (no longer sanctioned 
by God) to a narrative that transposes them into talk of character and virtues answerable 
to a common notion of human flourishing does not mean that such a transposition would 
make (or is intended to make) flourishing an option for everyone in America; and 
certainly many of the traditions that MacIntyre favors for their successful integration of 
the material and the spiritual were notorious for their denial of what would now be
considered inalienable human rights to groups like women and slaves.  In fact, one of the 
recurring dilemmas in Howells’ novels of this period is how to preserve the purity of the 
cosmopolitan outlook, which prides itself on its tolerance and openness to adjustment, 
when this openness exposes it to the erosion of some of the qualities that ensures its 
viability—a dilemma that Howells never resolves successfully, as we shall see in the next 
section.
Before turning to that topic, however, I want to briefly address how Howells 
makes up for the lack of transparency between Silas seemingly overwrought stand for 
“justice” and “right” and the larger cosmopolitan narrative to which it is attached. When 
material connections are occluded, when the ground slips out from under a character’s 
feet and he is forced to take a stand for “complicity” with and in a world where these 
connections are no longer tangible—where he is no longer able to ascertain whether 
money is backed by anything of real value—Howells comes to his or her aid by
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envisioning and enacting a role for art that is different from its primary goal (in his 
works) of constructing sustainable cultural narratives.  Instead, Howells puts pressure on 
art to provide a principle like “not robbing people who trust [us]” with an emotional 
appeal that becomes a justification for action in and of itself.  Although Silas’ 
commitment to principle is ultimately connected to a buried tradition of respect for 
individuals’ relationships with their property, that connection is not immediately clear in 
the immediate context, and rather than succumb to didacticism, Howells heightens the 
emotional affect of the situation itself, doing everything he can to enhance the dramatic 
affect of the opposition Lapham faces and, consequently, the heroism of his resistance. 
Silas’ wife listens to him pacing up and down his room all night and compares him to 
Jacob wrestling with the angels.  Rogers accuses him of “ruining” him and his invalid 
wife.  The entire novel is meant to create a portrait of modern-day heroism by evoking a 
picture of a lone businessman standing for law and justice against the wilderness of 
modern speculation; even the description of Silas in his retirement evokes the pathos of 
the shabby and retired man of action.  The guests at the dinner party that occurs in the 
middle of the book spend an extended period of time discussing acts of heroism 
committed during the Civil War and conjecturing about what heroism ought to look like 
in modern life and modern art.
The upshot of all this is that, in his effort to consolidate these principles in the 
absence of a clear consensus on their correctness, Howells allied himself with the 
sensationalism he spent so much of his career—and so much of this novel—decrying, 
although we could undoubtedly conclude that his issues with sensational and sentimental 
novels were less with their methods than with their matter.  Presumably, if sentimental
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novels had marshaled their resources around proving that virtue rather than love was the 
“chief interest of life,” they might have been better approved by the Reverend Sewells 
and by Howells himself:  Howells is not an enemy of emotional appeals, only of 
emotional appeals deployed in the service of vice and excess.   Love in a necessary and 
ennobling feature of the cosmopolitan storyline he constructs for Tom and Penelope, but 
Howells is not embarrassed about manipulating emotion even when the narrative 
rationale is obscured, demonstrating how thoroughly he understand the value of adapting 
his message—or rather, the vehicle for his message—to his audience in an age in which 
“product packaging” and mass marketing were increasingly important and traditional 
narratives no longer seemed convincing to large numbers of people.
It should not then surprise us, in light of what we have just discovered about 
Howells’ devaluation of characters without roots in the world, that Howells has a 
reprehensible habit of killing off his lower-class and immigrant characters just when their 
suffering threatens to disrupt his middle-class protagonists’ tidy lives:  Jim Millon’s 
widow, daughter and disreputable son-in-law, not to mention the seedy Rogers and his 
invalid wife, disappear from The Rise of Silas Lapham once they have threatened Silas’ 
marriage and business, never to be seen again.  In A Hazard of New Fortunes, the
German immigrant for whom Basil March compromises his new career as a literary 
journalist is clubbed to death by a policeman just in time to prevent March from actually 
losing his job; the populist preacher who lures Annie Kilburn to a life among the mill 
workers is struck dead by a train before Annie is forced to fulfill her promise; the callow 
factory girl who prevents Lemuel Barker’s upward mobility in The Minister’s Charge
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proves to be inconstant just as he is about to merge his life with hers; only characters of 
an equal social standing, whose respectability is backed by property and other tangible 
manifestations of virtue, have claims on other characters that Howells seems willing to 
enforce—eager to enforce, in fact, with all the shameless sentimentalism that he 
condemns in other contexts.   But we should also note, in an attempt at partial expiation, 
that the impetus for Howells’ novels of social realism was his growing sensitivity of the 
conditions that strike Basil March and his wife with middle-class guilt when they 
accidently ride through one of the poverty-ridden streets of New York looking for a new 
apartment.  A Hazard of New Fortunes depicts a middle-aged, middle-class family man 
attempting to navigate his way between his obligations to his nouveau riche boss, a 
bumpkin-turned-tycoon named Dryfoos who will eventually undergo a much ruder 
awakening than the one that Silas Lapham experiences, and his obligations to the New 
York working class, represented by the aforementioned German immigrant, named 
Lindau, whom March hires for his magazine.  Unfortunately, the tycoon demands that 
March fire Lindau once he learns of Lindau’s socialist commitments.  Many critics have 
argued that the novel lets March off the hook by aligning him with Lindau in their 
“common dispossession,” their impotence against forces of greed larger than themselves, 
while also allowing March the consolation of “recuperat[ing] his own self-image and 
dissociat[ing] himself from the identity of a worker” by refusing to fire Landau (Kaplan
58).  But in one recent article Sophia Forster suggests that Howells deliberately allows 
March this consolation—which both he and Howells suspect to be specious—in order to 
root his novel in the “typical” rather than the exceptional and to ground his characters in a 
historical dialectic even at the expense of its resolution.  Howells allows Lindau to be
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sacrificed because his real-life counterparts are being sacrificed on the streets of New 
York every day, and to pretend that anything that March does can salvage the situation— 
or that March would typically do anything more than the little that he does—is in some 
sense to belie its grimness.
Unfortunately, Forster undermines the acuteness of this argument by arguing that 
at the end of Hazard Howells cannot help but resurrect a version of American 
exceptionalism by portraying the tycoon Dryfoos as susceptible to motives that are not 
purely acquisitive.  By making Dryfoos’ motive for starting the magazine his desire to 
provide some creative outlet for his sensitive son and his motive for selling the magazine 
to March his remorse over that son’s death, Howells strays from his allegiance to the 
typical in this renewed attempt to do what he did in Silas Lapham: obscure the excesses
of capitalism behind a family face and suggest that its practice in America can genuinely 
be benign.  While there is doubtless some truth to this reading, I also want to suggest that 
in this particular novel Howells exhibits a greater awareness of the limitations of his old 
allegiance to virtues rooted in the cultivated of the earth, limitations rooted not only in 
their elitism but also in their growing impractically; significantly, Dryfoos himself is a 
former farmer who has been forced off his land by the Standard Oil Company. 
Interdependence in America is becoming increasingly linked to its citizens’ common 
dispossession rather than their shared possession of the land, a dispossession whose 
manifestations Howells finds more sympathetic in a farmer like Dryfoos than an 
immigrant like Lindau—and whose resolution he cannot envision without reverting to 
some version of Christian and agrarian ideals—but which nevertheless forces him to
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deploy such ideals with much more caution and sensitivity than he did in The Rise of
Silas Lapham.
In addition, any hope Howells still displays in the efficacy of these ideals is 
linked, curiously, to a notion of evolutionary progress influenced by Darwinism.  For 
Howells the possibility of aberration is built into the structure of the “typical” situation 
that he tries to portray in A Hazard of New Fortunes.—the possibility of a mutation or 
(less dramatically) a genetic drift that will ultimately evolve the species towards a kinder 
and gentler place.  The speech that he puts in March’s mouth at the end of the novel, 
when March strenuously denies the possibility that Dryfoos has undergone a radical 
change of heart since his son’s death, supports such a reading:
I suppose I should have to say that we didn’t change at all.  We develop. 
There’s the making of several characters in each of us; we are several 
characters, and sometimes this character has the lead on us, and sometimes 
that.  From what Fulkerson has told me about Dryfoos, I should say that
he has always had the potentiality of better things in him that he has ever 
been yet; and perhaps the time has come for the good to have its chance. 
The growth in one direction has stopped; it’s begun in another; that’s all 
(485-6).
“We are always looking for the miraculous!” March tells his wife a few sentences later 
after she accuses him of drifting dangerously close to “fatalism” in his assessment of 
Dryfoos possible motivations for selling March the magazine:   “I believe that unhappy 
man truly grieves for his son, whom he treated cruelly without the final intention of 
cruelty, for he loved him and wanted to be proud of him; but I don’t think his death
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changed him, any more than the smallest event in the chain of events remotely working 
through his nature from the beginning (486).  March’s deliberate rejection of the 
possibility of “miraculous” transformation in favor of a more evolutionary notion of 
progress, of “chains of events remotely working,” of alterations that occur not at once but 
through the slow intricate process of mutation and “growth”—through recessive traits 
becoming dominant through a series of responses to environmental changes, the 
development of an organism’s  “potential of better things”—allows for Dryfoos’ 
motivations to be mixed, for him to exhibit latent traits of generosity and benevolence
that might emerge within the right set of circumstances.  In short, Forster’s claim that 
Howells reintroduces the rhetoric of American exceptionalism through his reversion to 
the “atypical” possibility that Dryfoos might have started a business out of a complexity 
of motives that could be mercenary or not or both or more bespeaks her insufficient 
understanding of what the “typical” might entail within the possibility of benign 
evolutionary progress that Howells’ attempts to imagine here—the “typical” allows for 
precisely these kinds of complex inter-weavings of greed and love, motives and
situations, genetic inclinations and environmental factors that might introduce unexpected 
results.
In A Hazard of New Fortunes Howells is, in fact, inching away from his more 
aggressive attempt to unify society under the version of Americanized cosmopolitanism 
that he unveils in The Rise of Silas Lapham.  He has not completely backed away from 
his aggrandizement of characters like Lapham or Dryfoos nor his allegiance to the 
agrarian and family values to which both characters return, to one degree or another, by 
the end of their respective novels.  But he seems to be having a quieter recognition that
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such values are being undermined by forces more complex than pure greed and that the 
best way for him to resist—at least given his etiolated arsenal of weapons—is not to 
swim against the stream but to swim with it and, in the process, attempt to divert it into 
pleasanter channels.  As Edward Bellamy remarks at the end of his 1888 utopian 
bestseller Looking Backward:
To the stream of tendency setting toward an ultimate realization of a form 
of society which, while vastly more efficient for material prosperity, 
should also satisfy and not outrage the moral instincts, every sigh of 
poverty, every tear of pity, every humane impulse, every generous 
enthusiasm, every true religious feeling, every act by which men have 
given effect to their mutual sympathy by drawing more closely together 
for a purpose, have contributed from the beginning (243).
The forces to be resisted are no longer, as they were in the early days of America, the 
repressive British government; they are now the oppressive conglomerate of corporate 
monopolies that do “outrage the moral instincts,” and resistance can take different forms 
and grounds.  It can be a quiet resistance backed by the relative independence that his 
wife’s inheritance provides Basil March—a stance based in property—or it can be backed 
by more a forceful commitment to a refigured notion of property that Howells can’t quite 
envision but which a Jewish-American socialist like Abraham Cahan does. Nevertheless, 
what Howells does see is that all resistance to capitalist culture that attempts to articulate 
an alternative that will work within the confines of a system is going to be characterized 
by a certain amount of compromise that is not necessarily fatal to the value of that 
resistance.
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Abraham Cahan exemplified the kind of American success story that Howells 
wanted to believe was still possible for immigrants and others who were willing to adapt 
to the middle-class lifestyle and work their way upwards.  Born in Luthuania to a 
rabbinical family, Cahan chose to pursue a secular education against his father’s wishes 
and became a school teacher in Vilna after passing his teaching examinations.  Within a 
couple of years his life was endangered by his socialist associations and the threat of the 
pograms that began after the assassination of Alexander II, so he fled to America in 1882, 
at the age of twenty-one, where he worked in New York sweatshops and studied English
at night, paying his board through teaching lessons in Yiddish and Hebrew and eventually 
giving English lessons to newly arrived immigrants when manual laborer begin to feel 
insupportable to him.  Almost immediately he became a champion of Yiddish as a
vehicle for spreading socialist propaganda among the Jewish working class, giving a 
Yiddish speech at a socialist meeting less than three months after his arrival, and in the 
late 1890s he helped found the Yiddish socialist newspaper the Jewish Daily Forward 
that would eventually become “the leading Yiddish newspaper in the world” and which 
he ran as sole editor for over forty years (Marovitz 1996).  His entrée into the New York 
literary scene came at the behest of Howells, whose wife discovered Cahan’s first story 
published in English in a magazine that she bought on an elevated train platform in 1895. 
Howells invited Cahan to dinner and helped him find a publisher—and a more
marketable title—for his first novel, which was published in 1896 as Yekl, A Tale of the
New York Ghetto.
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For his part, Cahan was a Howells’ enthusiast who read “every line” that Howells 
wrote (qtd. in Kirk).  In 1889 Cahan gave a lecture on “Realism” to the New York Labor 
Lyceum which was subsequently published in the Workman’s Advocate, an English 
journal supported by the Socialist Labor Party, and in a paragraph devoted to Howells, 
Cahan wrote that “Mr. Howells is not a socialist, and yet, unconsciously, free from the 
pressure of partisan passion, merely at the bidding of his realist instinct, he accentuates in 
his works…and brings into high relief a fact in American life which lays bare the 
fictitiousness of American equality” (qtd. in Kirk).  Cahan was still an admirer three 
decades later, publishing a reverent obituary in the Jewish Daily Forward after Howells 
died, calling Howells’ “famous character” Silas Lapham “an American ‘allrightnik’ (qtd. 
in Kirk).  The title of Cahan’s 1917 novel The Rise of David Levinsky is an allusion to
The Rise of Silas Lapham; like Silas, David Levinsky is a young man who rises from 
Russian poverty to become a successful American industrialist, although—in true 
naturalist fashion—he never undergoes the crisis of conscience that arrests Silas’ upward 
climb, experiencing instead a steady forward progress that the novel represents as 
corresponding to the gradual death of his soul, a death that culminates in the rejection of 
his hand in marriage by a modern young socialist girl who finds him personally and 
morally repugnant.
The Rise of David Levinsky is considered Cahan’s masterpiece, but my focus here 
is on the lead story from Cahan’s 1898 collection “The Imported Bridegroom” and Other 
Stories of the New York Ghetto, a collection that lies more squarely within the realist 
tradition promulgated by Howells himself.  Howells wrote a review for The Imported 
Bridegroom as well as for the earlier Yekl, and his brief but positive analysis of Cahan’s
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second major foray into English-language fiction places Cahan within a pantheon of 
regionalist writers like Mary E. Wilkins Freeman who were then creating “topographical” 
but “lifelike” American fiction (qtd. in Kirk 40).  Cahan was reared reading the Russian 
realists whom Howells was only beginning to read and emulate in the 1880s and 90s, and 
his own realism in his novels of Jewish-American life is in many ways more
sophisticated than Howells’, less marred by intrusions of “useless information,” preachy 
characters or aimless and awkwardly resolved plots.  Indeed, a comparison between the 
two men highlights the connection between the form and function of the realist novel, 
between its success at storytelling and its success at constructing sustainable cultural 
narratives, and we might argue that—as we have already seen—Howells’ trouble 
integrating lower-class characters into the cosmopolitan family tradition is 
indistinguishable from his inability to resolve their presence in the plot; whereas Cahan’s 
success at sustaining all the narrative threads through the end of “The Imported 
Bridegroom” without reverting to the deux ex machina of death is an indication of the 
extent to which he was able make the (Jewish-American) immigrant experience palatable 
to a genteel English audience, a feat that Howells does not pull off in A Hazard of New 
Fortunes, whose dead German immigrant could very easily pass for one of the characters 
who are very much alive at the end of Cahan’s story.  Part of Cahan’s success lies simply 
in the fact that he was a Russian-Jewish immigrant, and “otherness” was not alien to him 
the way it was to Howells, but the rest lies with Cahan’s conscious rejection of 
assimilationist ideals for a version of the American success story that looks similar to 
Howells in some ways but very different in others.
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Character and not plot—and words rather than deeds—often seems to be a focal 
point for Howells because, despite his best intentions, he has trouble sustaining a 
narrative that will actually imbed all his characters within a shared way of being in the 
world, one that will fix the cultural problems that he sets himself to address.  In The Rise
of Silas Lapham, Howells puts several different American narratives in conversation with 
each other, some old and some new:  the East Coast establishment tradition that Tom 
Corey and his parents represent; the agrarian tradition out which Silas emerges; the new 
business “tradition,” which, as we have seen, Howells hardly considers a tradition at all; 
and, finally, the narrative of the American underclass, which in The Rise of Silas Lapham 
is constructed out of the remnants of the Jim Millon family, who are indigenous to 
America as Silas himself—Mrs. Lapham and Mrs. Millon grew up together in 
Lumberville.  The vices that prevent Millon’s widow, daughter and son-in-law from
being assimilated into the novel’s resolution consist in their disreputable behavior, which 
threatens the sanctity of marriage and property, and their lack of any assets that guarantee 
their respectability beyond the heroism of their dead husband and father.  Jim’s daughter 
Zerilla married her drunken husband because—so she tells Mrs. Lapham—“he had a little 
property then,” a fact that seems to stand in for his right to be taken for a person of 
character, as it often does in the novels of Jane Austen.  By the time of the novel’s 
opening, however, he is a sailor who will neither stay on land nor leave for long enough
to allow Zerilla to marry someone more substantial, and the novel abandons all three of 
them to succumb to their fate.
In contrast, the three narrative strands introduced in “The Imported Bridegroom”
are still in place at the end of the novel:, the first-generation story of the self-made Jewish
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immigrant Asriel; the story of his daughter Flora, the Jewish-American princess; and the 
story of the imported “prodigy of Talmudic learning” who defects to atheism and 
socialist ideas as soon as Flora helps him get his hands on Gentile books.  By the end of 
the story, a marriage has taken place, the marriage between Asriel’s daughter Flora and
the young scholar Shaya, whom Asriel has fetched back from a trip home to Poland in an 
attempt to redeem himself in the eyes of God from the taint of his American success 
(Cahan 776).  Another marriage is in the works, the marriage that Asriel contracts with 
his pious widowed housekeeper when he realizes that his new son-in-law has become 
corrupted by American culture and turned into an “appikoros” (797). “America is now 
treife to me,” he says mournfully to the widow Tamara as he suggests that the two of 
them get married and “end our days serving God in the Holy land together” (803). 
Asriel’s retreat from America, a much less ambiguous retreat than Silas’ escape from 
Boston at the end of Silas Lapham, signals the incompatibility of the values of the old 
world with those of the new.  Asriel’s money has made Flora’s transformation possible, 
but he himself remains “only a boor,” unable to satisfactorily negotiate between the 
competing claims of the past and the present (803).   The burden of that task then falls on 
Flora and Shaya, who are left to figure the future of the Jewish-American identity and 
tradition through their marriage and individual characteristics.
In many ways a shallow character, out of place in the “veritable icon of a ‘race’- 
mixing, diasporic, radical immigrant, Lower East Side modernism” with which Cahan 
closes the story, Flora is a mediator not only between the old world of her father and the 
new world of her husband but between the old America of Cahan’s genteel American 
readership and the new America to which he is attempting to introduce them (Blair 276).
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The story opens with her reading Little Dorrit in her parlor in a scene immediately 
recognizable to the middle-class women who formed so large a part of the late 19th- 
century reading public.  Unlike Irene Lapham or the other girls of her own circle, Flora is 
aware of the advisability of reading Dickens, Scott and Thackeray, of perfecting her 
idiomatic English, and of marrying a doctor, an “educated American gentleman, like
those who lived uptown” (765). When her father brings the boyish Shaya back from 
Poland, she demonstrates a stubbornness equal to Asriel’s in her resistance to Shaya’s 
charms—until she manages to convince the nineteen-year-old boy, who is already 
besotted with Gentile learning and threatening to surpass Flora “on her own ground,” to 
study to become a doctor (790).  Unfortunately, the learning that he acquires and the 
company he keeps “queers” her expectations in ways that make them unintelligible in 
light of any of the languages she knows and turns Shaya himself into someone she no 
longer recognizes outside of the glow of the bourgeois halo she has thrown about him.  In 
the crowded attic into which he draws her on the eve of their wedding day, as she sits 
among the men who strike her like “some of the grotesque and uncouth characters in 
Dickens’s novels,” Shaya himself seems “a stranger and an enemy,” and the people in the 
room are obscured in their smoke and “broken English” (806).  The compassion with 
which the text treats her “desolation and jealousy” even as it bears down on the word 
“excluded,” the last word of the story, demonstrates not only the thoroughness with
which Cahan understood the limitations of the middle-class mindset but also his 
awareness of the price it will pay for its ignorance in its unsought but inevitable alliance 
with the races and classes that make up the new America.  At the same time, his 
knowledge of the language and conventions of this white audience are what guarantee
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Cahan himself—the real mediator between his up-town readership and the motley crew 
of modernity—access to the parlor room in which Flora nurtures her accomplishments 
and keeps Shaya at bay as well as the to over-crowded attic into which Shaya manages to 
introduce her, and Cahan’s empathy for Flora’s predicament reflects his awareness of his 
own precarious position as the “Yiddish-language intellectual who has helped give life- 
formative idioms, practices, institutional models and cultural forms-to English-language 
radicals and avant-garde writers, only to discover that those transactions are rendered 
invisible” by their appropriating audience, just as Flora’s role in helping Shaya navigate 
the American terrain is effaced in the smoky attic (Blair 277-8).
Ultimately, Flora is no more a part of the uptown white community than Cahan 
himself is, and his gentle mockery of her aspirations, not to mention the more disquieting 
“nightmare” into which he eventually leads her, demonstrates his sense of the cost of an 
assimilationist strategy like the one that Howells endorses (806).  In the last analysis, 
Flora’s mediation between immigrants like her father and immigrants like Shaya is 
unnecessary—the money and knowledge of American culture that she has at her behest 
are as available to Shaya as they are to her, and Shaya is discovered not through her 
agency but through her father’s.  “You know I ain’t to blame for it all,” Flora says 
sobbingly to Asriel when he rages at her clandestine marriage; and in truth the 
relationship between Shaya and Flora is described less in hierarchal than in egalitarian 
terms, despite the patronizing attitude Flora initially adopts towards the beardless young 
“holy child” dressed in uncomfortable Gentile clothes.  The two are portrayed as siblings
and playmates, children of a common benefactor, and their infantile romps throughout the 
prelapsarian Eden of the Stroon household constitute one of the story’s main charms.
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Flora’s “labored Yiddish” strikes Shaya “as the prattle of a child” and he feels “as if he 
were playing with another boy,” while Flora is “amused and charmed as with a baby” and 
gets used to his presence in the house “as if he actually were a newly discovered brother 
of hers, brought up in a queer way which she could not understand” (782-3, -9).  By 
underplaying the gender divisions between the two in the early sections of the story, 
Cahan emphasizes their equal potential as heirs and bearers of the Jewish-American 
cultural identity, but their joyous partnership only holds up in the front and back parlors
of Asriel’s house on Mott Street.  In the final scene in the attic Flora’s gender plays a 
conspicuous part in her outsider status and her inability to comprehend and adapt to 
Shaya’s life outside the house as well as he has adapted to hers inside the house.  Shaya is 
the one who roams the streets freely, who discovers the Astor library, who eats the 
forbidden Gentile food and makes friends beyond the confines of a narrow circle of 
Jewish acquaintances, and Flora’s security becomes dependent on her doubtful ability to 
make the same adjustments that he does or on an increasing dependence on him; the story 
closes without enlightening us as to which of these dubious alternatives Flora will choose 
to take.
In short, the tradition that holds up least well to the conditions of modernity is the 
one that most closely resembles Howells’ bourgeois cosmopolitanism tradition, 
highlighting what Howells himself seems to have suspected, that “bourgeois” and 
“cosmopolitan” might be contradictions in terms.  The necessity of bringing them into 
some sort of relation was clearly more urgent to him than to Cahan, who—not being a 
part of the white middle- class—was less worried than Howells by a fact that seemed 
equally clear to them both at the turn of the twentieth century:  the class with which Flora
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aligns her behavior is becoming increasingly irrelevant in the fight over the future of 
America, and its continued relevance depends in large part on how it positions itself in 
relation to both the industrialist class that increasingly provides its means of subsistence 
and the immigrant and working classes which are threatening to overtake it.  The Rise of 
David Levinsky, published almost twenty years after “The Imported Bridegroom,” makes 
clear that Cahan had no illusions about the ability of the industrialist class to overcome 
qualms inherited from older traditions or cultures about the morality of ruthless 
acquisitiveness, even at the expense of its own best interest.  Despite being trained in a 
Talmudic seminary in his native Russia, David Levinsky experiences little of the guilt 
that characterizes his forerunner Asriel Stroon—or his forerunner Silas Lapham.  In the 
novel itself the Jewish middle class and the old-world elite both revolve around David in
an attempt to curry his favor; the only exceptions to the ubiquitous ass-kissing contest are 
a few of the East-side Jewish socialists and intellectuals that David professes to treat with 
contempt.  In reality, they embody and symbolize some aspect of his soul that he has 
neglected in his pursuit of financial success, one that proves impossible to reclaim and 
that is intractably, even if not very effectively, set against him.  As David moves closer to
his fortieth birthday without having married and produced heirs, he becomes obsessed not 
just with the idea of love but of marrying into a tradition whose values represent those he 
has never possessed (since he does not come from an old and respected Jewish family) or 
has neglected to acquire.  “It was my ambition,” he proclaims, “to marry to some
orthodox family, well-to-do, well connected, and with some atmosphere of Talmudic 
education—the kind of match of which I dreamed before my mother died, with such 
modifications as the American environment rendered natural” (377).  He achieves this
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ambition, becoming engaged to a girl who fulfills these conservative requirements, the 
daughter of a retired merchant and the granddaughter of a Russian rabbi, a family whose 
social prominence in the old world created a chasm between them and the impecunious 
David, whose rabbinical education was funded by charity and donations.  Nevertheless, 
David is not in love with her; she is more a representative of ideals he himself finds 
empty than of any substantive personality.  Fanny’s intellectual range is “not that much 
wider than that of her old-fashioned mother, and her reading is “confined to the cheapest 
stories published” (397).  Although David attempts to convince himself that what matters 
is that she will be perfect as a “wife, a mother, and a housekeeper,” he breaks the 
engagement as soon as he meets and falls in love with the alluring Miss Tevkin, a 
budding socialist and the daughter of an impoverished artist who frequents “a well- 
known gathering-place of the East Side Bohème” (397, 455).
Miss Tevkin rejects him, but the conclusion is the same as that reached in the 
earlier “The Imported Bridegroom”—the values of the middle are becoming increasingly 
pre-empted by those on the right and the left.  Asriel is not yet as heartless as David nor 
Shaya as strident as Miss Tevkin but both stand for more (good and bad) than Flora does. 
The battle lines between Asriel and Shaya are not yet clearly drawn, at least on Shaya’s 
end, but what is implied in “The Imported Bridegroom” is made clear in David Levinsky, 
that the values that have been exclusive to the white middle class—tradition, work, 
family—are being appropriated by other intersections of race and class in American 
culture and worked out in ways that are more responsive to the dynamics of life within an 
industrial capitalist culture run amuck.  Cahan was clearly better placed than Howells to 
recognize that the older traditions of both Europe and America were being supplanted by
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the battle for money and position; the substitution of the norms of American consumer 
culture for the traditions of Russian-Jewish orthodoxy created a more apparent divide 
than the transmogrification of older versions of American culture into what sometimes 
looked to Howells like (and were) cheaper and flimsier versions of the same.  Yet Cahan 
understood that Howells and others like him were not only attempting to provide life 
support for the American middle class but attempting to do so by reaching out to the
more reputable members of the immigrant class in hopes that they would join their ranks, 
like Basil Marsh reaches out to Lindau, whose lack of gratitude surprises his would-be 
benefactor.   Cahan was similarly aware of the liabilities of Jewish-American immigrants 
buying into the conventions of the middle-class, not necessarily because the assimilation 
process was any harder for Jewish immigrants than it was for Americans who were many 
generations in—Flora seems to be much more at home among the books and trappings of 
gentility than her Western counterparts Irene and Penelope Lapham—but simply because 
the lifestyle manifests a sterility that Cahan recognizes is difficult if not impossible to 
surmount.  Flora is no more alienated in her back parlor on Mott Street than Bromfield 
Corey in his library or the Lapham women at their window or Annie Kilburn in her lone 
splendor on the right side of the tracks in a town that has been renamed for its burgeoning 
hat industry.  And while Cahan is more than willing to drag Flora into modernity— 
largely because he identifies with the experience of marginality that she comes to embody
—he makes clear that the difficulty lies with her inability to assimilate, not his.
If we treat the scenes in the two different rooms in which “The Imported 
Bridegroom” opens and closes as creating a kind of visual synecdoche in which the 
contents and atmosphere of the rooms are reflexive and constitutive of two different
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versions of American national identity, we will perhaps be better equipped to see why 
Cahan embraces the latter at the expense of the former, besides the expediency of doing 
so for an impoverished Jewish intellectual eking out a living on the Lower East Side. 
The indices in Flora’s back parlor are its isolation and emphasis on material comfort— 
and on Flora’s identification with this material comfort, with a particular kind of
interiority rather than with other human beings.  The room creates a recognizable version 
of American late-Victorian gentility in the incipient stages of high modernist 
isolationism, shoring itself up with both borrowed and cheap culture (“Dickens, Scott or 
Thackeray in addition to the ‘Family Story Paper’ and the ‘Fireside Companion’”) in
“triumphant [un]consciousness of the snowstorm” of the twentieth century raging outside
(7).  The opening paragraph tells us that
Flora was alone in the back parlor, which she had appropriated for a sort 
of boudoir.  She sat in her rocker, in front of the parlor stove, absorbed in 
“Little Dorrit.” Her well-groomed girlish form was enveloped in a kindly 
warmth whose tender embrace tinged her interest in the narrative with a 
triumphant consciousness of the snowstorm outside (1).
The back parlor has become a boudoir where visitors are no longer expected and Flora
sits in her rocker, a forerunner to Sister Carrie, entertaining herself with a novel about the 
conditions of the poor and the working class in Victorian England.  As we have already 
seen, Flora is a stand-in for the typical female reader of the period who will no doubt be 
“absorbed” in The Imported Bridegroom from the safety of her boudoir.  Flora is also 
Cahan’s contribution to the pantheon of American girl characterizations of the period,
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characterizations which functioned as a locus for recording, observing and furthering the 
changes underway in American cultural identity.
One of the main interests of the Penelope/Irene subplot of Silas Lapham is 
constructing a coherent version of American girlhood that might “‘honor the name of 
American Woman and redeem it from the national reproach of Daisy Millerism’” (19). 
Bartley Hubbard means this as sneer at the back-woods conservatism of the Laphams in 
the article he writes for the “Solid Men of Boston” series, but this allusion alerts readers 
that Howells is engaging in contemporary conversations about American womanhood 
through the characters of Irene and Penelope Lapham, especially through Penelope; and 
Flora Stroon, who may be the first version of the Jewish-American princess in American 
literature, is like Penelope in having a taste for more substantive reading than the girls in 
her immediate circle (Blair 273).  The novels both girls read are indicative of their own 
investment in portrayals of women in fiction as well as of the ways in which they are 
fashioning their identities in relation to these characters.  Penelope is critical of George 
Eliot’s heavy-handed control over both her readers and her female characters, aware of 
fiction’s potential to stimulate—and simulate—independent thinking and action, a 
potential that was extremely important to Howells himself, as we have already seen.  In 
contrast, Flora reads with very little critical insight, engrossed in a novel titled after one 
of Dicken’s angel-in-the-house heroines.  Reading is a status and class marker for Flora, 
confirming her complacency in her difference from the other girls in her Jewish circle 
and enabling her to re-imagine herself as something other than what she is.  The opening 
paragraph of “The Imported Bridegroom” describes Flora’s “well-groomed girlish 
form”—the story makes a consistent point of her “dignified bearing” and careful dress—
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as “enveloped in a kindly warmth whose tender embraced tinged her interest in the 
narrative,” an interest that is heightened rather than diminished by her “consciousness of 
the snowstorm outside” (64,1).  The things with which Flora surrounds herself narrow her 
experience to a small space delimited by a personified “warmth” whose primary function 
is to enable a greater degree of withdrawal into the inner regions of the self, aided by the 
practice of solitary reading.  At the same time, this reading displaces any real opportunity 
for self-recognition; the next paragraph tells us that “the thickening twilight, the warmth
of the apartment, and the warmth of the apartment blended together, and for some 
moments Flora felt far away from herself” (1).  Thus the accoutrements and activities that 
construct Flora’s world enable a withdrawal from others that simultaneously enacts an 
alienation from her own self.  Like her father before her, Flora is “too busy to live, much 
less think of death”—her soul is as lost to her as Asriel’s soul is to him, and as the 
“afternoon light beg[ins] to fade into a melancholy gray” dusk creeps into Flora’s room 
“in almost visible waves” (9,1).
Unfortunately for Flora, she is just as lost in “stuffy, overheated atmosphere of the 
misshapen apartment” in which she finds herself at the end of the story as she is in the 
melancholy gray of her parlor at the beginning, although her awareness of her alienation
in the overcrowded attic increases its pathos for the reader and obviously for Cahan 
himself.  Flora “gaze[s] about her perplexity” at a world which is “anything but the world 
of intellectual and physical elegance into which she had dreamed to be introduced by 
marriage to a doctor” (119).  Reading is as important a marker of values in this new
world as it is in Flora’s boudoir and in all the other worlds and traditions of the novel. 
When Shaya first arrives in America he brings with him—in Asriel’s baggage—“a huge
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box full of Hebrew books…of various sizes” which “frighten” Flora, “as if they were 
filled with weird incantations and Shaya were the master of some uncanny art” (58). 
The book being read by the group assembled in the attic apartment is similarly 
unintelligible to Flora—Harriet Martineau’s translation and condensation of Auguste 
Comte’s Cours de Philosophie Positive.  The substitution of a work by the man who 
coined the word “sociology” for the books of the Talmud and the novels of Dickens
signals the transfer of cultural authority from art to science under way in the second half 
of the nineteenth century; the men in the attic are not crouching close to a dying fire— 
they are reading aloud in an “overheated” room by the light of a kerosene lamp that casts 
a halo on the “frank, pleasant face” of the reader, a Scotchman who is “a leading spirit in 
positivist circles” (118).  Modernity is figured here as a horizontal rather than a vertical 
phenomenon, one that involves a recognition of plurality and the possibility of disparity 
and dissent rather than conformity to a master narrative inherited from above.  Although 
the common language is English, it is significantly “broken English,” informed and 
modified by a heterogeneous collection of cultures whose differences are insisted upon 
rather than elided, and the discussion “engages itself” seemingly without effort, as an 
organic outgrowth of the simultaneous insistence on diversity and commonality.  In this 
case, the commonality resides in a common interest in politically-oriented intellectual 
inquiry filtered through the works of a philosopher (himself filtered through an 
interpreter) bent on tying science to political philosophy, on viewing sociology as the last 
development in the progress of science and the human race.  In fact, we could argue that 
the story’s progress from the Jewish through the bourgeois to the modernist/socialist 
worldview illustrates Comte’s three stages of human development as outlined in the
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Cours, confirming “The Imported Bridegroom’s” implied point that the liberal bourgeois 
tradition is an intermediate stage between the supplanting of the theological stage by the 
positivist one.  In the positivist stage, the search for absolute knowledge has been 
abandoned and a harmonious balance between order and progress achieved through the 
rule of technocrats who understand that society itself operates according to the ongoing 
process of connecting observable facts to general laws.
In Comte’s sociology, science and industry are detached from their seemingly 
inevitable association with exploitative economics and associated with the harmonious 
balance of the positivist mindset, with the organized but non-reductive plurality of the 
ideal mind and the ideal society.  The scene in the attic illustrative of this ideal mind and 
state, a scene in which the diversity of the debaters’ backgrounds is described in eccentric 
detail—a Swedish tailor with “the face of a Catholic priest; a Zurich Ph. D. in blue 
eyeglasses; a young Hindoo who eke[s] out a wretched existence by selling first-rate 
articles to second-rate weeklies, and several Russian Jews”—while their fundamental 
egalitarianism and indifference to financial success are insisted on with equal vehemence. 
“There is a lot of such nice gentleman there!” Shaya enthuses as he urges Flora to come 
with him into the attic.  “You’ll see what nice people.  I tell you they are so educated, and 
they love Jews so much! A Jew is the same as a Gentile to them—even better” (117). 
What the men do have in common is their education, intense intelligence and love of 
learning; they are all “insatiable debaters” and most of them have “university or 
gymnasium diplomas” (118).  They are also impoverished day labors who, like Shaya,
are characterized by a kind of natural refinement except when they are reflected through
Flora’s perplexed gaze; thus the emphasis of this particular version of modernity seems to
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be on an ambivalent relationship with work as well as a more significant emphasis on 
virtues associated with education, enlightenment, natural refinement, curiosity and open- 
mindedness—virtues that are much easily imagined in conjunction with a group of 
displaced European intellectuals than with the middle-class characters to whom Howells 
attempts to attribute them.  For Cahan’s intellectuals, work is not the haloed and 
unqualified good that Howells’ texts seem to want it to be; its value depends on its kind. 
Manual labor that exhausts and degrades people who are suited for something better is 
not depicted as ennobling, nor is living in a culture that provides insufficient outlets for 
its intellectuals.  In theory, Howells endorses the same position, and his anxiety over 
American’s lack of appreciation for its artists and intellectuals is manifested in middle- 
class characters like Basil Marsh who have spent their youth in uncongenial occupations 
because their culture does little to nurture the talents and opportunities of its “natural- 
born literary men” (3).  Yet the assumption still lingers in Howells’ novels that natural 
talent will have its day, that characters like Lindau who fail to succeed despite their 
natural abilities have a predisposition towards and inclination for adversity; whereas 
Cahan has lived a little too closely to the Lower East Side to be able to accept this
sanguine interpretation of American opportunity, as all the stories in the collection of The
Imported Bridegroom attest.
Another significant difference between Cahan’s and Howells’ versions of 
modernity lies in their attitude towards land or place.  As we have seen, Howells ends 
The Rise of Silas Lapham with an attempt at assembling a cosmopolitan tradition that
modifies the pioneer connection of value and identity with land to include the connection 
of identity with property—although, ideally, property more intrinsically interesting than
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cold hard cash.   Houses, horses, art and paint, rightly incorporated into the well-lived life 
(i.e. treated as ends in themselves and not merely means to one’s own ends) become 
genuine markers of value and virtue, as they could still afford to be in the spacious and 
fashionable—or unfashionable—neighborhoods of Boston.  Space is more available than 
it is in a crowded attic in New York City and it is demarcated and protected; even Flora’s 
connection to her environment is predicated on her proprietorship of a “little private
house on Mott Street,” which belongs to her father (2).  But the crowds in the attic 
apartment of which even its resident is only a lodger force the boundaries of personal 
identity to stop quite literally at the edges of the body, and “language, ethnic markers 
(clothes, speech, associations), body language, codes…and disciplinary distinctions in 
universities and church and organizational affiliations” become more crucial to 
demarcating the limits of the self than physical spaces or literal ground (Jacobson 17).  At 
the same time, the crowd in the attic is not crammed into a space that is portrayed as 
especially porous, as open to infiltration and interaction from outside, as might be if the 
text were engaging with issues of global identity and affiliations.  Instead, the Scotchman, 
the Swedish tailor, the Zurich Ph.D., the Hindoo journalist, not to mention the Russian 
Jews whom Flora particularly dislikes, are all crammed into a room from which there 
seems to be no escape, a figure of the nation as a “heterogenous commonwealth”
delimited by real physical and geographical boundaries that let select people in but very 
few out and that demand that all classes stop tugging at each other’s coat-sleeves in an 
effort to escape and, instead, settle down to do justice to the various embodiments of 
difference with which they are now trapped in marriage and logistical proximity (Hazard
199).
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This new national order is not without its own anxieties, however; the empty tea- 
glasses sitting on the table with “the slices of lemon on their bottoms” do not hold out the 
same promise as the lemon pie that becomes the ironic symbol of the promise of
salvation associated at different times with both the old and new worlds.10   (In Jewish
culture the etrog, a variety of lemon integral to festival of Sukkot, represents the heart as 
well as the ideal Jew, one who is characterized by good deeds as well as knowledge of 
the Torah—a goal that eludes everyone in “The Imported Bridegroom.”)  Shaya is not, 
after all, quite a full participant in the discussion—he sits “brimful of arguments and 
questions which he had not the courage to advance…fidgeting about in a St. Vitus’s
dance of impotent pugnacity” (120).  Cahan clearly has his own nostalgic leanings for the 
innocent environment of Flora’s apartment, where the two young people, second and
first-generation immigrants, can pursue their selective sampling of American modernity 
under the auspices of Asriel’s patronage—a marriage of bourgeois and bohemian values 
under the protective umbrella of the capitalist machine—but Cahan is aware that while 
the immigrant class may acknowledge some debt to the more established classes, the 
middle-class itself has a harder time embracing values that seem particularly threatening 
to the propriety and homogeny that have been the hallmark of its longevity. 
Nevertheless, Cahan is clear that the ongoing vitality of the middle class—its resistance 
to the leveling effects of greed and injustice—depend on its ability to ally itself with 
intellectual and ethnically diverse communities whose version of cosmopolitanism is 
built on relationships characterized by a shared commitment to political and intellectual
comradery rather than on an extension, literal or metaphorical, of blood and property ties.
10In Cahan’s fiction lemons and lemon pies often symbolize characters’ desire for .  See for example “The 
Apostate of Chego-Chegg.” The Century Illustrated Monthly Magazine 59.1 (November 1899) 95-105. 
Electronic Text Center, University of Virginia Library. Web. 15 January 2011.
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Cahan’s cosmopolitanism is an inversion of Howells’, an inversion in which ties built on 
marriage, family and their material accoutrements are flipped to the margins and 
voluntary ties built on a mutual appreciation for internalized property—human 
intellectual and cultural capital—are moved to center stage.  Virtue is still tied to the 
ability to respect people and things as ends in themselves, but this ability is independent 
of actual proprietorship of anything other than one’s own body and mind.
In “The Imported Bridegroom” the difference between Shaya and the Stroons’ 
strategies of self-conceptualization is very pronounced, with the latter dependent upon 
Flora and Asriel’s ability to project their desires onto its objects and Shaya disinterestedly 
delighted in even the things that concern him most.  But in Howells’ novels the characters 
often occupy some midway point between these two positions, a point in which self- 
definition is tied to ownership but ownership that has somehow been purged of any 
attempts to impose its effects on the objects owned—a compromise that can be seen in 
Howells’ attitude towards literature itself, which he believed should be freed from its 
servitude to the tastes of the masses while retaining some commitment to the
advancement of democracy.  Cahan’s own realism internalizes the instructive to the point 
that it becomes invisible, precisely by not attempting to impose it on a cultural narrative 
that seems by its (fragmented) nature to resist it; whereas Howells never fully conceives 
of the possibility of a coherent cultural narrative that preserves its coherence precisely by 
its internalization of an appreciation for difference as a shared cultured practice.  Yet the 
two men shared an essential belief in “an idealistic society and in a higher standard of 
life” whose goal was to preserve qualities virtues and practices that they believed would
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ensure a higher standard of human flourishing than that connected to the consumer 
culture which was—ultimately—the common enemy of both (qtd. in Kirk).
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Chapter Three:  Charles W. Chesnutt and the Appeal to Care
It is as difficult to trace the dividing-line between the real and the romantic as to plant a 
milestone between north and south.  –Henry James, Preface to The American
In many ways William Dean Howells and Charles W. Chesnutt’s lives had similar 
trajectories.  Both were outsiders, born in Ohio to solid but middling families, self-taught 
men who saw literary careers as the most practical means to self-advancement, who 
practiced fiction in the service of social and political reform but eventually became 
disillusioned with its power to effect change.  Both were feted but thought fusty in their 
old age.  “Spiritually” a Mugwump, Chesnutt had all the markers of the middle-class 
reformers—of whom Howells was a prototypical example—whose ideals dominated the 
Progressive Era (Hofstater 167).11   Yet Howells’ fight against what he believed to be the 
dehumanizing effects of commodity culture on middle-class American life was more 
sustainable, at least in the short term, than Chesnutt’s battles against racism in the New 
South.  In the eighties and nineties Howells was still able to envision the integration of 
capitalist expansionism with traditional narratives of pioneer and agrarian life that 
continued to resonate with white Americans, and if things got too compromising for his 
urban protagonists he could always solace them and their audience by sending them back 
home—via fictive dream—to rural New England and middle America.  But such idyllic 
escapes were impossible for Chesnutt, either in fiction or in fact: return meant either 
invoking an idealized version of the past or present or facing the harsh realities of 
Reconstruction.  There was no option for Chesnutt but to push forward, even though his 
belief in the American myth of the self-made man was clouded by his experience of the 
inequities of the color line.  In stories like “The Web of Circumstance,” for example,
11See also Pickens pp. 5-6 for an extended discussion of Chesnutt’s similarity in upbringing and outlook to
Howells and other typical Protestant middle-class reforms of the Progressive Era.
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Chesnutt shows that Afro-Americans’ increasing commitment to professionalism and 
economic advancement in the years after the war could be undercut in an instant by the 
injustices of the Southern legal system and the culture at large.  Consequently, most of 
Chesnutt’s fiction is spent uncovering the limitations of the accommodationist agenda 
supported by men like Howells and suggesting that Negro advancement and assimilation 
could only come through blacks’ acquisition of civil rights as well as economic 
opportunities.  In all of his novels and short stories on the race question, Chesnutt is bent 
on showing the limitations of the accommodationist agenda and exploring the possible 
means of arguing for civil rights in a culture in which rational moral theories exclude the 
Negro by definition and popular prejudices against realist depictions of (lower-class) 
black experiences prevent him from constructing a viable narrative ethic in and through 
his fiction.  For Howells the great task of fiction was to protect the American way of life 
from the corrosive effects of modernity by providing some way of interweaving its rural 
past with its urban present in and through a sustainable cosmopolitan narrative; for the 
young Chesnutt writing in his journal in 1880, the task of fiction was to remind white 
audiences that such narrative needed to be extended to all American citizens and that 
their failure to do so was both a cause and an effect of its failure to achieve the kind of 
internal coherence and external force it needed to prevail against an increasingly 
exploitive consumer culture.
“The object of my writings would be not so much the elevation of the Colored 
people as the elevation of the Whites,” Chesnutt wrote on May 29:  “the negro’s part is to 
prepare himself for social recognition and equality; and it is the province of literature to 
open the way for him to get it—to accustom the public mind to the idea; and while
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amusing them to lead people out, imperceptibly, unconsciously, step by step to the desire 
state of feeling” (Journals 139-40).  For Chesnutt, American business practices were not 
necessarily as hostile to his purposes as they sometimes seemed to Howells—achieving 
economic success was an important aspect of “the negro’s part” in “preparing himself for 
social recognition and equality.” Chesnutt was extremely sensitive to the continuities 
between chattel slavery and capitalist exploitation of wage laborers, to the ways in which 
freed slaves were vulnerable to exploitation by industrialists looking for cheap labor; 
however, The Colonel’s Dream is just one among Chesnutt’s novels to suggest that more 
humane business practices might supervene in situations where the remnants of slavery 
made economic exploitation of the underclass by both Northern and Southern profiteers 
seem like an inevitable development.  The options in a capitalist economy were not 
selling out or getting out, but of remaining in—once you were in—and attempting to 
convert wage labor into free labor and opportunities to accumulate capital, thereby 
gaining power and leverage in the culture at large.12   Indeed, Elizabeth Hewitt has argued 
that Chesnutt understood his own authorship as a business venture of this type, as an 
attempt to “craft his fiction in such a way that authorial labor is aligned with capital 
ownership and not compensated labor,” in the hope that such an investment might be a 
means towards upward mobility much like his stenography business (935).  Slavery itself 
was a capitalist institution and not something that stood outside it, Chesnutt suggests in 
the Conjure Tales; and the storyteller, like the conjure woman, has a marketable product 
that gives him or her some bargaining power within a consumer culture (Hewitt 935).
Uncle Julius has something that Annie and John need, and he can protect it by refusing to 
reduce it to a skill for hire and by using the purchasing power with which it provides him
12This entire paragraph is heavily indebted to Hewitt 931-962
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to establish himself as a consumer of goods—a power increasingly important to assert in 
a society in which “two-thirds of Americans were hirelings” (qtd. in Hewitt 940).
Yet “the material realities of authorship at the turn of the century” made writing a 
less lucrative business than Chesnutt had hoped (Hewitt 958).  Many white authors were 
struggling to establish and protect the status of their work.  The path to fame and fortune 
led through a few large literary publications and the field was glutted with aspirants as 
well as writers for hire.  In addition, there was very little market for the increasingly 
polemical fiction Chesnutt chose to write.  “The present aspect of the race question in this 
country is decidedly unpleasant,” wrote a reviewer of Chesnutt’s 1901 novel The Marrow 
of Tradition: “It arouses bitter resentments in politics and personal relations.  It tends to 
revive the sectional differences which culminated in the civil war.  It may be questioned, 
therefore, whether it is wise to force public sentiment in this direction by presenting the 
involved question in the form of a novel in which the writer’s feelings are neither 
obliterated nor skillfully concealed” (“With”).   Howells himself lamented the “bitter, 
bitter” tone of The Marrow of Tradition, which disturbed his belief in the patience and 
long-suffering of the black population and the efficacy of the reconciliationist approach
adopted by Booker T. Washington (Howells).13   Howells’ own treatment of the problem
of the color line in his 1859 novella An Imperative Duty ignores the larger political 
implications of race relations by suggesting that whoever can pass for white, should. 
Indeed, Chesnutt’s attitude towards race relationships was more radical than Howells or 
Washington’s, and a large part of his authorial mission was to resist and counteract 
Washington’s accommodationist agenda, which encouraged the aspiring negro to be
13  See also Andrews, “William Dean Howells” for an account of Howells’ relationship with Chesnutt and 
his responses to Chesnutt’s fiction, especially his dismissal of The Marrow of Tradition.
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content with “tilling a field” rather than “writing a poem” in the path to racial uplift 
(Washington).  Accommodationists and assimilationists shared a commitment to 
“individual self-help, thrift, self-reliance, economic security, Christian principles, and 
what Edward White called ‘popular elitism,’” but assimilationists also possessed a “deep 
commitment to human rights for black and white Americans, ” a commitment that 
Chesnutt is determined not only to uphold but depict as already implicated in the goal of 
economic advancement (Danielson 75).  Yet if we identify Chesnutt the author with the 
defeated Colonel French at the end of The Colonel’s Dream, as Paul R. Petrie has 
suggested we should, we can conjecture that the Colonel’s failure to realize his dream of 
reform is a reflection not only of Chesnutt’s awareness of the difficulty of solving race 
problems given Northern and African-American commitment to accommodationism but 
also his awareness of the limits of using fiction to as a path to personal fame and fortune 
or to social justice for his race.
As most critics has agreed, Chesnutt’s move away from fiction in the early part of 
the twentieth century after the poor sales of The Colonel’s Dream was influenced by his 
increasing preoccupation with more lucrative business ventures as well as his “deepening 
doubts about the efficacy of literature to create the social and ethical transformations at 
which he aimed” (Petrie 110).  As Petrie remarks, Chesnutt was much more sensitive
than Howells could have been to the ways in which readers’ preconceptions influenced 
how novels were read and received (109-16).  Chesnutt repeatedly wrote for what he 
thought white audiences might read—his journals indicate that his turn to increasingly 
inflammatory subject matter in his last two published novels was fueled at least in part by  
his hope to become the next Albion W. Tourgée or Harriet Beecher Stowe, a hope that
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shows how deeply his profit and humanitarian motives were intertwined.14    He returned 
to race fiction during the 1920s when the market for black authors seemed brighter, albeit 
without successfully finding a publisher; in the meantime he focused on building up his 
stenography business and stepped up his commitments to social and political activism. 
But within the short window of time in which he saw two short-story collections and
three novels into print he demonstrated both a keen awareness of the extent to which art, 
like any other commodity within a capitalist culture, is delimited and determined by the 
demands of the market as well as a shrewdness about the ethical ends to which it could 
nevertheless be put.  He was aware of the extent to which authorship could 
simultaneously produce both financial and cultural capital and he wrote until the market
forced him out.  He deliberately wrote for white Northern audiences not only because that 
was the surest way towards financial prosperity but also because he hoped it would be a 
swifter path to accumulating political and social capital for blacks than might be
generated by Washington’s “go slow” emphasis on industrial jobs and education.  In 
addition, he continuously pushed his own authorship past the limitations imposed on it by 
white audiences and, when he foresaw that those audiences were not going to be 
responsive, used his last published novels as spaces in which to urge human rights 
considerations in even more transparent ways.
Both The Marrow of Tradition and The Colonel’s Dream insist that economic 
progress and industrial education are necessary but insufficient conditions for ensuring
racial progress:  in both novels, characters—black or white—who put faith in the
14Chesnutt’s journal entry of March 16, 1880 reads “…why could not a colored man, who has lived among 
colored people all his life: who is familiar with their habits, their ruling passions, their prejudices…why 
could not such a man, if he possessed the same abilities, write a far better book about the South than Judge 
Tourgée or Mrs. Stowe has written?”
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possibility that Southern blacks might achieve personal security, much less civil rights, 
only through contributing to the economic and social viability of their communities are 
brutally disabused.  Chesnutt disagreed with Washington’s confident belief that “no race 
that has anything to contribute to the markets of the world is long in any degree 
ostracized” (Washington 223).  Nor did he believe that, as Washington claimed in his 
celebrated Atlanta speech, “the wisest among my race understand that the agitation of 
questions of social equality is the extremest folly, and that progress in the enjoyment of 
all the privileges that will come to us must be the result of severe and constant struggle
rather than of artificial forcing” (223).   In fact, he deliberately refutes that position in The 
Colonel’s Dream.  The colonel, who is fighting for the abolition of peonage in his home 
state of North Carolina, observes at one point in his battle with Southern conservatives 
that:
There was another party, of course, which deprecated any scandal that 
might involve the good name of the state or reflect upon the South, and 
who insisted that in time these things would pass away and there would be 
no trace of them in future generations.  But the colonel insisted that so also 
would the victims of the system pass away, who, being already in 
existence, were certainly entitled to as much consideration as generations 
yet unborn (230).
Identifying the points at which the humanizing power of upward mobility falls prey, in 
Chesnutt’s novels, to the law of diminishing returns—the point at which other paths to 
justice have to be explored—is part of my purpose in this chapter.  For Chesnutt, this 
point seems to lie flush with any and all particular instances of injustice; there is no room
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for sacrificing current victims of abuses like lynching and peonage for the sake of 
“generations yet unborn.” The horrors of lynching, peonage, unprovoked riots or unjust 
trials constitute immediate imperatives to change.
Beginning with The Conjure Tales, this chapter examines how Chesnutt 
understands blacks’ participation in an industrial capitalist economy—a participation that 
includes the production of artworks—to be helping and/or hindering their pursuit of civil 
rights.  Uncle Julius is a savvy capitalist player, even though his aims are never as 
thoroughly mercenary and predatory as his white employer John’s; yet ultimately his 
stories, like Chesnutt’s own, fail to win him the larger rights and considerations, 
proprietary or otherwise, that might make him a true competitor in the Southern
economic landscape.  Instead, they often circumscribe him within roles that have been 
determined by the consumer markets.  Nevertheless, there is still room for maneuvering 
within these roles:  by skillful manipulation of the conventions of the genre, the stories 
Julius tells provide both him and Chesnutt with a forum for generating sympathy for the 
victims of slavery and support for the natural rights of equity where rational arguments 
for justice might fail—a utilization of what Alasdair McIntyre would call emotivism, 
perhaps, but one that seems necessary given American whites’ reluctance to invest in 
realist novels about Southern race relations.  Chesnutt shows an acute sensitivity to the 
emotional effectiveness of an appeal to the maternal instinct in building the sorts of
sympathies that might lead to civil action, an appeal that he directs especially at the white 
(upper) middle-class female reader who comprised a large section of Northern audiences. 
Relationships between African-Americans and white women are complicated in 
Chesnutt’s novels, but a preoccupation with the redemptive power of motherhood and the
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maternal instinct runs throughout Chesnutt’s fiction from The Conjure Woman through 
his unpublished 1928 novel The Quarry.   In all three of his published realist novels on 
race relations, in which, as Brook Thomas remarks, “progress is connected to a sense of 
loss,” Chesnutt blames the defeat of his characters’ hopes for social and political justice 
not only on the failure of economic progress to guarantee civil rights but also—among 
other things—the failure of the common bond of motherhood to generate the kind of 
cross-racial sympathy that might hasten political action (173).
Chesnutt consistently suggests that economic progress is not enough as long as 
whites either refuse to profit from black enterprise or are willing to allow blacks the 
opportunity for economic advancement side by side with an ongoing refusal to guarantee 
them civil rights; however, the difficultly lies in formulating an argument for according 
blacks rights when they lie outside the pale of the arguments that usually hold water in 
the white world.  These rights are not self-evident when they are applied to African- 
Americans, nor does guaranteeing them hold any social benefits for whites, who felt 
threatened rather than gratified by the thought that blacks might hold some utilitarian 
value for their culture.  In addition, traditional American cultural narratives did not 
prioritize interracial justice.  Both Howells and many of the regionalist writers he
championed valued the genre in part because it comforted white urban audiences with the 
belief that pioneer and agrarian values were still somehow in play in the culture at large; 
part of the appeal of a work like The Rise of Silas Lapham, for example, is that it 
demonstrates a belief in the possibility of grafting pioneer narratives onto the trajectory
of industrial capitalism and coming out on the other side with a kinder, gentler business 
world in which the pursuit of profit is not only compatible with the virtues of industry,
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respect, community and justice for all but is somehow productive of them.  But such an 
illusion was impossible for a race of people whose presence in America was a result of 
planters’ greed for the cheapest possible labor source, whose national narrative was a 
story of slavery and exploitation; therefore, in his search for grounds for basic rights and 
protections for African-Americans Chesnutt frequently falls back on an appeal to 
something that present-day feminist philosophers might call a rudimentary ethics of care, 
which insists on the fundamental interdependence of human beings as the basis for moral 
reasoning.  The House Behind the Cedars, The Marrow of Tradition and The Colonel’s
Dream, which I want to look at here, all suggest that a major component of racial renewal 
might lie in awakening in white people a dormant recognition that we are all capable of 
either needing, feeling or eliciting a mother’s love.  In addition, Chesnutt’s final novel
The Quarry features a dusky orphan of uncertain origin who is adopted by a black
woman who raises the money for his education, which equips him to become “a leader of 
his people,” by starting a cosmetic business that generates a multiracial following—a plot 
development that suggests that capitalism can only be exercised humanely when it is 
generated by compassion and care and used in the service of justice.
The basic premise of an ethics of care is that post-Enlightenment justifications for 
moral norms start from an inadequate conception of human nature.  Human beings are
not necessarily rational, self-interested, and autonomous beings who only bond together 
when their private interests are better served than not through cooperation with others; 
they are equally motivated (or capable of being motivated) by emotional and social 
impulses that have their roots and metaphor in the mother-child relationship. 
Consequently, deliberations about the nature and basis of moral judgments should not
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avoid presupposing a belief in our basic desire for cooperative and caring relationships or 
our capacity to be persuaded to invest in such relationships.  Whether or not Chesnutt 
would—or could—believe that human beings were by nature cooperative, he was aware 
of the value of emotional appeals and the fertile ground that art provided for them; much 
of the success of his first works, including The House Behind the Cedars, might be 
attributed to his skill in creating characters who inspire sympathy and pity in his readers. 
Yet Chesnutt was also aware of the dangers and limits of such appeals; it was 
comparatively easy for his white audience to sympathize with the travails of slaves under 
a system that had passed away or the sufferings of a pretty “colored” girl who could pass 
for white; it was harder for a black writer to evoke the horrors of lynching or peonage as 
practiced against ordinary African-Americans without alienating his target audience. 
Moreover, Chesnutt was aware of the extent to which emotional appeals could feed his 
audience’s hunger for sentiment and sensationalism without necessarily furthering his 
cause; and as he raises the subject of Southern civil rights abuses in The Marrow of 
Tradition and The Colonel’s Dream he is no doubt influenced by both these 
considerations in his studied avoidance of lynching scenes or sensationalized depictions 
of the conditions of peonage, a delicacy that awarded him the grudging praise of Howells 
and others for his fair and balanced (albeit “bitter”) handling of the issues.  Ironically, 
Chesnutt’s own identification with the “talented tenth”—his impatience with the
“bigotry, superstition” and stubbornness of the uneducated blacks in the rural South— 
probably made his choice of white and upper-class black focalizers and his dispassionate 
handling of such situations easier than it might have been otherwise (Journals 81). 
Chesnutt was not a believer in emphasizing racial difference; in fact, he believed, as he
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claims in various essays, that “the future American race—the future American ethnic 
type—will be formed of a mingling…of the various racial varieties which make up the 
present population” (“Future” 846-7).
Yet his subject matter lent itself to emotional and artistic appeals more easily than 
that of white middle-class writers Howells; the moral deliberations to which Howells 
commits his characters in his novels of social realism are frequently several times 
removed from anyone who might really stand to suffer from them—and are, 
consequently, often difficult of dramatic realization, as at least one critic has remarked 
Carter 169).  Howells’ ultimate concern was for the health of the social body, on which
he believed the well-being of its individual members depended; his characters are often 
depicted as sacrificing their own or the well-being of those around them for the sake of 
some notion of the right that is supposed to be self-evident but yet rarely manages to 
make the impression that the portraits of individual sufferers might.  Chesnutt, on the 
other hand, recognizes that the good being invoked to justify the sacrifice of individual 
African-Americans is the well-being of the social body as a whole, a form of 
utilitarianism that he finds indefensible, as the opinions he attributes to Colonel French 
make clear.  Yet he is often denied recourse to accurate and sensitive portrayals of 
individual sufferers, the clearest method of making his point within an artistic medium, 
by the prejudices of his audience as well as by the restrictions of an art form (the novel) 
whose polarization of the realist and romantic modes—whose internalization of the fact- 
value dichotomy—makes any attempt to do justice to the situation in the South seem 
simultaneously both biased and brutal—both too subjective and too real.  His solution to
this problem is to show it to be precisely the reason that both art (his art) and morality are
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breaking down:  his novels’ inability to achieve what he wants them to achieve—an 
integration of the romantic and realist modes, an honest and emotional look at the lost 
“negro” whose fate is their absent center, whose tragic and brutal end is alluded to but 
never actually shown in the pages of Chesnutt’s fiction—is symptomatic (and no doubt, 
generative) of society’s inability to acknowledge and appreciate the value of individual 
human beings who happen to be black.  Thus, Chesnutt shows the success of both art and 
civic morality to depend on a fundamental and holistic valuation of the individual human 
that he links very closely to the maternal instinct in both its creative and care-giving 
aspects.
The collected conjure tales were published in 1899 along with The Wife of His 
Youth and Other Stories of the Color Line and Chesnutt’s biography of Frederick 
Douglass.   Howells wrote an appreciative review of all three for the Atlantic Monthly, 
focusing on the merits of The Wife of his Youth as an effective work of realism.  The 
House Behind the Cedars, the last of Chesnutt’s novels to be a success, was published the 
following year.  Of all of Chesnutt’s published books of fiction, The Wife of His Youth 
makes the most sustained attempt to depict the lives of ordinary African-Americans, 
culminating—deliberately, no doubt—in “The Web of Circumstance,” the story of a 
respectable young blacksmith named Ben Davis who is falsely accused of, and
imprisoned for, stealing a white man’s whip.  Chesnutt makes Davis a champion of 
property acquisition and upward mobility:  “…ef eve'y nigger in dis town had a tuck keer 
er his money sence de wah, like I has, an' bought as much lan' as I has, de niggers might
'a' got half de lan' by dis time," Davis says to his friends as he works; and a white man
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who is passing by says, “You're talkin' sense, Ben…Yo'r people will never be respected 
till they 've got property" (251).  But in the last analysis property only makes Davis more 
vulnerable to the jealousies of his neighbors and employees, one of whom steals the whip  
and plants it in Davis’ shop so that he can get Davis out of the way and hook up with his 
wife.  At the trial, the prosecutor connects Davis’ opinions on property, which are 
“‘prejudicial to the welfare of society’” with nihilism, communism, and a secret devotion 
to Tom Paine and Voltaire (253-4); but because he is “‘the best blacksmith in the 
county,’” according to the colonel whose whip is in question, he is let off with the “light 
sentence of imprisonment for five years in the penitentiary at hard labor” (257, 61).  In a 
move that at first reads like a nod to his white audience’s penchant for “impartiality” 
when it comes to racial questions, Chesnutt has Davis try to break out of jail the night 
before his sentencing, even though his lawyer has suggested that he might be let off with
a light fine.  Chesnutt makes a point of emphasizing that Davis is not privy to the 
exchange between the colonel and the judge in which the colonel suggests that the judge 
“let him off easy” because of his blacksmithing skills:  “It is a pity,” Chesnutt remarks, 
“that Davis could not hear what was said” (257).
Chesnutt wrote a number of stories—“The Sheriff’s Children” earlier in the same 
collection is another example—in which the reader knows what the black prisoner/victim 
doesn’t, that the white man in power is inclined to mercy, but before the white man can 
act on his sympathies the black man takes matters into his own hands and seals his tragic 
doom.  The point to such stories is that justice cannot be trusted to the idiosyncrasies of 
individuals any more than to the accumulation of property; it needs to be codified in
some public way that frees it from dependence on private interests.  At the same time,
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however, Chesnutt shows that the responsibility for ensuring this legal protection lies 
with men like the colonel and the sheriff (who is also a colonel) who need to make the 
connection between their familial responsibilities and their responsibilities to their fellow 
men.  In “The Sheriff’s Children” an imprisoned mulatto turns out to be sheriff’s 
illegitimate son, to whom he owes a natural duty:  “neither law nor custom could destroy 
a responsibility inherent in the nature of mankind. He could not thus, in the eyes of God
at least, shake off the consequences of his sin” (146).  But in “A Web of Circumstance” 
this natural obligation is extended to the human family:  the recently released Davis is 
dissuaded from killing the colonel by the sight of the colonel’s little girl, a sensitivity that 
the colonel—who shoots him—declines to return.  The obvious irony is that Davis 
recognizes and responds to human feelings that the privileged class have chosen to
ignore, feelings like respect and tenderness for “purity and innocence” and sympathy for 
parental love (265).  The little girl herself displays a sympathy for Davis’ sufferings that 
forms a contrast to her father’s violence and indifference.
The ironic contrast that Chesnutt creates between Davis’ feelings—or the little 
girl’s—and the colonel’s actions is just one of the ways he uses a literary technique to 
“lead people out, imperceptibly, unconsciously, step by step to the desired state of 
feeling” when rational arguments have failed.  Chesnutt also relies on irony in The 
Conjure Woman and Other Conjure Tales, a collection of stories featuring a frame
narrator named John, a white Northerner who has come down to North Carolina to buy an 
old plantation and “start a new industry” (31).   In their initial reconnaissance of the land, 
John and his wife Annie encounter an ex-slave named Uncle Julius who still lives on the 
plantation and whose stories about plantation life, told in dialect, become the centerpiece
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of the tales.  Each tale that Uncle Julius tells has an apparent meaning and a hidden 
meaning, the apparent meaning (according to Annie) being the expression of pathos or 
the illustration of some moral for the entertainment of his listeners, and the hidden 
meaning (according to John) being the achievement of some underlying material end,
some sort of usually mercenary agenda in the unequal war for assets that Julius is waging 
against John.   The reader is left to choose between the two, to see Annie as sentimental 
and naïve or John as cynical and patronizing—or to recognize that both positions are 
equally limited, that Annie’s apparent sympathy with Julius is driven in large part by her 
own needs and frustrations, by her own stultifying reification as a luxury good within a 
consumer culture, and that John’s dismissal of Julius is motivated by his desire to 
downplay Julius’ significance as a competitor for the land and its resources.  Chesnutt’s 
emphasis on the “artificiality” of the Southern local-color genre and the potential 
subversiveness of a character like Uncle Julius has become a commonplace observation 
among twenty-first century critics: not only does Julius inhabit a social world whose 
values and systems are as codified and complete as John’s, he also understands that his 
world is intertwined with and defined over and against the larger capitalist culture in 
which he is forced to compete for limited goods and resources (Brodhead Cultures 196). 
His conjure tales are not just “means by which [his] sense of the world is stored and 
transmuted” in a culture whose relationship with the land is more “predial than 
proprietary”; they are also commodities that provide him with a source of leverage within 
a larger culture that turns all art forms, indigenous or otherwise, into bargaining tools (55; 
Brodhead Cultures 199).  The real irony, then, is that Uncle Julius knows what he is doing
—he is exploiting both John’s condescension and Annie’s sympathy for real
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cultural and economic gains.  But how valuable are those gains and at what cost are they 
achieved?
Chesnutt’s deliberate disavowal of the local-color genre after the publication of 
The Conjure Woman might suggests that the cost of capitalizing on black folklore 
outweighed the benefits; and indeed the material gains that Uncle Julius registers against 
John—an un-demolished church building, a new set of clothes, employment for his 
nephew—are fairly limited and fail to reestablish him as default proprietor of the 
plantation and its resources, even though most of these gains—which disrupt John’s plans 
in some way—are made through Julius’ exploitation of the effect that his stories have on 
John’s wife.  In “Po’ Sandy,” Uncle Julius tells the story of a young slave named Sandy 
who is such an obliging worker that his master loans him out to the other family members 
every month or so.  When Sandy falls in love with a young conjure woman named Tenie 
he asks her to turn him into a tree during the day so he can remain on the plantation and 
not be separated from her.  Unfortunately, however, Sandy is chopped down for lumber 
one day while Tenie is away nursing one of “Mars Marrabo’s” grandchildren and the 
lumber is used to build a new kitchen and eventually a schoolhouse.  Annie clearly 
sympathizes with the agony and impotence that Tenie feels when she returns to the 
plantation to find Sandy chopped down and in the process of being ground through the 
sawmill, and her distaste for having her own new kitchen built from the lumber of the old 
schoolhouse enables Uncle Julius to keep the schoolhouse intact for his new community 
church.  The same thing happens in “Mars Jeems’s  Nightmare,” when Uncle Julius’
story about an unsympathetic plantation master persuades Annie to re-hire Julius’ lazy 
nephew against John’s wishes; and similar things happen in other Uncle Julius tales that
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were excluded from the 1899 volume. In “Dave’s Neckliss” Uncle Julius relates a 
horrific tale of a young black slave, a literate preacher, who is falsely accused of stealing 
meat from the master’s smokehouse and  punished by having a ham chained to his neck 
until he comes to believe that he is a ham and hangs himself in the smokehouse to cure— 
a story that compels Annie to send Julius home with the rest of the ham that she has just 
been serving him.
As Richard Brodhead remarks, “Dave’s Neckliss,” is one of Chesnutt’s most 
“powerful” works not only in its portrayal of a literate slave but in its record of the ways 
that slavery stripped African-Americans of their freedom as well as their capacity to 
develop a coherent and humanizing selfhood (“Introduction” 18).  But as John frames it, 
this brutal story of oppression and injustice becomes a tool for Uncle Julius to procure the 
rest of Annie’s delectable ham. John’s need to control and contain Uncle Julius parallels 
“Mars Dugal’s” need to control Dave, in both cases a more benign form of control than 
that exercised by Mars Dugal’s overseer but much more insidious for that very reason. 
Like Mars Dugal, who needs to believe that the only use Dave has for his reading skills is 
to read the Bible and “‘l’arns dat it’s a sin fer ter steal, er ter lie, er fer ter want w’at doan 
b’long ter yer; en l’arns fer ter love de Lawd en ter ‘bey my marster’ John needs to
believe that Uncle Julius is, as he states in his extended prologue to the tale, “curiously 
undeveloped” and unable to feel, except in a “vague, uncertain way” his own degradation 
(126).  John doesn’t want Uncle Julius to disrupt his economic system or question his 
right to control the means of production; consequently, he not only attempts to yoke 
Uncle Julius to an infantilized and infantilizing self-conception—the darky too benighted 
to know the import of what he is saying—but he also attributes duplicitous motives to
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Julius’ storytelling just like Mars Dugal attributes false motives to Dave’s preaching 
when he believes Dave has stolen his meat.  John is just as bent on turning a black man 
into a ham as Mars Dugal was, in reducing what Uncle Julius is and the potentially 
subversive power of what he might have to say to a cheap and greedy motive—or a 
motive that John wants to appear cheap.
But Chesnutt also insists, through Dave, that content can and should be taken at 
its apparent/real value, not (merely) its seeming market value: even though Mars Dugal 
and Mars Walker are right to believe that black literacy does pose some fundamental 
threat to their economic hegemony—that it is form of human capital that often enables 
African-Americans to materially better themselves—they are nevertheless wrong to 
believe that Dave is not committed to the things he reads and says:  Dave does believe
it’s wrong to lie and steal and disobey his master.  He’s not saying those things as a blind 
so he can steal hams.  If he’s saying them as a blind—as he clearly is, feeding Mars
Dugal exactly the lines that will pacify him—he’s saying them in order to protect his right 
to continue speak and read and preach.  In addition, the truths he preaches have 
subversive potential in and of themselves, not just as they are tied to their power to 
generate financial capital—which they clearly don’t do in this particular instance.  The 
professions of letters, as both Washington and (eventually) Chesnutt realized, are not 
always the clearest or swiftest path to economic empowerment in a capitalist culture.  But 
Dave’s words do have power of another kind:  black men who preach and teach that it’s 
wrong to steal not only lay these obligations on themselves but make others subject to 
them as well.  Part of the remorse Mars Dugal eventually feels—and the pathos the story
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creates for readers—lies in the fact that Dave is someone whose integrity and good name 
deserve respect.
Clearly this remorse, or any good name Dave has created for himself, is 
insufficient to save him from a fate that Mars Dugal and Walker make doubly retributive 
because of their resentment at having trusted him in the first place.  And the respect that 
Dave does generate is obviously of the Uncle-Tom variety, the noble and long-suffering 
martyr who appeals to white readers because he models a type of Christian suffering that 
they can emotionally endorse without having to practice it themselves—or having to look 
too closely at the hypocrisy of their self-righteous condemnation of fictional plantation 
owners from a past era.  Chesnutt recognizes that white readers (at least the men) 
probably will identify with John, yet given the form and the limits of his audience’s 
sympathies he cannot make his critique of potential allies too apparent, which is no doubt 
part of the reason he eventually abandoned the genre.  Yet by making the parallels 
between John and Mars Dugal and Uncle Julius and Dave so obvious—and then 
implanting in Dave a willingness to manipulate his master for ends that are not related to 
finagling hams or any other grossly acquisitive agenda—Chesnutt makes an argument for 
preaching, storytelling or novel-writing as ennobling practices in and of themselves, even 
if they don’t ultimately achieve anything beyond (temporarily) elevating an individual’s 
aspirations and self-conception.  Uncle Julius, Chesnutt suggests, could be telling stories
—as John dimly and uneasily perceives—because telling stories is an expression
of “simple human feeling,” a way of being human that is fundamentally self-fulfilling 
(125).  It also often generates appreciation—and sometimes apprehension—from people 
who recognize the import of  demonstrations of thought, creativity, and self-expression,
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people who understand that storytelling is a sign of humanity that cannot be discounted 
without some fundamental denial of the best manifestations of themselves. In addition, 
Uncle’s Julius stories—and Chesnutt’s—have meanings that are potentially subversive of 
imperialist agendas even if those meanings boil down to the disquieting reminder that 
black people have souls and aspirations and creative gifts of their own.  In this case, 
however, we can probably attribute to Uncle Julius himself—whose agenda in almost all 
his stories, even the ones that are more obviously told to achieve some kind of material 
end, is to draw an analogy between life under slave masters and life under John—the 
classic double gesture of attempting to placate the white man while also showing him, 
whether he gets it or not, that his ways need to be adjusted—that the black man to whom 
he’s condescending can exploit that condescension to his own gain—meet him with his 
own game—and go beyond this by providing his employers with an essentially human 
and creative pastime that John himself is unable to provide them, since John’s own spirit, 
in would seem, has been desiccated by dry philosophy and trivial novels, the unfortunate 
fruit of the disparity between the rational and the emotional that exists within his culture.
We can attribute this same agenda to Chesnutt, whose relationship with his white 
audience replicates and complicates the John/Julius and Dugal/Dave relationships. 
Chesnutt isn’t just writing for white audiences, careful of what aspects of his humanity 
they are and aren’t ready to see—he also writes in a white man’s voice, demonstrating an 
ability to write stories that embody and inhabit a white perspective.  Such a move had to 
be unsettling for white readers, although no doubt a large part of Chesnutt’s target 
audience identified with Annie, who is often in cahoots with Julius behind John’s back. 
Annie is the one who grasps the moral or pathetic elements in each story, who insists on
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their “truth” when John scoffingly dismisses them as “fairy tales” (92).  In two of the last  
three stories of the original volume Uncle Julius tells stories that are designed to help 
Annie and Annie’s sister regulate their personal affairs, and even the ever-suspicious
John cannot discover what mercenary motives that Julius might be hiding.   In the first of 
these stories, “Sis’ Becky’s Pickaninny,” Julius tells a story about a slave woman who is 
parted from her baby but eventually reunited with him through the power of conjure.
One of the few conjure tales to end happily, it achieves Julius’ goal of rousing Annie
from a bout of “settled melancholy” that the reader is left to infer is connected to her own 
childless state as well as to her liability to the malaise that was associated with middle
and upper-middle class women at  the time who were “leisured, unproductively employed, 
and given to neurasthenia”(Brodhead “Introduction” 7).  In “Hot-Foot Hannibal,” the last 
story in the volume, Julius tells a story about thwarted love that motivates Annie’s sister
to mend her relationship with her young suitor, a reconciliation in which Julius takes an 
active part.  The collection ends with John’s puzzled attempt to attribute selfish motives 
to Julius in this particular affair—the best he can come up with is to suggest that he was 
trying to get on Mabel’s suitor’s good side, although he notes—still humorously puzzled
—that when “the young people set up housekeeping” they invite Julius to “enter their 
service” but he chooses to remain with John and Annie.  Thus, the volume closes with 
John’s implicit acknowledgement that love and good will have triumphed over trickery, 
that Julius’ stories have created a bond between mistress and man—and through mistress, 
master—that has transcended the power struggle.
Yet Petrie insists that “Julius’s success in reaching his listeners is at best a Pyrric 
victory: he has succeeded in making his white audience see themselves in the black
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protagonists’ lives, but the limited terms of that identification do virtually nothing to 
expand their sense of group identity to include the more alien aspects of black culture— 
those aspects that define it as Other and necessitate literature’s cross-cultural mediation in 
the first place” (133).  Ultimately, Petrie suggests, Julius’ tales highlight the impossibility 
of using such a medium to puncture the prejudices of readers whose reactions will mimic 
those of John and Annie—at best the tales allow white audiences to appropriate black 
experiences for agendas of their own, whether economic or emotional, personal or 
political, and any willingness on African-Americans’ part to surrender their own ends 
results in their being re-inscribed in the role of the good-natured, accommodating negro. 
At the end of the volume Julius is in the same place as he was at the beginning, reduced 
from a nascent ownership position as default proprietor of the old McAdoo plantation to a 
wage laborer with, at the most, a choice of wealthy employers. There has been an 
exchange of sympathies between Julius and Annie—a recognition, on both their parts, of 
their respective humanity—but not one that has generated real results for Julius of the
kind that matter for Chesnutt.  Both authors and audience—Julius and John/Annie as well 
as Chesnutt and the real Johns and Annies—are circumscribed by the limitations of a 
genre that evolved as a compensatory gesture for white Northerners already exhausted by 
the personal repletion they were experiencing in an increasingly fraught urban 
environment; very few readers are “careful” enough to get the ways in which Chesnutt is 
attempting to subvert these expectations through ironic inversion of generic conventions, 
turning a story meant to provide Northerners with escapist entertainment into subtle
social critique.
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Petrie’s reading is generally correct, and bolstered by Chesnutt’s own subsequent 
rejection of the Southern local-color genre or of any stories making use of “blacks, full- 
blooded, [whose] chief virtues have been their dog-like fidelity to their old 
master” (Letters 65). To complicate this analysis, however, I want to close by examining 
the
Uncle Julius story “A Victim of Heredity” that Chesnutt wrote for the 1899 collection but 
which was left out by editorial decision.  In the introduction to his 1993 edition of The 
Conjure Woman and related tales, Brodhead claims that this story, among other 
uncollected conjure tales, shows Chesnutt “flirting fairly unironically with demeaning 
racial stereotypes” (19).  “The Victim of Heredity; Or, Why the Darky Loves Chicken” 
sets out to explain African-Americans’ supposed preference for chicken with a folk tale 
about an exceptionally avaricious plantation owner named “Mars Donal’” who starts out 
as a poor overseer and works his way to wealth, becoming so greedy for greater profit at 
the expense of his laborers that he goes to Aunt Peggy, the conjure woman, to ask her to 
give him a spell that will make his slaves work more on less food.  In his greed to 
maximize results he overuses the conjure and his slaves begin to starve, forcing him—at 
Aunt Peggy’s recommendation—to begin feeding them even higher-quality meat than he 
had given them previously in order to keep them alive.  When he buys up all the pork and 
beef in the surrounding counties he begins to feeding them chicken, again at Aunt
Peggy’s recommendation, since she has previously loaned Mars Donal’s defrauded 
nephew Tom the money to buy all the chickens that he sells back to his Uncle at 
exorbitant rates, thus recovering the fortune that his Uncle has stolen for him years ago. 
Aunt Peggy aids Tom, Uncle Julius tells us, because Tom had saved her life after she had 
fallen in the river.  As Hewitt remarks, this is a unique story in the Uncle Julius canon not
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necessarily because Aunt Peggy is shown to have capital of her own and to successfully 
manipulate the laws of supply and demand in order to ruin a wealthy white man—one of 
the overall themes of the conjure tales is blacks’ ability to be savvy capitalist players— 
but because she uses her knowledge and power to help another white man achieve
financial success that includes buying a plantation and “a lot er” slaves (Hewitt 950).  She 
herself is rewarded with the promise of “a cabin on [Tom’s] plantation en a stool by his 
kitchen fiah” (182), but as Hewitt observes, “this does little to mitigate the strong sense 
that conjure, capitalism, and slavery work hand in hand” (950).  Conjure, and storytelling 
as a form of conjure, are incorporated into a capitalist system as “techniques for the 
production and reconfiguration of value,” but what happens in the frame narrative is more 
telling:  Julius is inspired to relate the tale because John has caught a chicken thief and is 
trying to decide how to punish him—and by the time he finishes it he has “conjured” 
Annie into letting the prisoner go, the only instance in the conjure stories in which a tale 
results in a positive act of retributive mercy/justice for one of the black characters, a 
benefit that goes beyond a trite material benefit for a black character or an emotional pay- 
off for a white one.
In John’s introductory frame narrative for this tale his similarities with the heavy- 
handed white classes who are depicted in more ominous light in other stories are made 
more apparent than they are in other tales.   Aware that “the law in North Carolina, as 
elsewhere, was somewhat elastic,” John decides that “five years in the penitentiary would 
be about right for this midnight maurader” (172).  He briefly rethinks the severity of that 
punishment later in the afternoon, especially when he founds out that his prisoner has “a 
large family and a sick wife,” no steady employment and is “dependent on odd jobs for
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his livelihood” (173). Still, John concludes that “while these personal matters might be 
proper subjects of consideration for the humanitarian, I realized that any false sentiment 
on my part would be dangerous to social order; and that property must be protected, or 
soon there would be no incentive to industry and thrift” (173).   Holding firm at six 
months in the local jail, John vents to Uncle Julius about “your people’s” preference for 
chicken, a racist sentiment to which Annie objects but which inspires Julius to tell the 
story of Mars Donal’s defeat at the hands of Aunt Peggy and Mars Tom. The immediate 
impact of Julius’ tale is that when John goes off to tend to his vineyard Annie turns the 
constable away and lets the prisoner go, justifying her decision with much different 
criteria than John’s.  While John believes that “personal” considerations ought to be 
ignored for the good of the “social order” whose preservation depends on respect for laws 
that “protect property” and incentivize “industry and thrift,” Annie believes that she can 
“trust [her] intuitions” (182).  “I’ve been thinking more or less,” she tells John, “about the 
influence of heredity on environment, and the degree of our responsibility for the things 
we do, and while I have not been able to get everything reasoned out, I think I can trust 
my intuitions” (182).  The contrast between the couple’s opinions is the difference 
between judgments driven by an ostensibly dispassionate assessment of what it takes to 
make (a particular kind of) society work and judgments rooted in sympathy and
sensitivity to the demands of a particular situation.  The culprit has stolen the chickens, a 
fact that is beyond dispute; but listening to Julius’ story has led Annie to reflect that 
Southern blacks have inherited a set of circumstances that predispose them not to favor 
chicken but to behave in certain ways, circumstances that she finds harder than John to 
dismiss, like the legacy of slavery and the poverty and necessity into which many
180
uneducated African-Americans were forced after the War.   If theft is always a bad thing, 
the way to discourage it, Annie implies, is to fix the environmental factors that encourage 
it.  Chesnutt is not advocating laws that bend to the whims of particular individuals—in 
both his fiction and his political writing he criticizes Southern states like North Carolina 
that leave the severity of punishments up to individual enforcers who are allowed to 
punish petty crimes committed by negroes out of proportion to their severity.  But he is 
after a recognition that certain environmental factors that incite crime need to be 
addressed.  States need to adjust their laws to fit the severity of the crimes committed; 
they need to make laws that are less subject to the idiosyncrasies of individuals like John 
(or Annie), but states also need to create a social and cultural atmosphere that supports 
cooperative behavior:  people who are constantly being victimized are not going to be 
particularly respectful of the rights of those who are victimizing them.  Chesnutt may 
even be pointing out the ways in which the struggle for property ownership and the
accumulation of capital inevitably leads to exploitive relationships; in Uncle Julius’ story, 
property is not exactly the holy term that John and the American establishment— 
including someone like William Dean Howells, whose rhetoric John often seems to be 
echoing here—claim that it is.  As former slaves were in the best position to know, the 
protection of “property” is often an incentive to things much less wholesome than
industry and thrift.
A story in which a colored person is allowed to escape unpunished because the 
wife of his captor recognizes that he may not be completely liable for his misdeeds—and 
that the accumulation and consolidation of property under the new industrialists is 
replicating many of the injustices of slavery—is a story that, in a collection of local-color
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tales, probably needed to be cloaked under a fairly heavy blind; and an anecdote that 
purports to justify a racist stereotype seems an appropriately ironic choice.  Thus, the 
conjure tale that on the surface appears to be pandering to white prejudices in the most 
flagrant way is doing so in order to make the collection’s strongest criticism of racist 
practices (“A Victim of Heredity” was written to be included in the collection, after all). 
We may still want to criticize the mobilization of such a stereotype, but we can 
nevertheless see why Chesnutt might have thought it necessary given what happens a few 
years later when he tries to make the same points in a straightforward realist novel.  In 
addition, we can also see the value in his attempt to both explore and suggest audience 
responses by way of John and Annie.  If, as Petrie argues, The Conjure Woman is a
record of Chesnutt’s attempts to gage the strength and weaknesses of reaching white 
audiences through this particular medium by actually staging their responses in and 
through the stock figures of John and Annie, we can say that he does demonstrate or 
suggest that the judicious use of folklore can achieve counterintuitive results.  By 
pandering to white preconceptions of blacks’ inherited dispositions Julius wins freedom 
for one of them; Annie’s sympathies are aroused because she recognizes the deeper 
theme of Julius’ story, that people are in large part determined by their environment and 
that environmental factors need to be considered in deciding their degree of culpability.
Annie is not concerned about upholding the social order; she is concerned about 
sparing someone a punishment that she believes is disproportionate to his degree of 
responsibility for his crime.  To say that something is wrong because it violates certain 
rules that contribute to social order—and that rules that promote social order take 
precedence over the suffering of any specific individual who may in fact be a casualty of
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the weaknesses in this social order, in which punishments for crimes might outweigh the 
positive incentives to good citizenship—is a kind of rule utilitarian position that
privileges the good of the whole over the good of the individual or sees individual human 
flourishing as tied to and secured by the health of the social body, a position that
Chesnutt seems bent on criticizing not only in The Conjure Woman but in subsequent 
realist novels.  This was the rationale used by many leading thinkers of the time—or at 
least here in John’s case—to justify ignoring the human rights abuses occurring in South 
in the period between the end of reconstruction and the Civil Rights movement ninety 
years later; and Chesnutt seems to understand that fiction is a good forum for employing 
the technique of the counterexample, for reminding readers, partly be playing on their 
sympathies, that—in  fact—the republic has not necessarily ensured justice for all its 
citizens.  And while Julius does not say this directly nor paint a moving portrait of the 
sufferings of the incarcerated chicken thief, he tells a story that creates a link in Annie’s 
mind between Sam Jone’s misfortunes and African-Americans’ suffering under slavery, 
suggesting to Annie and to his readers that moral culpability is collective in a different 
way, that the republic is only as strong as its investment, and its understanding of its 
investment, in the well-being of its individual members.
The idea that people can be victims of their environment was one that Howells 
and many conservatives were reluctant to embrace, believing that—despite appearances 
to the contrary—personal responsibility and willpower were the key to social change, but 
Chesnutt was writing in the Progressive Era, the same year that Norris produced 
McTeague, and he was astutely aware of the extent to which human beings’ fates were
not only intertwined—a belief that Howells shared, if we identify Howells’ beliefs with
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those of his character Reverend Sewells—but sometimes fixed and immobilized by that 
interconnectedness.  Yet unlike the naturalists, Chesnutt was unwilling to invest the “web 
of circumstance” with transcendent and inexorable force; he believed that human beings 
had the power to change things, even if that belief was shot through, as Brook Thomas
has remarked, with a heavy sense of tragedy—tragedy engendered by human failure. 
Chesnutt was unwilling and unable to concede that anything like the “social order” could 
impose a necessity of its own, whereas someone like Howells believed that the social 
order was what guaranteed the possibility of human freedom in the first place ( ). 
Chesnutt recognized that feelings like Howells’ were one of the main impediments to 
racial reconciliation in America and that such feelings were bolstered by an almost 
unconscious “spirit of caste” that undermined any counter-pressure that might be applied 
by the specter of black suffering, a spirit that might best be addressed through the 
medium of fiction.  In the 1880 journal entry that outlines his plans for authorship 
Chesnutt writes:
I consider the unjust spirit of caste which is so insidious as the pervade a 
whole nation, and so powerful as to subject a whole race and all connected 
with it to scorn and social ostracism—I consider this a barrier to the moral 
progress of the American people, and I would be one of the first to head a 
determined, organized crusade against it.  Not a fierce indiscriminate 
onslaught; not an appeal to force….but a moral revolution which must be 
brought about in a different manner…The subtle almost indefinable
feeling of repulsion toward the negro, which is common to most
Americans…cannot be stormed and taken by assault…it is the province of
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literature to open the way for [the negro] to get [social recognition and 
equality]—to accustom the public mind to the idea, and while amusing 
them to lead people out…(Journals 139-40).
This agenda is in full effect in The Conjure Woman as Chesnutt attempts to sway John 
and Annie’s emotions not by force or reason, but by reminding them of the humanity of 
the African-Americans around them, by depicting blacks telling stories or extending 
friendship or, more significantly, suffering pain as much from the emotional as from the 
physical abuses of slavery.  Most of the conjure tales involve slaves using conjure to 
avoid being separated or sold away from their loved ones, tales which leave Annie, and 
are meant to leave Chesnutt’s audience, feeling an empathetic connection with the their 
protagonists and a recognition of the similarity between the feelings slaves have for their 
families and the feelings that Annie and Mabel have for their own.  Annie and Mabel 
bond not just with Julius but with Becky and Chloe over the recognition of the human 
losses that these female (characters) suffer.  As we will see again and again in Chesnutt’s 
novels, he relies heavily on this woman-to-woman—or woman-to-female-character— 
recognition as a possible motivation for human and civil rights’ agitation.  He mirrors it 
repeatedly in his fiction, creating white female characters whose sympathy—or lack 
thereof—with embattled black or mixed-blood characters proves key to those characters’ 
salvation or demise.
Annie has no conception of how her feelings should affect the contemporary legal 
system—she has “not been able to get everything reasoned out”—but she does 
demonstrate that empathy with fictional characters has real-world implications not only 
for her, in her appropriation of these experiences as outlets for her own suppressed
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emotions, but for African-Americans themselves, at least in “A Victim of Heredity.” In 
addition, she believes that emotion and intuition are strong factors in moral judgments. 
For Annie and for Chesnutt himself, the horror or disgust we feel at Mars Donal’s actions 
or at Becky or Chloe’s tribulations are morally relevant emotions.  When faced with a 
perspective like John’s, Chesnutt’s response—at least in the medium of fiction—is not to 
launch a counter-argument but to depict human suffering as an impetus for change. 
Chesnutt was obviously not against rational deliberation, but he understood that 
deliberation could only begin when all parties were seated at the table, and that no one 
could be seated until whites could be persuaded that blacks ought to be included—a 
persuasion that would not be effected solely through appeals to reason.  What is also 
interesting is that unlike Abraham Cahan, who sees his moral community as beginning 
with educated individuals who come together through common purpose and choice in a 
tradition built around virtues more intellectual than natural, Chesnutt sees the ideal 
community (and we should hasten to point out that like other social-realist novelists, 
Chesnutt was convinced that morality should not be reduced to a set of principles but be 
conceptualized as a shared way of being-in-the world) as beginning with
a recognition of shared investment in values that he wants to see as inevitably and 
irreducibly human:  shared experiences of loss and suffering, of motherhood, of family, 
even of food or possession of goods or some practical advantage over someone else. 
Chesnutt is attempting to demonstrate the necessity of starting from a more fundamental 
point than either Howells or Cahan recognizes to be necessary—a tradition built neither 
from the scraps of old ones or in reaction to new ones but on a mutual re-evaluation of 
what it means to be human, a re-evaluation that in order to be any different from the
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others ought to include an attempt to probe the kinds of human experiences that 
sentimental fiction is both generating and responding to.
In The Conjure Woman, Chesnutt aligns rationalism with sentimentalism, 
showing both to be manifestations of the eviscerated conditions of life that prevail under 
industrial capitalism.  John yawns as deeply over “the impossible career of the blonde 
heroine of a rudimentary novel” as Annie does over his dry and “nonsensical” works by 
Herbert Spencer (70, 96).  Both he and Annie stand in dire need of the entertainment that 
Uncle Julius provides them to alleviate their Sunday boredom, yet the text invites us to 
consider the possibility that Julius’ tales might function as something larger than a more 
satisfying form of escapism, a more textured sentimentalism.  The relationship between 
John and Julius is a purely economic one—Julius provides John with a service that John 
intends to get as cheaply as possible, while Julius attempts to extort more from John 
through whatever means possible, including telling manipulative stories—but Julius’ 
relationship with Annie opens up the possibility of a more humanized and humanizing 
culture of exchange:  the two characters’ need to profit from each other remains intact,
but the definition of profit expands to include nonmaterial gains like emotional assistance 
or civic justice, and the idea of cooperation for mutual benefit enters the picture.  At the 
heart of this cooperation lies both Julius and Annie’s willingness and ability to view the 
exchanges in which they are involved as more than exploitive, to understand the stories 
that Julius tells as more than an idle afternoon’s entertainment—as an attempt, also, to 
create connections, to convey feelings, to civilize the entire process of human interaction. 
Like many examples of the local-color genre, the conjure tales attempt to synthesize the
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disparate elements of consumer culture, to re-unite the pleasurable and the profitable, the 
romantic and the realistic, the emotional and the rational, the useful and the good.  Yet 
whether or not this attempt succeeds—or just remains an exercise in nostalgia—depends 
on Chesnutt’s audiences’ willingness to push past generic expectations and to establish 
unconventional but intentional relationships with texts, to understand that their 
relationships with fictional characters are meant to be analogous to their relationships 
with those around them: characterized, ideally, by appreciation rather than appropriation.
In turning my attention to Chesnutt’s three published novels, I want to keep my 
focus on his ongoing attempt to negotiate the line between the romantic and the real, to 
determine the point at which he has mined the limits of what each mode can provide him 
in the service of humanity and civil rights.  The House Behind the Cedars, Chesnutt’s
first and most successful published novel, is foremost a romance, despite its commitment 
to the issues of passing and the color line.  Set in the fictional town of Patesville, North 
Carolina a “few years” after the war, the novel opens with a scene of an old Southern 
marketplace in which “Time seems to linger lovingly long after youth has departed, and 
to which he seems loath to bring the evil day” (267). As William L. Andrews observes,
this story of a brother and sister of mixed blood who attempt to pass for white begins as a
“conventional bourgeois romance”:
As children of lowly origins seeking happiness and prosperity, [John and 
Rena] are compared to well-known characters in popular romances and 
fairy tales, making their aspirations seem utterly natural to nineteenth- 
century readers.  John Walden is named after and compared to Warwick 
the king-maker in Bulwer-Lytton’s popular novel The Last of the Barons
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(1843), and Rena is compared several times to Cinderella (Literary 159). 
More accurately, John Walden names himself after Warwick when he decides to pass for 
white; both his identity and his aspirations are shaped by the books in the library that his 
white father keeps at John’s mother’s home, a library filled with novels and tales of 
knights, wanderers, and adventurers, of men going forth to seek their fortune armed with 
nothing but their courage and wits.  The young John Walden devours the adventures of 
Tom Jones, Eugene Aram, Richard the Lionhearted and Gil Blas, and “when he had read 
all the books—indeed long before he had read them all—he too had tasted of the fruit of 
the Tree of Knowledge: contentment took its flight, and happiness lay far beyond the 
sphere where he was born” (375).  The secret of his blood is not revealed until midway 
through the novel—it is only alluded to, portentously, as the dark shadow that threatens 
to undo his progress—and his path upward is painted like that of an “Alger 
hero” (Andrews Literary 160).  Leaving home at eighteen, he goes to South Carolina, 
avoiding military service “by some good chance” (which the novel shrouds in mystery) 
and overseeing a large plantation “in default of older and more experienced men” (282).  
He eventually marries the orphaned daughter of the late plantation owner, becomes a 
lawyer and uses her money to establish himself professionally “on a high plane” (282). 
Eventually she dies and leaves him with a young son of his own.
His sister’s journey is the female version of this rags-to-riches story, but with a 
downward rather than an upward trajectory:  when John Walden returns home in a fit of 
sentiment after a ten-year absence he suggests that Rena come live with him and help him 
take care of his son.  After a year in boarding school, she takes up her position as Rowena 
Warwick at her brother’s home and is engaged to marry the manly and spirited George
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Tryon, a friend and client of her brother’s, within a month of their acquaintance. 
Significantly, she meets George during a mock-jousting ceremony that John’s South 
Carolina town has modeled on the novels of Sir Walter Scott, where George wins the 
tournament and crowns her the Queen of Love and Beauty.  Convinced against her 
scruples that love will conquer all and that concealing her true identity is an act of “self- 
sacrifice” in the service of her brother and nephew, she agrees to marry George after 
some faint attempts to test his constancy and disinterestedness (323).  Unfortunately, she 
is rudely disabused of her hopes for his character through a series of fateful and highly 
contrived circumstances, including a series of dreams that recall her to her mother’s 
sickbed, that culminate in Tryon’s awakening from his charmed sleep—quite literally, as 
he lounges in the window of the doctor’s office in Patesville—to discover that his 
princess is a “young cullud ‘oman,” a discovery that promptly leads him to break their 
engagement (339).  Disowned by her lover, Rena resolves to devote the rest of her life to 
improving the welfare of the negro race, a act of renunciation typical of mix-blood 
heroines of the period (Andrews Literary 152-4).  Unfortunately, she is pursued in her 
retreat by both an evil mulatto with corrupt designs and the tormented but love-sick 
Tryon, whose own designs are suspiciously unclear.  Cornered by both on her way home
one day, she plunges off the road and is hounded to collapse in a storm--recovered, as she 
lies senseless in a thicket, by the devoted family darky Frank, who carries her home to 
breathe her last breath in her quadroon mother’s arms.
Andrews has argued that despite Chesnutt’s unfortunate descent into this 
melodramatic plotline and his one-dimensional portrait of the martyred Rena, Chesnutt 
uses the more “remarkable and original character creation” of John Walden/Warwick to
190
represent a more forward-thinking and pragmatic solution to the problem of passing 
(Andrews Literary 165).  Like Dr. Olney in An Imperative Duty, John is unmoved by the 
need for complete transparency that troubles Rhoda and Rena; his romance, if it is one, is 
the practical romance of the American dream, strongly rooted in commonsense and the 
acquisition of wealth and middle-class status, even though Chesnutt deviates from this 
pattern in at least one way by marrying into money and status instead of earning it first. 
But “once persuaded that he had certain rights, or aught to have then, by virtue of the
laws of nature, in defiance of the customs of mankind,” Chesnutt tells us, John “had 
promptly sought to enjoy them…with no troublesome qualms of conscience 
whatever” (320).   If John possesses imagination and sentiment, he “nevertheless ha[s] 
a practical side that outweigh[s] them both” (320).  As a man—as an American man—
John possesses much more modern sensibilities than Rena:  his romance has adapted 
itself to
the conditions of life under bourgeois capitalism—or rather it is the romance of bourgeois 
capitalism—which includes adopting a more fluid and pragmatic morality, the same sort 
of ethics-in-progress approach that characterizes Tom Corey and other Howells
characters who attempt to succeed under the terms of the new American dream and to 
navigate their way through the tumultuous terrain of the post-bellum American 
landscape.  Interestingly, John also recommends this approach to Rena when her 
engagement with Tryon ends:  let me “send you to some school at the North,” he 
suggests, “where you can acquire a liberal education, and prepare yourself for some
career of usefulness” (386).  When she refuses this plan, he suggests that the two of them
“go to the North or West…far away from the South and the Southern people, and start 
life over again” (388).  And when she refuses even this, he leaves her alone with the
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pragmatic reflection that she may once again “tire of the old life” after she has been back 
home for a few months (389).
But Rena’s refusal to leave her mother, her performance of this romantic fatalism
—“God must have meant me to stay here,” she tells her brother—is not just, as Andrews 
believes, an indication of Chesnutt’s unfortunate susceptibility to the constraints of the 
tragic mulatto plot and his fear of pushing his characters too brazenly down the
path to assimilation; it is more accurately an attempt, like The Conjure Woman, to take a 
stereotypical plotline—one that resonates with white Northern audiences—and to make it 
pay in ways that it normally wouldn’t, to subject it to an ironic inflation of its original 
meaning (387).  If Chesnutt felt constrained throughout his literary career by the demands 
of his audience to reproduce generic conventions, he nevertheless continued to put 
pressure on these conventions to produce unconventional results.  In fact, Rena does not 
make a noble and self-sacrificial choice to deny the opportunity to pass for white:  she 
eagerly accepts this option, including her brother’s arguments against revealing her black 
blood, and abandons her new life only with angry remonstrations against her white
lover’s inconstancy: “‘He did not love me,’” she cries “angrily” to her brother, “‘or he 
would not have cast me off…He might have gone anywhere with me, and no one would 
have stared at us curiously; no one need have known’” (386).  The blame here is placed 
not on fate or on the aggregate of racial prejudice that has the cumulative weight of fate
—or on some abjured imperative to honesty—but on a specific white man who fails in 
an obligation contingent upon his commitment to a private emotion, an obligation that a 
forward-thinking white man like Howells was already portraying—in An Imperative
Duty—as real and binding (and indeed in all of his novels on love and marriage, provided
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the feeling was real and both parties of sufficient maturity to judge that).  If Rena might 
still have gone North and pursued not only an education but the option of marrying—as 
her brother suggests—“a better man than even Tryon,” Chesnutt denies her this freedom 
because he needs to deny his mixed-blood characters the appearance of success in order 
to impress upon his white audiences that the pragmatic solution is not enough (386). 
Chesnutt provides scant rationale for John’s decision to reside in South Carolina or 
Rena’s refusal to go North, and the commonsensical reader may feel annoyed by 
Chesnutt’s refusal of these obvious solutions.   “It might have been wiser,” observes 
Judge Straight, who serves as the novel’s seer, “for [John] to seek [his chance in life] 
farther afield than South Carolina” (291).  But John goes to South Carolina because 
South Carolina is “the land of his fathers, where, he conceived, he had an inalienable 
birthright” (282).  Both John and Rena’s decisions are based on sentiment, on some 
human feeling that looms larger than common sense, and Chesnutt’s suggestion is that 
these reasons are not wrong but merely overwrought because they have been denied, that  
in fact they point to natural emotions or intuitions that has not been allowed adequate 
expression, that have not been factored into the process of judgment and acculturation as 
they ought to be.  Social and economic advancement should not have to come at the 
expense of denying familial connections, and Chesnutt is not interested in having mixed- 
blood characters succeed up North: he wants them to reclaim their birthright in the land 
of their fathers.  If his romances never end happily, it is because they are deliberately
depriving their colored protagonists not only of the realistic option of going north but also 
of the romantic compensation of devoting their lives to (pseudo-) heroic self-sacrifice. 
Neither realism nor romance offers a satisfactory solution to the problem of race in
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America:  if black people take the realist path they cut themselves off from natural ties 
that always come back to haunt them.  If they take the romantic option they die.
In both scenarios, a natural obligation to love and connect with other humans is 
violated, an obligation that always involves acknowledging the disparate influences that 
make up the human self.  John’s decision is problematic because it involves abandoning 
his mother and sister—abandoning the natural ties of “sentiment”—and legitimizing the 
alienation of self from others that occurs under the auspices of the American myth of the 
self-made man.  Going north would only displace this dilemma, as John and Rena both 
realize.  They would still have to choose between abandoning their mother or identifying 
as black, and either option entails denying some real part of their identity, some actual 
person in their lives.  On the other hand, the romantic solution involves a similar 
deception, a belief that the real, interconnected human self can be transcended and denied 
through service to a “higher” ideal and an empty conception of human freedom.  Both 
responses involve flight from the immediacy and complexity of personal identity, 
responses that backfire in both directions.  John is unable to resist returning to his mother; 
Rena is unable to escape the burdens of the real world.  In addition, neither the judge nor 
Tryon, the two major white characters in the novel, are able to avoid their obligations to 
the black characters whose lives are enmeshed in their own.  Flight is not the answer, 
Chesnutt insists in response to black novelists who portrayed migration as the only option
in the face of Northern complicity in Southern oppression.15   The sentimental and the real
are inescapably intertwined, and the problem of race in America is in some sense 
symptomatic of the culture’s distorted and long-standing attempts to divorce the two, to
15See Andrews Literary Career 182-9 for a detailed discussion of white and black novelists writing about 
the race question in the South.
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deny or deflect natural human sentiment— “human sympathy” Chesnutt repeatedly calls 
it—in the name of human progress.  “Love is the only law,” George Tryon recognizes as 
he is “driven by an aching heart” back towards the woman he has spurned, just as John 
and Rena are driven back to the mother they have denied (460).  Forward progress will 
always be hampered by the return of the repressed, Chesnutt warns; consequently, the 
solution is to rehabilitate sentiment and the romance, not to abandon or fetishize them.
Chesnutt’s project here is almost identical to Howells’:  Howells obsession with 
marriage—with what makes a good marriage—in his novels of social realism is driven by 
his recognition that marriage is a place where sentiment and civilization intersect, a locus 
for reuniting the claims of the personal and the social/economic, for rescuing love from
its marginalization and distortion within consumer culture and recovering it as a 
humanizing influence on that culture.  Howells’ solution to Silas Lapham’s business 
crisis and Penelope Lapham’s emotional one is a marriage that unites the aims of both, 
that consolidates Lapham’s business interests by extending them to his son-in-law, who 
in term enters into a business partnership that reflects the dynamics of his unusually 
egalitarian marriage.  Rehabilitating the romantic involves not abandoning love but 
understanding it to be best expressed—i.e. expressed to best social advantage—within 
the context of bourgeois companionate marriage, as well as understanding upward
mobility to be best achieved by uniting economic interests with personal ones, by backing 
financial investments with strong familial ties.  Chesnutt clearly agrees with these aims, 
and The House Behind the Cedars insists that racial prejudice impedes the
implementation of these goals, that as long as the “one drop of black blood makes the 
whole man [or woman] black,” society itself will be mired in these endless dramas of
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thwarted love and missed opportunities that could have been resolved into socially 
constructive marriages and strengthened family and economic ties—Tryon only meets 
Rena, we should note, because his business relationship with John develops into a 
friendship (379).  The romance of the tragic mulatto is a symptom of social illness, an 
illness that needs to be emphasized, not obviated, in order to be fixed.  Chesnutt is trying 
to write might be something along the lines of a James novel (if we read James as Martha 
Nussbaum wants us to read him), in which the lack of a satisfying resolution is meant to 
leave the audience with an uneasy sense that something different remains to be done—in 
this case, a sense that such a tragedy might have been avoided if either Rena’s father or 
her lover had fulfilled their natural obligations.  And while the psychological confusion 
that plagues John or Tryon is not nearly as complex as that which torments the typical 
James character, neither are the issues:  there are clear wrongs and rights in this case, as 
well as a cultural narrative trajectory that stands ready to be restored when certain white 
people decide to acknowledge the ties that they have denied against their own best 
interest.
Chesnutt’s next  novel, The Marrow of Tradition, is neither the considered work of 
realism that Howells hoped Chesnutt would publish—something akin to the stories in The 
Wife of His Youth—nor a straightforward romantic melodrama like The House Behind the 
Cedars.16 Chesnutt seemed to have believed that both genres were too accommodationist, 
that his ironic use of them was too subtle, and that the political agenda which inspired
him was best served by turning to the didactic or “purpose novel.”  The novel that he
16See Andrews “Criticism and Race” 331 for a discussion of Howells three extent letters to Chesnutt, 
including a 1900 letter in which he urges Chesnutt to produce “‘something about the color-line, and of as 
actual and immediate an interest as possible—that is of American life in the present, rather [than] the past,  
even the recent past…’”
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published in 1901—and which he confidently believed to be his best product yet—was a 
message novel that nevertheless proposed to entertain.  To that end, it contained, 
Chesnutt assured his readers, standard characters like “a typical old ‘mammy,’ a faithful 
servant who is willing to die for his master and an ideal old aristocrat who practically 
sacrifices his life to save that of his servant” (“Own View” 873).  It also features a 
cantankerous old Aunt with a hidden inheritance and secret papers, a murderous young 
aristocrat who impersonates the faithful servant, and two half sisters who could pass for 
each other, except that one is “black” and the other is white.  All these characters 
contribute to the story’s sentimental subplot, set against the overarching realist narrative 
that fictionalizes and dramatizes the Wilmington, North Carolina race riots of 1868, riots 
in which the town’s white supremacist leaders, feeling threatened by the fusion of the 
Republican and Populist political parties, led a premeditated, unprovoked attack on the 
city’s black population, killing an untold number of African-Americans and provoking a 
mass black exodus from the city (Bentley).  In the subplot of The Marrow of Tradition,
the wife of one of the leaders of the white supremacy movement discovers, after her Aunt 
Polly  is robbed and killed by an impecunious young aristocrat who impersonates a family 
servant named Sandy to disguise his identity, that her supposedly illegitimate colored
half-sister is actually legitimate and entitled to a significant portion of the family estate. 
Olivia Carteret burns the papers that prove this inheritance after finding them in her 
murdered Aunt’s room, keeping the secret until her son Dodie Carteret falls ill during the 
riots and Olivia’s black brother-in-law Dr. Miller becomes the only doctor available to 
perform the tracheotomy that will save her child’s life.  Unfortunately, Dr. and Mrs. 
Miller’s own son has just been killed by a stray bullet from the riots, and the doctor—
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eschewing his professional obligations—refuses to attend to Dodie until Olivia shows up 
and makes an appeal to her sister Janet in person.
The two women’s impassioned confrontation over the body of the dead child 
allows Janet to assert her moral superiority.  Eschewing Olivia’s appeal to their common 
relationship, rejecting “your father’s name, your father’s wealth, your sisterly 
recognition,” Janet places her acquiescence to her sister’s plea on less personal grounds 
(718).   She is showing mercy on Olivia and the Carterets, she says, so that Olivia will 
know “that a woman may be foully wronged, and yet may have a heart to feel, even for 
one who has injured her (718).  The action that serves as a bridge towards racial 
reconciliation (various critics have pointed out that the novel’s last line, spoken from the 
top of the stairs as Dr. Miller and Major Carteret start up them together, embodies 
Chesnutt’s guarded but hopeful prognosis for the possibility of change and renewal) 
involves a repudiation of private, idiosyncratic motivations, even in the name of family 
feeling, for a larger and more universal conception of human sympathy.  Janet 
commissions her husband to save Dodie not because Olivia is her sister—a motivation 
that at this point seems to incline her towards revenge—but because Olivia is a woman, a 
fellow human being, and because sympathy for fellow human beings, a “heart to feel”
and to forgive, is a “noble” quality (718).  Janet also asserts the superiority of compassion 
to justice:  since Olivia and her family have denied Janet her birthright and Major
Carteret has incited the riots that result in Janet’s son’s death, it is “but just,” as Olivia 
must acknowledge, that Janet should deny Olivia any favors based on an appeal to that 
same relation or attempt to save Olivia’s child (718).  “Love, duty, sorrow, justice call me 
here,” Dr Miller exclaims when Olivia begs him to come save her child:  “I cannot go”
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(715).  The italics are Chesnutt’s, and the conclusion is that the Carterets are reaping an 
appropriate punishment for their transgressions, a punishment that the Millers would be 
guiltless in watching play out.  But like twentieth-century feminist philosophers, Chesnutt 
is cautious about relying on notions of justice:  for one thing, justice is not always 
constructive; it is often merely retributive as it has the potential to be here for both the 
Millers and the Carterets.  Allowing Dodie to die does not help Chesnutt achieve the 
reconciliation that he is after.
In addition, Chesnutt knows that justice is often implicated in rationalist moral 
epistemologies that deny African-Americans the right to consideration because they lie 
outside the scope of consideration that applies to “white men and gentlemen” (491).  Yet 
Chesnutt doesn’t eschew justice altogether:  during the debate that takes place around 
Sandy’s narrowly escaped lynching, Wellington’s upstanding black citizenry, including 
Dr. Miller, repeatedly appeals to its white counterparts for protection and a fair trial for 
Sandy, which the white citizens deny it in the name of a higher authority that overrules 
justice.  The town judge admits that “lynching was, as a rule, unjustifiable, but 
maintained that there were exceptions to all rules—that laws were made, after all, to 
express the will of the people in the ordinary administration of justice, but that in an 
emergency the sovereign people might assert itself and take the law into its own 
hands” (613).   Here, as in Olivia and Janet’s confrontation and elsewhere in the novel, 
Chesnutt suggests that justice has a universal and self-evidentiary content that resonates 
with both
black and white characters but that is frequently overruled by caste and race prejudice, by 
white invocation of its “divine right” to “take the law into its own hands” and perform
acts of supposed higher justice that are really outbursts of resentment, hatred and
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hysteria—acts that, in fact, ally this higher justice with the worst kinds of emotivism. 
Consequently, Chesnutt sees the necessity of providing whites with an alternative “first- 
order” conception of humanity and human relations that will undergird and clarify their 
commitment to justice, some idea of the natural order of things that does not reduce itself 
to a belief in white supremacy.  What he articulates through Janet is a commit to a 
common humanity based in a mutual, compassionate recognition of similar and shared 
experiences, not skin color.  In this case—as in the House Behind the Cedars, where 
neither John nor Rena is able to justify a program of upward mobility that involves 
neglecting or forgetting their mother—these experiences begin with the common 
experience of motherhood and the bond between mother and child.  They also include the 
experience of love and something even more basic than that:  the experience of common 
ancestry.  Chesnutt is, of course, reminding whites that blacks share their blood and genes 
as well as their feelings and instincts, that the proof of African-Americans’ humanity lies 
as much in the biological possibility—and fruitfulness—of miscegenation as in any 
sympathetic or rational recognition of the similarities between the life experiences of the 
two races.  Thus Chesnutt affirms the essential interconnectedness between a biological/
evolutionary description of progress and one rooted in a compassionate identification 
with otherness, between the material and the ideological paths to uplift.
And we should further note that Janet’s articulation and performance of compassion as 
the more authentic form of higher justice integrates reason and emotion in a way that 
neither the whites’ ordinary or “higher” concepts of justice do.   After all, Chesnutt is 
interested in something more than fairness, law and order:  only compassion, with its 
commitment to transforming the most constructive of human instincts, like the instinct to
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nurture and create, into a mandate for respecting and preserving the creative and 
regenerative power of humanity wherever that appears, can fully transform and dispel its 
dark inverse, the instinct to codify and rationalize hatred as justice.
Therefore, it becomes important for Chesnutt to divest these convoluted human 
interrelations of their occult status and bring them to the light of day, to see them 
supported by laws that acknowledge their legitimacy and their right to legal protection. 
In The Marrow of Tradition this goal becomes identified with rehabilitating romantic 
tropes and paradigms involving secrecy and illegitimacy and incorporating them into a 
realist novelistic paradigm.  As in his earlier stories and novels, Chesnutt takes the 
romantic tropes of the doppelganger and the secret/illegitimate relatives and attempts to 
invest them with something more than a symbolic function.  Chesnutt’s black characters 
are not merely representations of repressed aspects of white consciousness and culture,
symbols of the human capacity for evil and exploitation, as they are in a proto-modernist 
story like Heart of Darkness being written around the same time:  Janet is a person, and 
not a particularly dark (in looks or temperament) or repressed person, not heavily laden 
with markers of Otherness and exoticism.  In fact, she looks exactly like Olivia, and 
instead of lurking around the margins of the story she proves extremely difficult for
Olivia to avoid, especially since Dr. Miller has bought the Carteret mansion and Janet and 
her son are frequently depicted riding in their buggy out and about in the town.  Janet is 
also provided with thoughts and feelings of her own before she and Olivia finally
interact, feelings which revolve around her sympathy for her sister and her longing for an 
acknowledged relationship between them.  In addition, her romantic feelings and desires 
culminate in a bourgeois marriage that is identical (if not healthier) than Olivia’s, and her
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sisterly feelings toward Olivia express themselves in outward and upward impulses 
towards reconciliation and recognition and not toward the secret desires or designs that 
Olivia imputes to her.  When her child dies (as in The Colonel’s Dream and many other 
Chesnutt stories, children here bear the weight not just of the natural expectations they 
give rise to but of their symbolic significance as the hope for larger justice and a better 
future for the human race), Janet refuses to let her relationship with her sister become 
caught in a narrative of family retribution and vendetta, forcing even the natural tie of 
blood to be subsumed within the larger narrative of justice and compassion, of moving 
forward in a socially constructive and life-affirming way.  Thus the novel implies that the 
romantic trajectory itself is a symptom of an eviscerated conception of human
experience, one that needs to be incorporated into a narrative that is neither realist nor 
romantic under the contemporary conceptions of the term but something that is an 
organic synthesis or manifestation of both.  Many critics have suggested that despite 
these lofty goals, the novel as a whole suffers from the fault of being “a tract in the guise 
of the novel,” undeveloped in terms of character and story (“Fireside”).  “One might
almost fancy it a lot of clippings from editorials on the negro questions strung together by 
a few illustrative incidents and characters,” a contemporary reviewer sniped (“Fireside”). 
Yet, as in Howells’ case, I would argue that the fault lines in the project—Chesnutt’s 
difficulty in reconciling the two modes into something that resembles a full-orbed and 
integrated alternative narrative—lie less with any artistic failure of Chesnutt’s than with 
the very real difficulty of assembling materials sufficient to the task.
In The Marrow of Tradition Chesnutt depicts several levels of response—both 
individual and collective—to what he considered the natural and inevitable state of
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human relations, which were miscegenation and ultimately assimilation:  white characters 
can sometimes ignore it, pretend it doesn’t exist, like Olivia ignores Janet or like the
white and black populations in Wilmington ignore each other—or pretend that they
ignore each other—before the riots.  They can also attempt to forcibly halt or suppress the 
intermingling of the races like the “Big Three” do before and during the Wellington riots 
(the original Wilmington riots were sparked by an editorial by Alexander Manly, a black 
journalist who was also the grandson of former North Carolina governor Charles Manly). 
Or they can acknowledge and provide for private ties and relations without suggesting
that those relations have larger public and civic implications, a response that is—as 
everybody in the book knows—very difficult to maintain, although many white men in 
the novel attempt to do it, Olivia’s father included.  But the fourth response is not 
dependent on specific relational ties; rather it takes for granted that the fact of 
miscegenation itself demonstrates the ways in which human beings are similar and 
interrelated and should help and provide for each other to ensure their common progress 
in the “harmonious fusion” of the races.  In The Marrow of Tradition, unlike earlier 
stories like “The Sheriff’s Children,” the awareness of blood ties hinders rather than 
hastens the path to civic justice unless it is accompanied by some larger cultural or civic 
mandate.  Significantly, Olivia does not begin to feel guilt about her (non)relationship 
with her sister Janet until she discovers that her father actually married Janet’s mother, at 
which point she begins to feel both impressed and oppressed by her belief in the 
seriousness of the marriage tie.  Private emotions are relevant if helpful but they’re not 
enough, Chesnutt suggests—they certainly don’t keep Mammy Jane from being killed, 
nor do they keep her from being objectified and sentimentalized by the Carteret family.
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In short, Chesnutt is qualifying and expanding the moral of The House Behind the 
Cedars: if it is important to recoup the private and the sentimental, to become aware of 
the extent to which public virtue and civic progress depend on our ability to acknowledge 
and appreciate natural ties, it is equally important for those ties themselves not to mark
the limits of moral responsibility, although we should note again that Janet attributes her 
magnanimity to right feeling, not to a dispassionate commitment to justice. Compassion
—human sympathy—is necessary for right action but it is also larger than private 
sympathies or antipathies: Janet feels for her sister like she would for any other woman 
whose child was in danger of death, a feeling that her sister never gives evidence that she 
returns.
In a 2008 article published in the Southern Literary Journal, Susan Danielson 
argues that there are actually three narratives in The Marrow of Tradition, not two. 
Besides the romantic and realist plots, the private and public storylines, there is a third 
narrative that Danielson calls the “professional” narrative, in which Dr. Miller is able to 
achieve some kind of status and power within the community of Wellington by 
solidifying himself within the professional class, adopting the supposed neutrality and 
impartiality of his profession and devoting himself to racial uplift through establishing a 
black hospital without white support and establishing collegial relationships with white 
physicians (Danielson 76).  Closely allied with an assimilationist standpoint through his 
desire for civil rights and his resentment of the indignities of Jim Crow, Dr. Miller 
nevertheless fails to take a strong stand for justice when the riots break out and the work 
he has built—and the child he has fathered—are threatened and then destroyed by white 
violence.  “Our time will come—the time when we can command respect for our rights,”
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he responds to Josh Green’s cry for armed resistance, “but it is not yet in sight.  Give up, 
boys, and wait” (684).  Danielson suggests that the inefficacy of Miller’s pacifism and 
professionalism in stemming the tide of white violence—his “conflation of assimilation 
and accommodation”—points towards Chesnutt’s frustration with the limitations of 
professional ethics in the service of racial uplift; ultimately, Miller abandons his 
standpoint in favor of the “discourse of domestic feminism” articulated by his wife, in 
which both private feelings and professional values are replaced by a commitment to 
“compassion and social justice”:
The Millers’ repudiations of both Olivia’s and Carteret’s pleas for help 
implicitly reject both the New South creed and the sentimental ties of 
family as grounds for building a new, more inclusive nation state. 
However, in criticizing Dr. Miller’s professionalism, Chesnutt also indicts 
the modern ideological perspectives such as assimilation or 
accommodation or racial uplift supported by the black bourgeoisie for 
putting individual (masculine) claims over domestic and community 
interests (87).
Chesnutt’s alternative, Danielson suggests in her closing sentence, is to infuse “the public 
world with the values of the private, the masculine world with the values of the feminine, 
and the white world with a deeper understanding of the black,” so that “there may yet be
‘time enough but none to spare’ to build a nation of compassion and justice” (87-8).
Though arrived at independently, my own conclusions coincide very closely with 
Danielson’s.  The Marrow of Tradition does, in fact, seek to establish a separate 
trajectory for Dr. Miller and his professional ethics, an ethics that the novel ultimately
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shows to be in collusion with the hollow New South Progressivist agenda embodied and 
practiced by Major Carteret, General Belmont, and “Captain” George McBane.  The 
similarities that Chesnutt sets up between Major Carteret and Dr. Miller are deliberate, 
including their parallel but ineffectual attempts to quell the violence of the riots 
(Danielson 81).  However, I would point out that the discourse and practice of 
professionalism, which arose alongside Progressivism in the nineteenth-century as “an 
attempt to sweep away petty bias and present a neutral, scientific ground from which to 
begin the process of social amelioration,” was simply a more “refined” articulation of the 
practice of alienation already in play in American culture, a patch-work solution to the 
problem of exploitation endemic to the nature of consumerism itself (Danielson 77). 
Professionalism was one manifestation of bourgeois culture, another being the increasing 
sentimentalization and enervation of the domestic sphere; it is no accident that both Janet 
and her half sister are frequently portrayed as wandering around rather aimlessly in their 
respective buggies, preoccupied with overwrought obsessions and desires.  As Chesnutt 
knew, regulating industries and professions in order to eliminate unfair or unsafe business 
practices did not eliminate several core problems endemic to the nature of capitalist 
culture, not merely to its manifestation as professionalism:  one is that the respect that a 
character like Dr. Miller accrues as a member of his profession—one who has received
an education superior to many white doctors of his time—depends solely on whether or 
not the culture provides a market for his services, which does not happen in The Marrow 
of Tradition until the riot brings the accoutrements of white civilization to a rather 
contrived halt.   All four of the doctors that Major Carteret tries to find to save Dodie are 
busy with (white) fall-out from the riots, except Dr. Price who has deliberately left town
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in order to avoid becoming involved.  The fortuitous consequence is that Dr. Miller’s 
services suddenly become indispensible to a bigot like Major Carteret—a hollow victory, 
since it only comes after Miller has been forced to recognize that his claims to 
consideration as a human being are contingent upon the market for his professional skills.
The second and more obvious problem with professionalism and with the public 
face of bourgeois culture as a whole, one that has perhaps been sufficiently explicated by 
twentieth and twenty-first-century critics (though the contemporary academy’s obsession 
with professionalization may be an indication that its lessons have not hit home) is that it 
relies on supposedly objective standards of knowledge and conduct that ignore the extent 
to which professional behavior is influenced by “irrational” considerations that are in fact 
profoundly relevant to the practice of such activities.  As Danielson points out, even 
before the riots Dr. Miller’s skill and accomplishments are not enough to overcome the 
prejudices that he encounters on the segregated trains and in the Carteret home during 
Dodie’s initial life crisis.  In fact, the justification for segregation is given in terms that 
echo the systemizing impulses of professionalization:  “The beauty of the system lies in 
its strict impartiality—it applies to both races alike,” the conductor tells the Northern 
doctor who asks if he is free to sit in the colored car (507).  This same Northern doctor 
submits to Major Carteret’s objections against Dr. Miller’s inclusion in on Dodie’s 
surgical team when Dr. Price assures him that the major’s objections are “personal” and 
not merely based in race prejudice (522). And while these personal objections are as 
much personal as racial, Dr. Burns is nevertheless forced to concede that “personal 
questions” have a valid role in deciding what initially seems to be an issue of “standing 
upon [his] professional rights” (522).  Olivia and her husband may be in the wrong—if
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the case had been brought before her, Olivia’s duty would have been to swallow her pride 
and antipathy in the service of fairness and compassion, as Janet will do later—but the 
situation still demands an adjudicator with an ability to negotiate its complex
interrelations of personal feeling and professional execution; and Dr. Burns, with his 
blunt sense of Northern efficiency and “professional honor,” his simple commitment to a 
hierarchy of skill, is ill-equipped to deal with the intricacies of Southern customs, 
prejudices and emotions and eventually resigns them to Dr. Price to address, washing his 
hands of the affair “like Pontius Pilate” (520, 522).  We could also add that to the extent 
to which such emotions and prejudices are in fact irrelevant to the stark exigency of a 
choking child in need of an expert surgeon, depending on the code of conduct specific to 
that skill for deciding larger matters of human justice is clearly inappropriate.  In this 
particular situation, Dr. Burns has a professional obligation to save Dodie’s life that 
supersedes his obligation to fight for an egalitarian working space and is in some sense
irrelevant to it, if he can in fact perform the operation without Dr. Miller’s help.  So while 
Dodie Carteret’s sickbed is not irrelevant to issues of racial justice, it is nevertheless not 
the place where such issues can ultimately be decided.
If Dr. Burns is ill-equipped to deal with the realities of Southern existence, Dr. 
Miller—and Chesnutt himself—is less so, to the extent that any character or individual 
can be less than ill-equipped to deal with the paralyzing realities of the New South racial 
climate.  Danielson is wrong, I believe, not to make a distinction between Chesnutt’s 
attitude towards Dr. Miller and his attitude towards the accommodationist position that 
Dr. Miller seems to inhabit as much by default as by deliberation.  As other critics have 
pointed out, Chesnutt’s attitude towards Miller’s position is one of the novel’s “more
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nettling ambiguities” (Andrews Literary 192).  “Because their social disengagement 
leaves the racists a free hand,” Andrews says, “the adherents to the philosophy of 
evolutionary progress in the novel may be scored for unwarranted optimism and a lack of 
moral initiative against the forces of reaction” (192).  Yet until the forces of reaction 
break out, Dr. Miller is living in a town that doesn’t seem to demand much activism, 
whose citizens seem unusually conciliatory and progressive in their attitude towards race 
relations.  “If our race had made as much progress everywhere as they have made in 
Wellington, the problem would be well on the way to solution, Dr. Miller “declares” to 
Dr. Burns; and when he is confronted with overt discrimination he makes at least a weak 
attempt to resist it (504).  He protests when General McBane is allowed to sit in the 
railway’s colored car, and more significantly he attempts to intervene with his white 
friends to get Sandy Campbell a fair trial when Sandy is accused of murdering Aunt 
Polly.  He is the one who alerts Mr. Delamere to Sandy’s incarceration in time to save
Sandy from lynching.  Unquestionably Chesnutt is attempting to expose the limitations of 
a program of racial uplift that relies on “evolutionary progress” alone, that is not 
supported by black advocacy for social and civic justice, but he also understands the 
futility of actions like Josh Green’s, which are driven by private vendettas as much as 
outraged justice and—if successful—do little more than satisfy their perpetrators’ lust for 
vengeance.  In fact, Janet’s decision to show mercy on her sister Olivia is as much about 
demonstrating the futility of private vengeance as it is about asserting standards of justice 
that apply regardless of the success of economic programs of racial uplift.
If the confrontation between Josh Green and Dr. Miller demonstrates anything, it 
is the ineffectiveness of both their approaches and the extreme options to which African-
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Americans of the period seem to be confined—and Chesnutt is sympathetic, I would 
suggest, to the dilemma in which men like Miller find themselves.  Although Miller 
makes a distinction between the heroism of “dying in defense of the right” and the 
weakness of “killing another for revenge,” he nevertheless chooses to be “wise” rather
than heroic when the riots give him a clear rationale for taking up arms in defense not just 
of family and home but of innocent people who have been wrongly attacked (684).  For 
him the decision comes down to a pragmatic assessment of what the black citizens of 
Wellington stand to gain by such a resistance versus what they stand to lose:  he tells Josh 
and his followers that “in this riot we are placed as we should be in a war: we have no 
territory, no base of supplies, no organization, no outside sympathy…we stand in a 
position of a race, in a case like this, without money and without friends” (684).  This 
“philosophical” assessment of the realities of the situation—a black man must be “either
a philosopher or a fool” to live in American, Miller recognizes early in the story—is not 
only accurate but compounded by other factors, including national fatigue with the Negro 
problem and with the whole idea of war and revolution (511).  “Eighteen hundred and 
fifty-two [the year Uncle Tom’s Cabin was produced] was a year when men’s passions 
and men’s imaginations were quickly fired” wrote one reviewer of The Marrow of 
Tradition, “Nineteen hundred and one is a different year. Men differ, the spirit of the time 
differs. We are more lethargic; we think more and do less; we refuse to let our passions 
run away with our actions. And we are become so accustomed to the negro problem, 
which, like the negro, seems destined to remain with us, that we are become indifferent to 
it” (“Books”).  Despite his hopes that The Marrow of Tradition would become the 
sensation that Uncle Tom’s Cabin did—a hope fueled no doubt by his own sense of the
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continuing urgency of the negro problem—Chesnutt was highly sensitive to white 
indifference and the limitations it placed on black self-advocacy; thus, his dramatization 
of Miller’s dilemma is less a condemnation of Miller for his reluctance to act than a 
depiction of situation in which all current strategies for handling it seem equally 
ineffectual.  Chesnutt is sympathetic to the particular kind of frustration that exists when 
two different value systems collide, when human rights violations that seem to demand 
an immediate and unequivocal response come in conflict with a status quo that even 
would-be revolutionaries consider necessary to maintaining and sustaining progress—or 
at least order and decency—as a whole.
“He would be a dreamer, indeed, who should hope to change these conditions 
save by the slow processes of growth,” wrote another reviewer of Marrow (“Review”). 
Yet the novel seems targeted to dreamers, to those who feel that the accommodationist 
position still leaves some larger and graver questions unresolved, Chesnutt’s readers—he 
hopes—among them.  Miller’s obvious impotence (confirmed by the destruction of his 
son/seed), when set against Josh Green’s equally nihilistic actions,  opens up a vacuum in 
which Janet Miller’s position can be heard and felt.  Janet’s position involves a vehement 
assertion of her right to consideration as a wronged mother and woman as well as a 
principled refusal to deprive Olivia of the same right, despite Olivia’s crimes against her. 
Janet does justice to the most authentic intuitions behind both Miller and Green’s 
positions:  the validity of black protests against violations of human rights as well as the 
wisdom of pursuing those rights through nonviolent and conciliatory actions.  We should 
note, however, that Janet is able to articulate this position only because her husband has a 
skill that Major and Mrs. Carteret finally need—Chesnutt is very clear that even in this
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crisis Olivia is motivated entirely by her desperate fear for her own child; she never 
expresses any real sympathy for Janet’s loss.  “‘You are young,” she says instead, “‘and 
may yet have many children—this is my only hope!’” (244) Olivia confesses her 
involvement in covering up Janet’s legitimacy and inheritance only as a final bargaining 
tool, and it is definitely possible to argue that in this novel Chesnutt’s final hope for racial 
reconciliation lies neither in black nor white virtue nor anything moral at all but in the 
inevitable “evolutionary process’ of the two races drawing into closer proximity with
each other and being forced to find harmonious ways of dealing with the vehement 
demands of their respective needs and desires, one of the most basic of which is 
motherhood and its intense admixture of possessive and nurturing instincts.  Yet we must 
also note that this process depends on two equally indispensible contingencies:  on 
Miller’s cultivation of a marketable skill that gives him (and his wife) leverage to make 
demands and on their ability to wield that power in ways that extricate everyone involved 
from the constraints of exploitive exchange.  The moment of freedom and hope is the 
moment in which the ethos of the marketplace enables its own transcendence, in which
the pursuit of profit provides buyers and sellers with an opportunity to transform financial 
payoff into a moral/emotional one.  We might note too that the transformation does not 
involve substituting equitable exchange for exploitive exchange but imagining a world in 
which people are awarded what they are assumed to deserve as human beings even if
they never live up to that potential or even manage to produce some socially serviceable 
good.
If The House Behind The Cedars is about validating the sentiments that undergird 
the tragic romance and The Marrow of Tradition is about finding some strategy for
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incorporating those sentiments into the narrative of American life, The Colonel’s Dream, 
Chesnutt’s third and last published race novel, is about understanding the reasons for the 
failure of these goals.  Colonel French is a character who combines—supposedly—the 
best of both worlds, a Southern aristocrat with a romantic appreciation for Old South 
traditions who has migrated North after the war and achieved success as a principled 
industrialist.  When the novel opens, his business has been forced to sell out to a larger 
trust, and he and his partner are waiting by the telephone to see if they have sold out for a 
gain or a loss.  Once they find out they have realized a gain, the Colonel packs up his 
ailing son and returns to his boyhood home in North Carolina for what he intends to be a 
three-month vacation.  While there he falls under the charm of old associations, buying 
back his ancestral home and rescuing the old family retainer Peter from being sold into 
peonage.  Eventually he sees “the old Eureka cotton mill of his boyhood” standing idle 
and he decides to buy the old place and revive the milling industry in Clarendon along 
principles that are more enlightened than those governing the Excelsior Mills in the 
neighboring town (104).  The Excelsior Mills are controlled by Bill Fetters, Colonel 
French’s childhood enemy, who “came back after the war, with money” and owns a 
monopoly over both towns’ business and property interests (35).  Fetter’s father was the 
town slave trader, and the similarities between the sins of father and son remind readers 
that slavery and wage labor perpetuate the same abuses if industry is not regulated by 
humane laws and enlightened principles.  Although forced out by a monopoly in the 
North, Colonel French imagines that his money and ideals, along with his appreciation
for the best of what the old South stands for, will enable him to implement progressive 
business practices in his “backward old town,” in ways that would be impossible in “the
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great centers of commerce” from which he has come (117).  In the process he hopes to 
“do something for humanity, something to offset Fetters and his kind, who were preying 
on the weaknesses of the people, enslaving white and black” (117).  Unfortunately, the 
Colonel’s enthusiasm proves unequal to the townspeople’s prejudices:  despite 
weathering numerous setbacks, French finally surrenders and returns north when a mob 
unearths his servant Peter’s coffin and dumps it on his front porch.  Peter has died after 
unsuccessfully attempting to save French’s son from being crushed by a railway car, and 
little Phil’s dying wish was that the two of them be laid to rest together in the family plot 
in the white folks’ cemetery.
Critics have puzzled over why this particular action becomes the last straw, when 
French has stood firm through his unsuccessful battle against peonage, through the 
lynching of a black man whom French had attempted to save from unlawful 
imprisonment, and through the death of his son as well as his servant Peter.  The cotton 
mill, the actual enterprise in which French is engaged, is still standing and moving
forward at the novel’s end, and Colonel French is no radical—until he involves himself in 
the issue of peonage through an attempt to do a favor for his new fiancée, he has been 
prepared to work slowly and achieve change primarily through promoting industry and 
helping establish a prosperous and law-abiding middle class in Clarendon, overtly 
challenging racism only when it interferes with his business practices or results in some 
grievous injustice.  “Diligently he would work to lay wide and deep foundations of 
prosperity, education, and enlightenment, upon which would rest justice, humanity, and 
civic righteousness,” French thinks even after the lynching: “Patiently would he await the 
results of his labors, and if they came not in great measure during his own lifetime, he
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would be content to know that after years would see their full fruition” (279).  As 
Ernestine Pickens remarks in Charles Chesnutt and the Progressive Movement, French is 
the ideal “super-white” character whom Chesnutt believes it is the duty of the fiction 
writer to portray, a character not too accommodationist but also not too extreme to incur 
white opprobrium (92).  Although he relies on the “foundations of prosperity, education, 
and enlightenment” to surmount prejudice in the long run, he is also not above agitating 
for immediate justice when the occasion presents itself—even taking his case against 
peonage to the national courts, arguing that generations “already in existence” are as 
entitled to consideration as “generations yet unborn” (219).  French clearly does not lack 
courage or initiative, nor does he exhibit a naiveté about the amount of time and effort his 
reforms will need to achieve fruition; after the lynching, he writes a letter to his Northern 
detailing his intention to stay in the South and continue his work.  But when he wakes up 
he finds Peter’s coffin sitting on his porch, with a note attached that has been written by 
the less literate members of the white community, and immediately packs up and leaves.
Although the unearthing of the coffin has an oppressive and fatalistic force that 
seems to align the text with naturalistic narratives of the period, it is difficult to determine 
why this particular acts has such an unsettling effect on the Colonel, especially in light of 
his determination to struggle through worse adversities. Only Laura Treadwell, the 
colonel’s fiancée, seems to anticipate the reaction the unearthed body will have on him, 
expressing no surprise at his decision to leave even though she confronts him (albeit with 
“sorrow rather than reproach”) with abandoning “the work which you have begun” (285). 
In a brief summation at the novel’s end, Chesnutt himself accuses the Colonel of “having 
put his hand to the plow and turned back,” insisting that while men cannot “gather grapes
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of thorns or figs of thistles…other hands have taken up the fight which the colonel 
dropped” (293).  Manufacturing and popular education are growing in the South, 
Chesnutt says, as well as a “new body of thought, favorable to just laws and their orderly 
administration (294).  Yet despite Chesnutt’s willingness to sound a positive note at the 
novel’s end, French’s defeat by the unearthed coffin signals Chesnutt’s awareness that
Southern problems are deeper than can be fixed by the idealistic and piecemeal process of 
one reformer, however well-intentioned.   “A new body of thought” is needed—“a 
changed attitude of mind” (294).17   Colonel French embodies an idealism that concerns 
Laura (and Chesnutt), especially since she is one of the most idealized elements of 
French’s dream, the “‘dream…of the old and happy past on which [he] hoped to build, as 
upon the foundations of the old mill, a broader and a fairer structure’” (284).  This dream 
can survive the self-sacrificial death of an old servant and the far-off lynching of a guilty 
Negro—as long as the colonel is “spared the details”—but it cannot survive a rude assault 
on the delicate memories and sensibilities that form the “foundation” of a specific kind of
philanthropic motivation (277). From the beginning Peter has been one of the colonel’s 
most treasured links to the “dead past,” and the townspeople’s apparent regret over his 
death is one of the factors that consoles French in his grief and fuels his resolution to stay 
in Clarendon (25).  His dream has been augmented by the desire to make the town “a 
monument to mark his child’s resting place” (276).  As he takes comfort in the town’s 
sympathy, he resolves that “his fight against Fetters and what he represented should take 
on a new character: henceforward it should be a crusade to rescue from threatened 
barbarism the land which contains the tombs of his loved ones” (276).  Consequently,
when these tombs are unceremoniously and inelegantly desecrated the colonel, like many
17See Andrews Literary Career 255-6 and previous.
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a Greek hero before him, considers this an unpardonable injury, one that he can no longer 
focalize in Fetters—the enemy is indeed baser and more pervasive than he has proved 
capable of imagining or confronting.
Andrews argues that The Colonel’s Dream is in many ways the classic American 
initiation story of the idealist who becomes disillusioned with the American dream, who 
falls victim to oppressive cultural forces that are also always a symbol or manifestation of 
the evil that lies within the human heart.  Colonel French is unable to stand this glimpse 
into the “New South’s heart of darkness,” the human predilection to run after evil like 
little Phil chases after the black cat, and his retreat is an indictment on both the 
thoroughness of Southern degeneracy and the inefficacy of the ideals of most well- 
intentioned but naïve middle-class progressivists (Andrews Literary 250).  Chesnutt 
himself has French-like sensibilities that have been exacerbated by his twenty-year 
absence from the South; his own inclinations and experiences lie closer to those of
middle-class whites than they do to a Bud Johnson or an Uncle Peter (259).  He has 
himself fled the South like Colonel French flees it, and his attempt to intervene in 
Southern affairs through the medium of fiction is heavily indebted to romantic 
stereotypes that he is nevertheless aware are often dangerously and debilitatingly 
deceptive.  No doubt this double-consciousness, this awareness of the inadequacy of 
middle-class ideals and experiences in dealing with Southern ills, combined with a 
natural identification with these same values—and a fear of offending against these 
values—contributes to Chesnutt’s reluctance to completely condemn French or to 
graphically depict the “sordid, brutal” details of actual instances of oppression (“To
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Be”).18   As in his other novels, this confusion of affinities and intent has repercussions for 
the novel’s form:  Chesnutt finds it hard to identify with any single character or even to 
create full-orbed characters when he exists in an unlicensed and undefined place between 
the white and black worlds, yet he also proves squeamish about describing the lynching
in a genuinely affective manner, thus leaving readers in doubt about the Colonel’s 
character and effectiveness, Uncle Peter’s humanity or the genuine urgency of the 
problem.  As with The House Behind the Cedars and The Marrow of Tradition, Chesnutt 
experiences difficulties in fleshing out narratives that his audience is determined to keep 
from becoming too realistic; consequently, he is almost always driven back to romance or 
allegory to make his essential points.  If American racial relations make the kind of 
narrative that Chesnutt glimpses—at death’s door—in The Marrow of Tradition seem 
increasingly unimaginable and unmarketable, then Chesnutt has no choice but to attempt 
to allegorize the reasons why, in an allegory that is itself a symptom of the problem. 
Chesnutt recognizes that the bourgeois reluctance to confront evil directly—to see it as 
anything more than an affront to some effete code that pertains between men and 
gentlemen—is a large reason for its failure to remedy that evil.
For a twenty-first century reader, one of the most  annoying features of any given 
Howells novel is his protagonists’ refusal to treat lower-class suffering and anger as if it 
demands a stronger response than a conciliatory  dinner party. Yet the coffin on Colonel 
French’s front porch is not meant just to guild the outrage of the black holocaust with an 
appeal to how tacky its methods are to the sensibilities of gentleman.  As in The House
Behind the Cedars, Chesnutt is both appealing to middle-class sensibilities and reminding
18  See Andrews Literary Career 235 a quotation from Chesnutt’s correspondence with Walter Hines Page, 
his eventual publisher, over the advisability of moderating [   ]
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his sheltered readers that the truths that bourgeois novels dramatize, sentimentalize, or 
allegorize are still there to be unearthed by the real reformer, who never assumes that a 
pretty burial in a white cemetery gets rid of the corpse inside.  What the real reformer/
attentive reader might recognize is that the colonel’s hopes for racial renewal in the wake 
of his son’s death point towards a more authentic expectation that, like Olivia and Janet 
over the body of another child, death will have clarified everyone’s priorities, reminding 
both black and white of their common humanity and the insignificance of their 
differences in light of their common end.  The last nine chapters are laid out to illicit this 
expectation, as well as its defeat.  The situation is extreme enough to demand a Christ 
figure, someone innocent whose sacrifice might become the means of salvation and 
redemption for the people, since all other means have failed.  Chesnutt feels compelled to 
offer two, one of them a white child, since his sacrifice of black characters in previous 
novels has failed to accomplish the desired end.  In addition, Chesnutt has the black 
character “sin” against the white child by telling him the story that “unwittingly lure[s] 
him to his death,” a story that itself dramatizes the black (i.e. human) proclivity for evil 
that lies within everyone (290).  Yet this does not prevent Phil, with true little Eva 
innocence, from requesting that he and Uncle Peter be buried side by side.   It also
enables the colonel to articulate to the protesting undertaker a sentiment that Chesnutt 
expects to ring true for his middle-class audiences: “‘when a person reaches the grave, he 
is not far from God, who is no respecter of persons, and in whose presence, on the 
judgment day, many a white man shall be black, and many a black white’” (262).  The 
colonel’s similar expectations are initially confirmed when the cemetery’s board of 
trustees is convened by the mayor, a man “from the same class as Fetters” (264).  The
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rest of the trustees are aristocrats, and among them they manage to mollify the mayor by 
linking arms with him as they proceed to Colonel French’s house, where the colonel’s 
dignity under his palpable grief convinces them all to “let the matter go by default” (266). 
The only person who displays any vulgar disrespect in the days leading up the funeral is 
Fetters himself, whose “tasteless” opinions are not relayed to the colonel but nevertheless 
confirm his sense (and presumably, the readers) that Fetters is the real culprit in a town 
whose offenses are merely their “conservatism” and their susceptibility to wrong
opinions and wills stronger than theirs (269, 276).
The double funeral is a triumph of humanity, sanctified by both God and art, in 
which Chesnutt repeatedly invokes the similarities between Peter and Phil’s burials/ends 
as proof of and propaganda for egalitarianism. Afterwards, however, things begin to 
disintegrate fairly rapidly as a series of confrontations with death undermine this exalted 
depiction of it as the great equalizer.  The first challenge to this summation comes in the 
subplot, which Chesnutt has developed from a short story written in conjunction with the 
conjure tales.   In its early version this story was an aesthetically and emotionally 
satisfying tale of successful black vengeance.  In the version that intrudes into the 
Colonel’s dream, however, an aging and impoverished plantation owner—the patriarch of 
a family whose most recent descendent is a suitor for the hand of Laura Treadwell’s niece
—lives with his equally ancient slave mistress on his decaying plantation, a slave mistress 
he had whipped and mutilated during the War for destroying his marriage prospects with a 
white woman.  After this whipping he discovers that she is the only one with knowledge 
of the whereabouts of a bag of gold his dead predecessor had supposedly hidden on the 
property, but she pleads dumbness as a result of her injuries, which
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presumably include (although once again the novel refrains from providing details) some 
injury to her tongue and mouth.  In the present time of novel, the master is dying as little 
Phil and Uncle Peter’s double funeral is moving towards its conclusion, dying in a 
melodramatic scene in which the slave mistress proves she can speak and could have 
spoken all along but that the gold was never hidden on the property except for the hour in 
which the master had her whipped.  In the earlier version meant for the conjure tales (and 
to Uncle Julius’ delight), the slave mistress doesn’t speak at all until after the master dies, 
at which point she shows his successor the hidden jewels and plantation deeds and 
everything is restored to its former glory.  In The Colonel’s Dream, however, the hidden 
treasure has never been there at all and its legend proves to be an(other) empty dream.
The master’s death and the futility of both his and his mistress’ ineffectual remorse over 
their respective sins, avarice, hatred and revenge, suggest to the reader that death does not 
always breed reconciliation and redemption, that in fact it came come too late to do 
anything but entrench the legatees of slavery even deeper in their vengeful pasts.
The next chapter portrays both the lynching and the unearthing of Peter’s coffin. 
The lynching depresses the colonel—it signals a defeat—even though it does not 
completely deter him from his dreams.  Yet it confirms the sense established in the 
preceding chapter that the emotions that collect around death, especially violent deaths, 
can often reignite and inflame hatreds and passions in the living rather than invoke a 
sense of their futility or suggest the value of incorporating thoughts about the finality of 
death and/or the possibility of divine judgment into daily actions. Colonel French’s 
response to the lynching is typical of people of his class:  lynching practices were known 
and reported throughout the North and were deplored by the better classes who
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nevertheless preferred to be “spared the details,” to avoid confrontations with violence 
and Otherness that are less successfully ignored when mahogany caskets are dumped on 
their doorsteps.  In this case, the lynching victim’s obvious guilt seems meant to bear the 
complex burden of both conceding the wide-spread belief that such measures were 
confined to clear-cut cases of violent criminality and of insisting that “law and order” 
should prevail even in “clear-cut” cases.  Unlike the muckraking journalists of the time— 
or even an anti-lynching activist like Ida Wells—Chesnutt exhibited a palpable and 
confessed reluctance to approach the sordid details of such events at the same time that
he deplored this reluctance in the audience who read his books and whose willingness to 
look the other way was, as he was well aware, one of the main obstacles to stamping out 
the practice.  Nevertheless, as one of a trio of violent deaths/incidents occurring in the 
wake of the double funeral, the lynching serves to heighten the sense established in the 
preceding chapter that death does not always accomplish the goals that Chesnutt sets out 
for it to accomplish in The Marrow of Tradition, where the two half-sisters bond over the 
body of the dead child in the post-apocalyptic wasteland of Wellington.
Despite its conciliatory coda, The Colonel’s Dream is meant to register Chesnutt’s 
increasing pessimism about the faint note of hope sounded at the end of The Marrow of 
Tradition, which depicts the auspicious convergence of several factors that Chesnutt 
believed were essential to racial uplift, the first being black educational and economic 
betterment, a goal Chesnutt that shared with black and white accommodationists.  The 
second goal, however, was immediate civil and political rights for African-Americans, a 
goal that very few of his contemporaries shared.  Consequently, Chesnutt spends a large 
amount of space in his novels and short stories demonstrating
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how easily economic progress can be derailed by blacks’ lack of legal protection; his 
dramatization of the Wilmington riots and the havoc they wreck on the thriving middle- 
class black population in just one reminder of the instability of economic gains when 
African-Americans are increasingly deprived of the few rights and opportunities they 
gained in the wake of Civil War.  But he also recognizes that African-Americans’ rights 
are not self-evident to many whites, that at the bottom of disenfranchisement and 
segregation and lynching and peonage is not—despite any insistence to the contrary— 
rational and impartial awareness or agreement, if such things are possible, but deep- 
rooted prejudices that cloak themselves in a variety of arguments—to divine right, to 
evolutionary “science” (often equated, as it is by Clarendon’s minister, with divine will) 
to tradition, to natural rights or to any combination of these and more.  Prejudice cannot
be answered by rational argument alone or at least by the kind of argument that passes for 
rational among the 19th-century.  Consequently, the answers Chesnutt suggests, his 
alternative foundations for justice, run the gamut from an appeal to the inevitability of 
miscegenation and interracial love to the commonality of black and white experiences, 
which include the experience of birth and motherhood and the experience of death.  All
of these arguments lend themselves to emotional appeals rather than rational ones, 
although Chesnutt was not adverse to appealing to both or considering them inseparable; 
in the last analysis, all are meant to induce some kind of recognition that black people are 
human and that as humans they have a right to equal treatment regardless of any 
suggestions to the contrary.  Consequently, it seems inevitable that Chesnutt would turn
to various syntheses of the romance and the realist novel if he was attempting to address 
emotions that transcended appeals to law and order or to accomplish reforms that lay
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outside the scope of the black accommodationist agenda, which was notoriously anti- 
intellectual and anti-literary, invested in trades and industrial education.  Novels are not, 
after all, pure political treatises, even when they are didactic or dedicated to social 
realism.  In The House Behind the Cedars Chesnutt attempts to sway his audience simply 
by casting his heroine in a role they recognize, that of the innocent victim, in hopes that 
her plight—her death escaping both black and white molesters—will trigger responses 
that white audiences have become conditioned to make to threatened chastity in women. 
Yet even here the appeal of the character relies on the extent to which she is a 
recognizably bourgeois heroine, dedicated to marriage, family, decorum and self- 
sacrificial service to others.   In The Marrow of Tradition Chesnutt skews in the opposite
direction, invoking the romance in order to meld it more firmly to bourgeois conventions, 
demonstrating that many of the occult fantasies associated with miscegenation are, in
fact, legitimate relations that need to acknowledged in ways that neutralize the more 
sinister implications of the romance, particularly its preoccupation with retribution and 
vengeance.
In The Colonel’s Dream romance has been drained from the Southern landscape 
and re-deposited in the Northern minds where it has (Chesnutt knows) resided all along. 
By the time the novel concludes, every romance or folktale it tells has been de-mystified 
and stripped of its nostalgic appeal, including Uncle Peter’s dialect tale about a black cat, 
a tail that lures Phil to his death under a railway car.  At the novel’s conclusion, everyone 
has succumbed to the railway car, taking the trains back North where—as Laura’s niece 
well knows—what is real in American romance resides in the dining rooms of the 
Waldorf-Astoria and the drawing rooms of the Vanderbilts and the Rockefellers and the
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wit of the Ward McAllisters (48).   Despite its appeal—especially in its Old South 
versions—to ideals of feudalism, aristocracy, and tradition, the American romance and its 
local-color sister are wedded too closely to their bourgeois origins to be an effective 
means of combating the problems of the New South, and the negro remains excluded
from the bourgeois realist-romance of the self-made man and the American dream. 
Consequently, Chesnutt is forced to turn romance into allegory if he cannot make it real. 
What is needed in the South, Chesnutt suggests, is not men who occlude their vision with 
dreams and attempt to apotheosize institutionalized racism, to turn the Uncle Peters of the 
South into martyrs and fetishes, but men who are willing to open up the coffin and face 
the rotting corpse inside, resurrecting it as a new man.  The lesson of both The Marrow of 
Tradition and The Colonel’s Dream is that the upper-class white man’s commitment to 
justice, a necessary component of the battle against racism, lacks force unless it is 
manifested as an outgrowth of intense personal feeling, as an encounter with love and 
death that could breed hatred and despair but instead becomes an occasion for 
surrendering grief and anger and latching onto the salvific virtue of universal
compassion, which then fuels the grimy fight for civic and political rights.
Unfortunately, the colonel’s confrontation with death is not violent enough to 
loosen him from the grip of his genteel dreams.  That the novel lacks mothers is perhaps 
significant as well—that the colonel’s wife is dead before the story opens and Laura 
Treadwell is childless and unable to extricate herself from the transfixing arc of the 
colonel’s fantasies, although her own acts of philanthropy are more persistently and 
quietly effective than his even if not calculated to radically alter the Southern landscape. 
The Colonel’s Dream is in many ways a novel about gender and class, about the ways in
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which the dominant cultural narrative needs to be broadened and enriched by an 
investment in emotions and experiences that have been historically restricted to 
marginalized groups or diffused into escapist artworks, high or low.  It is a novel about 
the ways that the bourgeois story of upward mobility represses deeper human needs and 
desires and the ways that middle-class art enable human-rights atrocities by pandering to 
middle-class sensibilities.  Hampered by the realists’ disdain for didacticism and 
sensationalism yet aware that his subject matter lay outside the accepted realist narrative 
trajectory, Chesnutt critiques the effectiveness of that narrative by reminding readers of 
its complicity in sentimentalism and the falsification of human experience under 
capitalism.  This quasi-naturalist approach unfortunately failed to move readers, partly 
because the depiction of America’s sordid underbelly held liabilities for Chesnutt that it 
lacked for Dreiser, Crane or Norris and which, consequently, he felt compelled to
approach indirectly, a strategy that his audience failed to appreciate.  Disappointed by the 
failure of his third race novel, Chesnutt turned his attention back to business.
Although my dissection of the romantic and realist narrative trajectories in these 
novels may seem over-determined in light of Chesnutt’s own patchwork handling of both 
and the general American tendency to domesticate the romance, the distinction was over- 
determined by and for the late-nineteenth century realists who dominated the literary 
landscape that Chesnutt sought to penetrate, and one of the most curious proofs of the 
extent to which Chesnutt registered this dichotomy lies in the pair of race novels he wrote 
in the 1920s.   Neither Paul Marchand, F.M.C. (written in 1921) nor The Quarry (1928) 
found a publisher, but they share an intriguing plotline:  a man raised as a Negro
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discovers in adulthood that he is actually white but chooses to “pass” rather than to 
repudiate his family and his people.  The difference between the two books is equally 
interesting: one is a pure romance and the other a realist novel.  Paul Marchand, F.M.C.
is set in New Orleans in 1821 and bears little to no relationship to early twentieth-century 
life; its protagonist is—apparently—a well-to-do quadroon, a member of the large New 
Orleans community of free people of color.   When he finds out that he is not only white 
but the legitimate heir to one of the city’s wealthiest and oldest Creole families, he is able 
to wreck vengeance on his enemies, who turn out to be his cousins, in a manner
calculated to satisfy the most romantic reader.  The Quarry is set in 1920s Harlem and 
features fictionalized characterizations of many race activists and prominent figures of 
the time period.  It chronicles the story of an infant adopted by a childless white couple 
who turn him over to a prosperous African-American family when his dark skin tones 
and his belatedly-told back story convince everyone that he is a quadroon.  When the 
young man proves, instead, to be a legitimate descendent of Italian aristocracy on one 
side and Mayflower ancestors on the other, there are no real wrongs to be righted— 
Donald Glover has had one of the best upbringings and educations available to an 
African-American of his time and chooses to continue to identify with the race with
which he is “psychologically and spiritually” one (Quarry 277-8).19
The message of both these books is less that race is a cultural construct, not a 
genetic mandate, than that Chesnutt’s assimilationist message pertains to whites as much 
as, if not more than, blacks.  As Dean McWilliams says, “the logic of Chesnutt’s 
assimilationism requires that whites must first become blacks before blacks can become
19Dean McWilliams edition of The Quarry follows the 276-page manuscript in the Fisk Collection. See
McWilliams’ introduction for details.
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white” (xiii).  Regardless of bloodlines, “whites must be persuaded to enter the black 
world, morally and spiritually, to see the black condition from inside” (McWilliams xiv). 
The “elevation of whites” has been Chesnutt’s goal from the beginning, and if he has 
achieved it here, in this ironic way, for at least two characters, his task has clearly been 
aided by a climate of greater opportunity for blacks.  Although Donald is raised in the 
South where discrimination still exists, his educational and economic opportunities have 
improved from those of Chesnutt’s earlier characters, and those opportunities have not 
come at the expense of  repudiating his family or his race.  Donald’s mother is one of the 
book’s strongest characters:  she is the one who conceives the vision for Donald to be a 
leader of his people, refusing to let him be helped by whites, and she finances his college 
education by starting a cosmetics business that appeals to black and white consumers 
alike.  In fact, Mrs. Glover’s enterprise, which she develops at Donald’s suggestion, 
enables black barbers who have traditionally monopolized the black and white beauty 
industry to commercialize their products and combat “the tightening of race lines and the 
competition of whites” (95).  The Quarry is perhaps Chesnutt’s silent acknowledgment of 
the power of economic uplift, even while he insists that it still leaves much to be desired
—it has allowed to him to write a realist novel of upward mobility for blacks that 
assimilates and neutralizes many of the dark conventions of the romance.  The Seatons’ 
discovery of Donald’s supposed black ancestry and their resignation of his upbringing, 
which “would make a theme for a romance,” as sighs one of the more “sentimental” 
daughters of the black Senator whom the Seatons ask for advice, turns out to rest on a 
confusion of hospital records, and when the situation is laid before Daniel he has the 
freedom to reach a “logical” decision that is nevertheless “in accordance with his feelings
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and principles” (41, 278).  This integration of reason and emotion in a realist narrative, 
the collapse of the white experience into the black—however contrived—frees Chesnutt 
to write a local-color novel that does not bear the burden of a political agenda. As more
and more of the black experience becomes amenable to the rags-to-riches narrative, to the 
American bildungsroman, Chesnutt becomes more free to dismiss sentimentalism as 
entertainment, to situate discrimination in a more remote and exotic past:  the romantic/
realist dichotomy no longer reflects and sustains the black/white one, so Chesnutt feels 
increasingly free to succumb to its allure.
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